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Statutes: Connecticut

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Statutes: Connecticut

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

The statutes are current through all enactments of the 2020 Regular Session, the 2020 July Special Session, and the 2020 September Special Session. Please check the Connecticut General Assembly website to make sure there have been no changes since this time.

Title 1. Provisions of General Application

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Chapter 1. Construction of Statutes

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 1-1d. “Minor”, “infant”, “infancy”, “age of majority”, defined

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Except as otherwise provided by statute, on and after October 1, 1972, the terms “minor”, “infant” and “infancy” shall be deemed to refer to a person under the age of eighteen years and any person eighteen years of age or over shall be an adult for all purposes whatsoever and have the same legal capacity, rights, powers, privileges, duties, liabilities and responsibilities as persons heretofore had at twenty-one years of age, and “age of majority” shall be deemed to be eighteen years.

Title 21a. Consumer Protection

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Chapter 420B. Dependency-Producing Drugs

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Part I. General Provisions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 21a-279. Penalty for illegal possession. Alternative sentences. Immunity

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) (1) Any person who possesses or has under such person’s control any quantity of any controlled substance, except less than one-half ounce of a cannabis-type substance and except as authorized in this chapter, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(2) For a second offense of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the court shall evaluate such person and, if the court determines such person is a drug-dependent person, the court may suspend prosecution of such person and order such person to undergo a substance abuse treatment program.

(3) For any subsequent offense of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the court may find such person to be a persistent offender for possession of a controlled substance in accordance with section 53a-40.

(b) Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section in or on, or within one thousand five hundred feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school and who is not enrolled as a student in such school or a licensed child care center, as defined in section 19a-77, that is identified as a child care center by a sign posted in a conspicuous place shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of probation during which such person shall perform community service as a condition of such probation, in a manner ordered by the court.

(c) To the extent that it is possible, medical treatment rather than criminal sanctions shall be afforded individuals who breathe, inhale, sniff or drink the volatile substances described in subdivision (49) of section 21a-240.

(d) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any person (1) who in good faith, seeks medical assistance for another person who such person reasonably believes is experiencing an overdose from the ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance, (2) for whom another person, in good faith, seeks medical assistance, reasonably believing such person is experiencing an overdose from the ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance, or (3) who reasonably believes he or she is experiencing an overdose from the ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance and, in good faith, seeks medical assistance for himself or herself, if evidence of the possession or control of a controlled substance in violation of subsection (a) of this section was obtained as a result of the seeking of such medical assistance. For the purposes of this subsection, “good faith” does not include seeking medical assistance during the course of the execution of an arrest warrant or search warrant or a lawful search.

(e) No provision of this section shall be construed to alter or modify the meaning of the provisions of section 21a-278.

Title 29. Public Safety and State Police

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Chapter 529. Division of State Police

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 29-38c. Seizure of firearms of person posing risk of imminent personal injury to self or others

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Upon complaint on oath by any state’s attorney or assistant state’s attorney or by any two police officers, to any judge of the Superior Court, that such state’s attorney or police officers have probable cause to believe that (1) a person poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals, (2) such person possesses one or more firearms, and (3) such firearm or firearms are within or upon any place, thing or person, such judge may issue a warrant commanding a proper officer to enter into or upon such place or thing, search the same or the person and take into such officer’s custody any and all firearms and ammunition. Such state’s attorney or police officers shall not make such complaint unless such state’s attorney or police officers have conducted an independent investigation and have determined that such probable cause exists and that there is no reasonable alternative available to prevent such person from causing imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to others with such firearm.

(b) A warrant may issue only on affidavit sworn to by the complainant or complainants before the judge and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant, which affidavit shall be part of the seizure file. In determining whether grounds for the application exist or whether there is probable cause to believe they exist, the judge shall consider: (1) Recent threats or acts of violence by such person directed toward other persons; (2) recent threats or acts of violence by such person directed toward himself or herself; and (3) recent acts of cruelty to animals as provided in subsection (b) of section 53-247 by such person. In evaluating whether such recent threats or acts of violence constitute probable cause to believe that such person poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to others, the judge may consider other factors including, but not limited to (A) the reckless use, display or brandishing of a firearm by such person, (B) a history of the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force by such person against other persons, (C) prior involuntary confinement of such person in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, and (D) the illegal use of controlled substances or abuse of alcohol by such person. If the judge is satisfied that the grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, such judge shall issue a warrant naming or describing the person, place or thing to be searched. The warrant shall be directed to any police officer of a regularly organized police department or any state police officer. It shall state the grounds or probable cause for its issuance and it shall command the officer to search within a reasonable time the person, place or thing named for any and all firearms and ammunition. A copy of the warrant shall be given to the person named therein together with a notice informing the person that such person has the right to a hearing under this section and the right to be represented by counsel at such hearing.

(c) The applicant for the warrant shall file a copy of the application for the warrant and all affidavits upon which the warrant is based with the clerk of the court for the geographical area within which the search will be conducted no later than the next business day following the execution of the warrant. Prior to the execution and return of the warrant, the clerk of the court shall not disclose any information pertaining to the application for the warrant or any affidavits upon which the warrant is based. The warrant shall be executed and returned with reasonable promptness consistent with due process of law and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of all firearms and ammunition seized.

(d) Not later than fourteen days after the execution of a warrant under this section, the court for the geographical area where the person named in the warrant resides shall hold a hearing to determine whether the firearm or firearms and any ammunition seized should be returned to the person named in the warrant or should continue to be held by the state. At such hearing the state shall have the burden of proving all material facts by clear and convincing evidence. If, after such hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals, the court may order that the firearm or firearms and any ammunition seized pursuant to the warrant issued under subsection (a) of this section continue to be held by the state for a period not to exceed one year, otherwise the court shall order the firearm or firearms and any ammunition seized to be returned to the person named in the warrant. If the court finds that the person poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals, the court shall give notice to the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services which may take such action pursuant to chapter 319 [FN1] as it deems appropriate.

(e) Any person whose firearm or firearms and ammunition have been ordered seized pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, or such person’s legal representative, may transfer such firearm or firearms and ammunition in accordance with the provisions of section 29-33 or other applicable state or federal law, to any person eligible to possess such firearm or firearms and ammunition. Upon notification in writing by such person, or such person’s legal representative, and the transferee, the head of the state agency holding such seized firearm or firearms and ammunition shall within ten days deliver such firearm or firearms and ammunition to the transferee.

(f) For the purposes of this section, “ammunition” means a loaded cartridge, consisting of a primed case, propellant or projectile, designed for use in any firearm.

§ 29-36f. Eligibility certificate for pistol or revolver

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Any person who is twenty-one years of age or older may apply to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection for an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver.

(b) The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall issue an eligibility certificate unless said commissioner finds that the applicant: (1) Has failed to successfully complete a course approved by the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection in the safety and use of pistols and revolvers including, but not limited to, a safety or training course in the use of pistols and revolvers available to the public offered by a law enforcement agency, a private or public educational institution or a firearms training school, utilizing instructors certified by the National Rifle Association or the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection and a safety or training course in the use of pistols or revolvers conducted by an instructor certified by the state or the National Rifle Association; (2) has been convicted of a felony or of a violation of section 21a-279 or section 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d; (3) has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120; (4) has been discharged from custody within the preceding twenty years after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13; (5) (A) has been confined in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding sixty months by order of a probate court; or (B) has been voluntarily admitted on or after October 1, 2013, to a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding six months for care and treatment of a psychiatric disability and not solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person as those terms are defined in section 17a-680; (6) is subject to a restraining or protective order issued by a court in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, including an ex parte order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or section 46b-16a; (7) is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to subsection (d) of section 29-38c after notice and hearing; (8) is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing or receiving a firearm pursuant to 18 USC 922(g)(4); or (9) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States.

§ 29-36i. Revocation of eligibility certificate

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Any eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver shall be revoked by the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection upon the occurrence of any event which would have disqualified the holder from being issued the certificate pursuant to section 29-36f.

(b) Upon the revocation of any eligibility certificate, the person whose eligibility certificate is revoked shall be notified in writing and such certificate shall be forthwith delivered to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection. Any person who fails to surrender such certificate within five days of notification in writing of revocation thereof shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(c) If an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver is revoked because the person holding such certificate is subject to an ex parte order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or 46b-16a upon expiration of such order, such person may notify the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection that such order has expired. Upon verification of such expiration and provided such person is not otherwise disqualified from holding such certificate pursuant to section 29-36f the department shall reinstate such certificate.

§ 29-36k. Transfer, delivery or surrender of firearms by persons ineligible to possess firearms. Destruction of firearms. Penalty

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, not later than two business days after the occurrence of any event that makes a person ineligible to possess a pistol or revolver or other firearm or ammunition, such person shall (1) transfer in accordance with section 29-33 all pistols and revolvers which such person then possesses to any person eligible to possess a pistol or revolver and transfer in accordance with any applicable state and federal laws all other firearms to any person eligible to possess such other firearms by obtaining an authorization number for the sale or transfer of the firearm from the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection, and submit a sale or transfer of firearms form to said commissioner within two business days, or (2) deliver or surrender such pistols and revolvers and other firearms and ammunition to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection, provided a local police department may accept such pistols, revolvers, other firearms and ammunition on behalf of said commissioner, or (3) transfer such ammunition to any person eligible to possess such ammunition. The commissioner and a local police department shall exercise due care in the receipt and holding of such pistols and revolvers and other firearms or ammunition.

(b) Immediately, but in no event more than twenty-four hours after notice has been provided to a person subject to a restraining or protective order or a foreign order of protection, such person shall (1) transfer any pistol, revolver or other firearm or ammunition which such person then possesses to a federally licensed firearms dealer pursuant to the sale of the pistol, revolver or other firearm or ammunition to the federally licensed firearms dealer, or (2) deliver or surrender such pistols and revolvers and other firearms and ammunition to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection, provided a local police department may accept such pistols, revolvers, other firearms and ammunition on behalf of said commissioner. For the purposes of this section, a “person subject to a restraining or protective order or a foreign order of protection” means a person who knows that such person is subject to (A) a restraining or protective order of a court of this state that has been issued against such person, after notice has been provided to such person, in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, or (B) a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person.

(c) (1) A person subject to a restraining order or protective order or a foreign order of protection or an order of protection issued under section 46b-16a who has delivered or surrendered any pistol, revolver, or other firearm or ammunition to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection or a local police department, may request the return of such pistol, revolver, or other firearm or ammunition, upon (A) the expiration of the restraining order or protective order or a foreign order of protection or an order of protection issued under section 46b-16a, or (B) the issuance of a subsequent court order that rescinds the restraining order or protective order or a foreign order of protection or an order of protection issued under section 46b-16a.

(2) When making such request, the person described in subdivision (1) of this subsection shall provide notification of (A) the expiration of the restraining order or protective order or a foreign order of protection or an order of protection issued under section 46b-16a, or (B) the issuance of a subsequent court order that rescinds the restraining order or protective order or a foreign order of protection or an order of protection issued under section 46b-16a to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection or a local police department.

(3) Not later than five business days after the date on which a person has made a request pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection, the commissioner or a local police department shall review the request and make available for retrieval any pistol, revolver, or other firearm or ammunition to such person provided the commissioner or a local police department confirms: (A) (i) The expiration of the restraining order or protective order or a foreign order of protection or an order of protection issued under section 46b-16a, or (ii) the issuance of a subsequent court order that rescinds the restraining order or protective order or a foreign order of protection or an order of protection issued under section 46b-16a, (B) that such person is not otherwise disqualified from possessing such pistol, revolver, or other firearm or ammunition, and (C) that such person was legally entitled to possess such pistol, revolver, or other firearm or ammunition at the time of delivery or surrender to the commissioner or a local police department.

(d) Such person, or such person’s legal representative, may, at any time up to one year after such delivery or surrender, transfer such pistols and revolvers in accordance with the provisions of section 29-33 to any person eligible to possess a pistol or revolver and transfer such other firearms and ammunition, in accordance with any applicable state and federal laws, to any person eligible to possess such other firearms and ammunition, provided any person subject to a restraining or protective order or a foreign order of protection, or such person’s legal representative, may only transfer such pistol, revolver or other firearm or ammunition to a federally licensed firearms dealer pursuant to the sale of the pistol, revolver or other firearm or ammunition to the federally licensed firearms dealer. Upon notification in writing by the transferee and such person, the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection or a local police department as the case may be, shall, within ten days, deliver such pistols and revolvers and other firearms and ammunition to the transferee. If, at the end of such year, such pistols and revolvers and other firearms and ammunition have not been so transferred, the commissioner or a local police department as the case may be, shall cause them to be destroyed.

(e) Any person who fails to transfer, deliver or surrender any such pistols and revolvers and other firearms or ammunition as provided in this section shall be subject to the penalty provided for in section 53a-217 or 53a-217c.

Title 46B. Family Law

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Chapter 815A. Family Matters

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 46b-15. Relief from physical abuse, stalking or pattern of threatening by family or household member. Application. Court orders. Duration. Service of application, affidavit, any ex parte order...Expedited hearing for violation of order. Other remedies

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Any family or household member, as defined in section 46b-38a, who has been subjected to a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury, stalking or a pattern of threatening, including, but not limited to, a pattern of threatening, as described in section 53a-62, by another family or household member may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section. The court shall provide any person who applies for relief under this section with the information set forth in section 46b-15b.

(b) The application form shall allow the applicant, at the applicant’s option, to indicate whether the respondent holds a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver, a long gun eligibility certificate or an ammunition certificate or possesses one or more firearms or ammunition. The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath which includes a brief statement of the conditions from which relief is sought. Upon receipt of the application the court shall order that a hearing on the application be held not later than fourteen days from the date of the order except that, if the application indicates that the respondent holds a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver, a long gun eligibility certificate or an ammunition certificate or possesses one or more firearms or ammunition, and the court orders an ex parte order, the court shall order that a hearing be held on the application not later than seven days from the date on which the ex parte order is issued. The court, in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate for the protection of the applicant and such dependent children or other persons as the court sees fit. In making such orders ex parte, the court, in its discretion, may consider relevant court records if the records are available to the public from a clerk of the Superior Court or on the Judicial Branch’s Internet web site. In addition, at the time of the hearing, the court, in its discretion, may also consider a report prepared by the family services unit of the Judicial Branch that may include, as available: Any existing or prior orders of protection obtained from the protection order registry; information on any pending criminal case or past criminal case in which the respondent was convicted of a violent crime; any outstanding arrest warrant for the respondent; and the respondent’s level of risk based on a risk assessment tool utilized by the Court Support Services Division. The report may also include information pertaining to any pending or disposed family matters case involving the applicant and respondent. Any report provided by the Court Support Services Division to the court shall also be provided to the applicant and respondent. Such orders may include temporary child custody or visitation rights, and such relief may include, but is not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the applicant; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the applicant; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant. Such order may include provisions necessary to protect any animal owned or kept by the applicant including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from injuring or threatening to injure such animal. If an applicant alleges an immediate and present physical danger to the applicant, the court may issue an ex parte order granting such relief as it deems appropriate. If a postponement of a hearing on the application is requested by either party and granted, the ex parte order shall not be continued except upon agreement of the parties or by order of the court for good cause shown. If a hearing on the application is scheduled or an ex parte order is granted and the court is closed on the scheduled hearing date, the hearing shall be held on the next day the court is open and any such ex parte order shall remain in effect until the date of such hearing. If the applicant is under eighteen years of age, a parent, guardian or responsible adult who brings the application as next friend of the applicant may not speak on the applicant’s behalf at such hearing unless there is good cause shown as to why the applicant is unable to speak on his or her own behalf, except that nothing in this subsection shall preclude such parent, guardian or responsible adult from testifying as a witness at such hearing. As used in this subsection, “violent crime” includes: (A) An incident resulting in physical harm, bodily injury or assault; (B) an act of threatened violence that constitutes fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, including, but not limited to, stalking or a pattern of threatening; (C) verbal abuse or argument if there is a present danger and likelihood that physical violence will occur; and (D) cruelty to animals as set forth in section 53-247.

(c) If the court issues an ex parte order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and service has not been made on the respondent in conformance with subsection (h) of this section, upon request of the applicant, the court shall, based on the information contained in the original application, extend any ex parte order for an additional period not to exceed fourteen days from the originally scheduled hearing date. The clerk shall prepare a new order of hearing and notice containing the new hearing date, which shall be served upon the respondent in accordance with the provisions of subsection (h) of this section.

(d) Any ex parte restraining order entered under subsection (b) of this section in which the applicant and respondent are spouses, or persons who have a dependent child or children in common and who live together, may include, if no order exists, and if necessary to maintain the safety and basic needs of the applicant or the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, in addition to any orders authorized under subsection (b) of this section, any of the following: (1) An order prohibiting the respondent from (A) taking any action that could result in the termination of any necessary utility services or necessary services related to the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant, (B) taking any action that could result in the cancellation, change of coverage or change of beneficiary of any health, automobile or homeowners insurance policy to the detriment of the applicant or the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, or (C) transferring, encumbering, concealing or disposing of specified property owned or leased by the applicant; or (2) an order providing the applicant with temporary possession of an automobile, checkbook, documentation of health, automobile or homeowners insurance, a document needed for purposes of proving identity, a key or other necessary specified personal effects.

(e) At the hearing on any application under this section, if the court grants relief pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and the applicant and respondent are spouses, or persons who have a dependent child or children in common and who live together, and if necessary to maintain the safety and basic needs of the applicant or the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, any orders entered by the court may include, in addition to the orders authorized under subsection (b) of this section, any of the following: (1) An order prohibiting the respondent from (A) taking any action that could result in the termination of any necessary utility services or services related to the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant, (B) taking any action that could result in the cancellation, change of coverage or change of beneficiary of any health, automobile or homeowners insurance policy to the detriment of the applicant or the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, or (C) transferring, encumbering, concealing or disposing of specified property owned or leased by the applicant; (2) an order providing the applicant with temporary possession of an automobile, checkbook, documentation of health, automobile or homeowners insurance, a document needed for purposes of proving identity, a key or other necessary specified personal effects; or (3) an order that the respondent: (A) Make rent or mortgage payments on the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant and the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, (B) maintain utility services or other necessary services related to the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant and the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, (C) maintain all existing health, automobile or homeowners insurance coverage without change in coverage or beneficiary designation, or (D) provide financial support for the benefit of any dependent child or children in common of the applicant and the respondent, provided the respondent has a legal duty to support such child or children and the ability to pay. The court shall not enter any order of financial support without sufficient evidence as to the ability to pay, including, but not limited to, financial affidavits. If at the hearing no order is entered under this subsection or subsection (d) of this section, no such order may be entered thereafter pursuant to this section. Any order entered pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to modification and shall expire one hundred twenty days after the date of issuance or upon issuance of a superseding order, whichever occurs first. Any amounts not paid or collected under this subsection or subsection (d) of this section may be preserved and collectible in an action for dissolution of marriage, custody, paternity or support.

(f) Every order of the court made in accordance with this section shall contain the following language: (1) “This order may be extended by the court beyond one year. In accordance with section 53a-107 of the Connecticut general statutes, entering or remaining in a building or any other premises in violation of this order constitutes criminal trespass in the first degree. This is a criminal offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than one year, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars or both.”; and (2) “In accordance with section 53a-223b of the Connecticut general statutes, any violation of subparagraph (A) or (B) of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-223bconstitutes criminal violation of a restraining order which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both. Additionally, any violation of subparagraph (C) or (D) of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-223b constitutes criminal violation of a restraining order which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.”

(g) No order of the court shall exceed one year, except that an order may be extended by the court upon motion of the applicant for such additional time as the court deems necessary. If the respondent has not appeared upon the initial application, service of a motion to extend an order may be made by first-class mail directed to the respondent at the respondent’s last-known address.

(h) (1) The applicant shall cause notice of the hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and a copy of the application and the applicant’s affidavit and of any ex parte order issued pursuant to subsection (b) of this section to be served on the respondent not less than three days before the hearing. The cost of such service shall be paid for by the Judicial Branch.

(2) When (A) an application indicates that a respondent holds a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver, a long gun eligibility certificate or an ammunition certificate or possesses one or more firearms or ammunition, and (B) the court has issued an ex parte order pursuant to this section, the proper officer responsible for executing service shall, whenever possible, provide in-hand service and, prior to serving such order, shall (i) provide notice to the law enforcement agency for the town in which the respondent will be served concerning when and where the service will take place, and (ii) send, or cause to be sent by facsimile or other means, a copy of the application, the applicant’s affidavit, the ex parte order and the notice of hearing to such law enforcement agency, and (iii) request that a police officer from the law enforcement agency for the town in which the respondent will be served be present when service is executed by the proper officer. Upon receiving a request from a proper officer under the provisions of this subdivision, the law enforcement agency for the town in which the respondent will be served may designate a police officer to be present when service is executed by the proper officer.

(3) Upon the granting of an ex parte order, the clerk of the court shall provide two copies of the order to the applicant. Upon the granting of an order after notice and hearing, the clerk of the court shall provide two copies of the order to the applicant and a copy to the respondent. Every order of the court made in accordance with this section after notice and hearing shall be accompanied by a notification that is consistent with the full faith and credit provisions set forth in 18 USC 2265(a), as amended from time to time. Immediately after making service on the respondent, the proper officer shall (A) send or cause to be sent, by facsimile or other means, a copy of the application, or the information contained in such application, stating the date and time the respondent was served, to the law enforcement agency or agencies for the town in which the applicant resides, the town in which the applicant is employed and the town in which the respondent resides, and (B) as soon as possible, but not later than two hours after the time that service is executed, input into the Judicial Branch’s Internet-based service tracking system the date, time and method of service. If, prior to the date of the scheduled hearing, service has not been executed, the proper officer shall input into such service tracking system that service was unsuccessful. The clerk of the court shall send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of any ex parte order and of any order after notice and hearing, or the information contained in any such order, to the law enforcement agency or agencies for the town in which the applicant resides, the town in which the applicant is employed and the town in which the respondent resides, within forty-eight hours of the issuance of such order. If the victim, or victim’s minor child protected by such order, is enrolled in a public or private elementary or secondary school, including a technical education and career school, or an institution of higher education, as defined in section 10a-55, the clerk of the court shall, upon the request of the victim, send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of such ex parte order or of any order after notice and hearing, or the information contained in any such order, to such school or institution of higher education, the president of any institution of higher education at which the victim, or victim’s minor child protected by such order, is enrolled and the special police force established pursuant to section 10a-156b, if any, at the institution of higher education at which the victim, or victim’s minor child protected by such order, is enrolled, if the victim provides the clerk with the name and address of such school or institution of higher education.

(i) A caretaker who is providing shelter in his or her residence to a person sixty years or older shall not be enjoined from the full use and enjoyment of his or her home and property. The Superior Court may make any other appropriate order under the provisions of this section.

(j) When a motion for contempt is filed for violation of a restraining order, there shall be an expedited hearing. Such hearing shall be held within five court days of service of the motion on the respondent, provided service on the respondent is made not less than twenty-four hours before the hearing. If the court finds the respondent in contempt for violation of an order, the court may impose such sanctions as the court deems appropriate.

(k) An action under this section shall not preclude the applicant from seeking any other civil or criminal relief.

(l) For purposes of this section, “police officer” means a state police officer or a sworn member of a municipal police department and “law enforcement agency” means the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or any municipal police department.

§ 46b-15a Foreign order of protection. Full faith and credit. Enforcement. Affirmative defense. Child custody provision. Registration.

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) For the purposes of this section, “foreign order of protection” means any protection order, as defined in 18 USC 2266, as from time to time amended, or similar restraining or protective order issued by a court of another state, the District of Columbia, a commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States or an Indian tribe.

(b) A valid foreign order of protection that is consistent with 18 USC 2265, as from time to time amended, shall be accorded full faith and credit by a court of this state and may be enforced as if it were the order of a court in this state. A foreign order of protection shall be presumed valid if such order appears authentic on its face. The fact that a foreign order of protection has not been entered into the automated registry of protective orders maintained pursuant to section 51-5c, the Connecticut on-line law enforcement communication teleprocessing system maintained by the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized index of criminal justice information shall not be grounds for refusing to enforce such order in this state.

(c) A law enforcement officer shall enforce a foreign order of protection in accordance with its terms and the law of this state, and shall arrest any person suspected of violating such order and charge such person with a violation of section 53a-223b. Nothing in this subsection shall affect the responsibility of a law enforcement officer to make an arrest pursuant to section 46b-38b.

(d) It shall be an affirmative defense in any action seeking enforcement of a foreign order of protection or any criminal prosecution involving the violation of a foreign order of protection that such order is not consistent with or entitled to full faith and credit pursuant to 18 USC 2265, as from time to time amended.

(e) A child custody provision in a foreign order of protection may be enforced in this state if such provision (1) complies with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [FN1] or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, [FN2] and (2) is consistent with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 USC 1738A, as from time to time amended.

(f) A foreign order of protection may be registered in this state by sending to the Superior Court in this state: (1) A letter or other document requesting registration; (2) two copies, including one certified copy, of the foreign order of protection sought to be registered and a statement under penalty of perjury that, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the petitioner, the order has not been modified; and (3) the name and address of the person seeking registration, except if the disclosure of such name and address would jeopardize the safety of such person.

(g) On receipt of the documents required in subsection (f) of this section, the registering court shall: (1) Cause the foreign order of protection to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and (2) cause the foreign order of protection to be entered in the automated registry of protective orders maintained pursuant to section 51-5c, together with any accompanying information required or permitted to be contained in the registry of protective orders pursuant to the procedures adopted by the Chief Court Administrator under section 51-5c.

§ 46b-15b. Duties of Superior Court re applicants for restraining orders in domestic violence situations.

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

The Superior Court shall provide any person who applies for a restraining order in a domestic violence situation with information on steps necessary to continue such order beyond the initial period and shall provide an applicant with information on how to contact a domestic violence counselor, as defined in section 52-146k, and a domestic violence agency, as defined in section 52-146k.

§ 46b-15c. Powers of court in family relations matter re taking out-of-court testimony when one party is subject to a protective order, restraining order or standing criminal restraining order. Videoconference hearings permitted. Oaths. Cross-examination

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) In any court proceeding in a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1, the court may, within available resources, upon motion of the attorney for any party, order that the testimony of a party or a child who is a subject of the proceeding be taken outside the physical presence of any other party if a protective order, restraining order or standing criminal restraining order has been issued on behalf of the party or child, and the other party is subject to the protective order or restraining order. Such order may provide for the use of alternative means to obtain the testimony of any party or child, including, but not limited to, the use of a secure video connection for the purpose of conducting hearings by videoconference. Such testimony may be taken in a room other than the courtroom or at another location outside the courthouse or outside the state. The court shall provide for the administration of an oath to such party or child prior to the taking of such testimony in accordance with the rules of the superior court.

(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit any party’s right to cross-examine a witness whose testimony is taken in a room other than the courtroom pursuant to an order under this section.

(c) An order under this section may remain in effect during the pendency of the proceedings in the family relations matter.

§ 46b-16. Petition to Superior Court for ex parte order re temporary care and custody of child when parent arrested for custodial interference. Duration of order.

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Sec. 46b-16. Petition to Superior Court for ex parte order re temporary care and custody of child when parent arrested for custodial interference. Duration of order.

(a) When (1) a parent or relative has been arrested for violation of section 53a-97 or 53a-98 or arrested pursuant to chapter 964 for an offense of intentional interference of the lawful custody of a child under the laws of another state or territory, and (2) a child has been in the care of such parent or relative, the legal custodian of the child or the Department of Children and Families may petition the superior court or probate court which has venue over the matter for immediate temporary custody of the child.

(b) If the court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that the child will be removed from the jurisdiction of the court prior to a hearing to determine custody, an order of temporary custody may be issued ex parte by the court granting the temporary care and custody of the child to a suitable person or agency pending a hearing to determine custody pursuant to chapter 815j or 815p. Such hearing shall be held not more than five days from the issuance of the ex parte order or less than three days from the return of service, whichever is later.

(c) If the parent or relative arrested for violation of section 53a-97 or 53a-98 is in custody of the state, the state shall produce such parent or relative for the hearing to determine custody of the child pursuant to chapter 815j or 815p.

(d) The sole duty of the Department of Children and Families under this section shall be to provide care for the child during the period of custody pending determination of the custodial rights of the parents or guardians.

Chapter 815E. Marriage

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 46b-38a. Family violence prevention and response: Definitions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

For the purposes of sections 46b-38a to 46b-38f, inclusive:

(1) “Family violence” means an incident resulting in physical harm, bodily injury or assault, or an act of threatened violence that constitutes fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, including, but not limited to, stalking or a pattern of threatening, between family or household members. Verbal abuse or argument shall not constitute family violence unless there is present danger and the likelihood that physical violence will occur.

(2) “Family or household member” means any of the following persons, regardless of the age of such person: (A) Spouses or former spouses; (B) parents or their children; (C) persons related by blood or marriage; (D) persons other than those persons described in subparagraph (C) of this subdivision presently residing together or who have resided together; (E) persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they are or have been married or have lived together at any time; and (F) persons in, or who have recently been in, a dating relationship.

(3) “Family violence crime” means a crime as defined in section 53a-24, other than a delinquent act as defined in section 46b-120, which, in addition to its other elements, contains as an element thereof an act of family violence to a family or household member. “Family violence crime” does not include acts by parents or guardians disciplining minor children unless such acts constitute abuse.

(4) “Institutions and services” means peace officers, service providers, mandated reporters of abuse, agencies and departments that provide services to victims and families and services designed to assist victims and families.

(5) “Dominant aggressor” means the person who poses the most serious ongoing threat in a situation involving the suspected commission of a family violence crime.

Chapter 815J. Dissolution of Marriage, Legal Separation and Annulment

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Part I. General Provisions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 46b-40. Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal separation; annulment

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A marriage is dissolved only by (1) the death of one of the parties or (2) a decree of annulment or dissolution of the marriage by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) An annulment shall be granted if the marriage is void or voidable under the laws of this state or of the state in which the marriage was performed.

(c) A decree of dissolution of a marriage or a decree of legal separation shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred: (1) The marriage has broken down irretrievably; (2) the parties have lived apart by reason of incompatibility for a continuous period of at least the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will be reconciled; (3) adultery; (4) fraudulent contract; (5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty; (6) seven years’ absence, during all of which period the absent party has not been heard from; (7) habitual intemperance; (8) intolerable cruelty; (9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year; (10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.

(d) In an action for dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation on the ground of habitual intemperance, it shall be sufficient if the cause of action is proved to have existed until the time of the separation of the parties.

(e) In an action for dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation on the ground of wilful desertion for one year, with total neglect of duty, the furnishing of financial support shall not disprove total neglect of duty, in the absence of other evidence.

(f) For purposes of this section, “adultery” means voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person other than such person’s spouse.

§ 46b-44. Residency requirement

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A complaint for dissolution of a marriage or for legal separation may be filed at any time after either party has established residence in this state.

(b) Temporary relief pursuant to the complaint may be granted in accordance with sections 46b-56 and 46b-83 at any time after either party has established residence in this state.

(c) A decree dissolving a marriage or granting a legal separation may be entered if: (1) One of the parties to the marriage has been a resident of this state for at least the twelve months next preceding the date of the filing of the complaint or next preceding the date of the decree; or (2) one of the parties was domiciled in this state at the time of the marriage and returned to this state with the intention of permanently remaining before the filing of the complaint; or (3) the cause for the dissolution of the marriage arose after either party moved into this state.

(d) For the purposes of this section, any person who has served or is serving with the armed forces, as defined in section 27-103, or the merchant marine, and who was a resident of this state at the time of his or her entry shall be deemed to have continuously resided in this state during the time he or she has served or is serving with the armed forces or merchant marine.

§ 46b-56. Orders re custody, care, education, visitation and support of children. Best interests of the child. Access to records of minor children by noncustodial parent. Orders re therapy, counseling and drug or alcohol screening

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children, and at any time after the return day of any complaint under section 46b-45, the court may make or modify any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of chapter 815p. [FN1] Subject to the provisions of section 46b-56a, the court may assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award custody to either parent or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. The court may also make any order granting the right of visitation of any child to a third party to the action, including, but not limited to, grandparents.

(b) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests. Such orders may include, but shall not be limited to: (1) Approval of a parental responsibility plan agreed to by the parents pursuant to section 46b-56a; (2) the award of joint parental responsibility of a minor child to both parents, which shall include (A) provisions for residential arrangements with each parent in accordance with the needs of the child and the parents, and (B) provisions for consultation between the parents and for the making of major decisions regarding the child’s health, education and religious upbringing; (3) the award of sole custody to one parent with appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best interests of the child; or (4) any other custody arrangements as the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child.

(c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (11) the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the child’s cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.

(d) Upon the issuance of any order assigning custody of the child to the Commissioner of Children and Families, or not later than sixty days after the issuance of such order, the court shall make a determination whether the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to keep the child with his or her parents prior to the issuance of such order and, if such efforts were not made, whether such reasonable efforts were not possible, taking into consideration the best interests of the child, including the child’s health and safety.

(e) In determining whether a child is in need of support and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide support, the court shall take into consideration all the factors enumerated in section 46b-84.

(f) When the court is not sitting, any judge of the court may make any order in the cause which the court might make under this section, including orders of injunction, prior to any action in the cause by the court.

(g) A parent not granted custody of a minor child shall not be denied the right of access to the academic, medical, hospital or other health records of such minor child, unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown.

(h) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, when a motion for modification of custody or visitation is pending before the court or has been decided by the court and the investigation ordered by the court pursuant to section 46b-6 recommends psychiatric or psychological therapy for a child, and such therapy would, in the court’s opinion, be in the best interests of the child and aid the child’s response to a modification, the court may order such therapy and reserve judgment on the motion for modification.

(i) As part of a decision concerning custody or visitation, the court may order either parent or both of the parents and any child of such parents to participate in counseling and drug or alcohol screening, provided such participation is in the best interests of the child.

§ 46b-56a. Joint custody. Definition. Presumption. Conciliation. Parental responsibility plan. Modification of orders

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) For the purposes of this section, “joint custody” means an order awarding legal custody of the minor child to both parents, providing for joint decision-making by the parents and providing that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child of continuing contact with both parents. The court may award joint legal custody without awarding joint physical custody where the parents have agreed to merely joint legal custody.

(b) There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child or children of the marriage. If the court declines to enter an order awarding joint custody pursuant to this subsection, the court shall state in its decision the reasons for denial of an award of joint custody.

(c) If only one parent seeks an order of joint custody upon a motion duly made, the court may order both parties to submit to conciliation at their own expense with the costs of such conciliation to be borne by the parties as the court directs according to each party’s ability to pay.

(d) In any proceeding before the Superior Court involving a dispute between the parents of a minor child with respect to the custody, care, education and upbringing of such child, the parents shall file with the court, at such time and in such form as provided by rule of court, a proposed parental responsibility plan that shall include, at a minimum, the following: (1) A schedule of the physical residence of the child during the year; (2) provisions allocating decision-making authority to one or both parents regarding the child’s health, education and religious upbringing; (3) provisions for the resolution of future disputes between the parents, including, where appropriate, the involvement of a mental health professional or other parties to assist the parents in reaching a developmentally appropriate resolution to such disputes; (4) provisions for dealing with the parents’ failure to honor their responsibilities under the plan; (5) provisions for dealing with the child’s changing needs as the child grows and matures; and (6) provisions for minimizing the child’s exposure to harmful parental conflict, encouraging the parents in appropriate circumstances to meet their responsibilities through agreements, and protecting the best interests of the child.

(e) The objectives of a parental responsibility plan under this section are to provide for the child’s physical care and emotional stability, to provide for the child’s changing needs as the child grows and to set forth the authority and responsibility of each parent with respect to the child.

(f) If both parents consent to a parental responsibility plan under this section, such plan shall be approved by the court as the custodial and access orders of the court pursuant to section 46b-56, unless the court finds that such plan as submitted and agreed to is not in the best interests of the child.

(g) The court may modify any orders made under this section in accordance with section 46b-56.

§ 46b-56b. Presumption re best interest of child to be in custody of parent

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

In any dispute as to the custody of a minor child involving a parent and a nonparent, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent, which presumption may be rebutted by showing that it would be detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody.

§ 46b-56c. Educational Support Orders

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) For purposes of this section, an educational support order is an order entered by a court requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children to attend for up to a total of four full academic years an institution of higher education or a private occupational school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor’s or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction. An educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of age and shall terminate not later than the date on which the child attains twenty-three years of age.
(b) (1) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entry of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment, and no educational support order may be entered thereafter unless the decree explicitly provides that a motion or petition for an educational support order may be filed by either parent at a subsequent date. If no educational support order is entered at the time of entry of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment, and the parents have a child who has not attained twenty-three years of age, the court shall inform the parents that no educational support order may be entered thereafter. The court may accept a parent’s waiver of the right to file a motion or petition for an educational support order upon a finding that the parent fully understands the consequences of such waiver.
(2) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entry of an order for support pendente lite pursuant to section 46b-83.
(3) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entering an order of support pursuant to section 46b-61 or 46b-171 or similar section of the general statutes, or at any time thereafter.
(4) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entering an order pursuant to any other provision of the general statutes authorizing the court to make an order of support for a child, subject to the provisions of sections 1 to 78, inclusive, of public act 15-71.
(c) The court may not enter an educational support order pursuant to this section unless the court finds as a matter of fact that it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the child for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact. After making such finding, the court, in determining whether to enter an educational support order, shall consider all relevant circumstances, including: (1) The parents’ income, assets and other obligations, including obligations to other dependents; (2) the child’s need for support to attend an institution of higher education or private occupational school considering the child’s assets and the child’s ability to earn income; (3) the availability of financial aid from other sources, including grants and loans; (4) the reasonableness of the higher education to be funded considering the child’s academic record and the financial resources available; (5) the child’s preparation for, aptitude for and commitment to higher education; and (6) evidence, if any, of the institution of higher education or private occupational school the child would attend.
(d) At the appropriate time, both parents shall participate in, and agree upon, the decision as to which institution of higher education or private occupational school the child will attend. The court may make an order resolving the matter if the parents fail to reach an agreement.
(e) To qualify for payments due under an educational support order, the child must (1) enroll in an accredited institution of higher education or private occupational school, as defined in section 10a-22a, (2) actively pursue a course of study commensurate with the child’s vocational goals that constitutes at least one-half the course load determined by that institution or school to constitute full-time enrollment, (3) maintain good academic standing in accordance with the rules of the institution or school, and (4) make available all academic records to both parents during the term of the order. The order shall be suspended after any academic period during which the child fails to comply with these conditions.
(f) The educational support order may include support for any necessary educational expense, including room, board, dues, tuition, fees, registration and application costs, but such expenses shall not be more than the amount charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student at the time the child for whom educational support is being ordered matriculates, except this limit may be exceeded by agreement of the parents. An educational support order may also include the cost of books and medical insurance for such child.
(g) The court may direct that payments under an educational support order be made (1) to a parent to be forwarded to the institution of higher education or private occupational school, (2) directly to the institution or school, or (3) otherwise as the court determines to be appropriate.
(h) On motion or petition of a parent, an educational support order may be modified or enforced in the same manner as is provided by law for any support order.
(i) This section does not create a right of action by a child for parental support for higher education.
(j) An educational support order under this section does not include support for graduate or postgraduate education beyond a bachelor’s degree.
(k) The provisions of this section shall apply only in cases when the initial order for parental support of the child is entered on or after October 1, 2002.

§ 46b-56d. Relocation of parent with minor child. Burden of proof. Factors considered by court

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) In any proceeding before the Superior Court arising after the entry of a judgment awarding custody of a minor child and involving the relocation of either parent with the child, where such relocation would have a significant impact on an existing parenting plan, the relocating parent shall bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the relocation is for a legitimate purpose, (2) the proposed location is reasonable in light of such purpose, and (3) the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

(b) In determining whether to approve the relocation of the child under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, but such consideration shall not be limited to: (1) Each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation; (2) the quality of the relationships between the child and each parent; (3) the impact of the relocation on the quantity and the quality of the child’s future contact with the nonrelocating parent; (4) the degree to which the relocating parent’s and the child’s life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the relocation; and (5) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating parent and the child through suitable visitation arrangements.

§ 46b-56f. Emergency ex parte order of custody

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Any person seeking custody of a minor child pursuant to section 46b-56 or pursuant to an action brought under section 46b-40 may make an application to the Superior Court for an emergency ex parte order of custody when such person believes an immediate and present risk of physical danger or psychological harm to the child exists.
(b) The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath which includes a statement (1) of the conditions requiring an emergency ex parte order, (2) that an emergency ex parte order is in the best interests of the child, and (3) of the actions taken by the applicant or any other person to inform the respondent of the request or, if no such actions to inform the respondent were taken, the reasons why the court should consider such application on an ex parte basis absent such actions.
(c) The court shall order a hearing on any application made pursuant to this section. If, prior to or after such hearing, the court finds that an immediate and present risk of physical danger or psychological harm to the child exists, the court may, in its discretion, issue an emergency order for the protection of the child and may inform the Department of Children and Families of relevant information in the affidavit for investigation purposes. The emergency order may provide temporary child custody or visitation rights and may enjoin the respondent from: (1) Removing the child from the state; (2) interfering with the applicant’s custody of the child; (3) interfering with the child’s educational program; or (4) taking any other specific action if the court determines that prohibiting such action is in the best interests of the child. If relief on the application is ordered ex parte, the court shall schedule a hearing not later than fourteen days after the date of such ex parte order. If a postponement of a hearing on the application is requested by either party and granted, no ex parte order shall be granted or continued except upon agreement of the parties or by order of the court for good cause shown.
(d) The applicant shall cause notice of the hearing and a copy of the application, the applicant’s affidavit, and the ex parte order, if issued, to be served on the respondent not less than five days before the hearing on the application.

§ 46b-57. Third party intervention re custody of minor children. Preference of child

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody of minor children, and on any complaint under this chapter or section 46b-1or 51-348a, if there is any minor child of either or both parties, the court, if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of chapter 815p,1 may allow any interested third party or parties to intervene upon motion. The court may award full or partial custody, care, education and visitation rights of such child to any such third party upon such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. Before allowing any such intervention, the court may appoint counsel for the minor child or children pursuant to the provisions of sections 46b-12 and 46b-54. In making any order under this section, the court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference.

§ 46b-58. Custody, maintenance and education of adopted children

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

The authority of the superior court to make and enforce orders and decrees as to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children in any controversy before the court between husband and wife brought under the provisions of this chapter is extended to children adopted by both parties and to any natural child of one of the parties who has been adopted by the other.

§ 46b-59. Petition for right of visitation with minor child. Order for payment of fees

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) As used in this section:

(1) “Grandparent” means a grandparent or great-grandparent related to a minor child by (A) blood, (B) marriage, or (C) adoption of the minor child by a child of the grandparent; and

(2) “Real and significant harm” means that the minor child is neglected, as defined in section 46b-120, or uncared for, as defined in said section.

(b) Any person may submit a verified petition to the Superior Court for the right of visitation with any minor child. Such petition shall include specific and good-faith allegations that (1) a parent-like relationship exists between the person and the minor child, and (2) denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm. Subject to subsection (e) of this section, the court shall grant the right of visitation with any minor child to any person if the court finds after hearing and by clear and convincing evidence that a parent-like relationship exists between the person and the minor child and denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm.

(c) In determining whether a parent-like relationship exists between the person and the minor child, the Superior Court may consider, but shall not be limited to, the following factors:

(1) The existence and length of a relationship between the person and the minor child prior to the submission of a petition pursuant to this section;

(2) The length of time that the relationship between the person and the minor child has been disrupted;

(3) The specific parent-like activities of the person seeking visitation toward the minor child;

(4) Any evidence that the person seeking visitation has unreasonably undermined the authority and discretion of the custodial parent;

(5) The significant absence of a parent from the life of a minor child;

(6) The death of one of the minor child’s parents;

(7) The physical separation of the parents of the minor child;

(8) The fitness of the person seeking visitation; and

(9) The fitness of the custodial parent.

(d) In determining whether a parent-like relationship exists between a grandparent seeking visitation pursuant to this section and a minor child, the Superior Court may consider, in addition to the factors enumerated in subsection (c) of this section, the history of regular contact and proof of a close and substantial relationship between the grandparent and the minor child.

(e) If the Superior Court grants the right of visitation pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the court shall set forth the terms and conditions of visitation including, but not limited to, the schedule of visitation, including the dates or days, time and place or places in which the visitation can occur, whether overnight visitation will be allowed and any other terms and conditions that the court determines are in the best interest of the minor child, provided such conditions shall not be contingent upon any order of financial support by the court. In determining the best interest of the minor child, the court shall consider the wishes of the minor child if such minor child is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent opinion. In determining the terms and conditions of visitation, the court may consider (1) the effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the parents or guardians of the minor child and the minor child, and (2) the effect on the minor child of any domestic violence that has occurred between or among parents, grandparents, persons seeking visitation and the minor child.

(f) Visitation rights granted in accordance with this section shall not be deemed to have created parental rights in the person or persons to whom such visitation rights are granted, nor shall such visitation rights be a ground for preventing the relocation of the custodial parent. The grant of such visitation rights shall not prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from thereafter acting upon the custody of such child, the parental rights with respect to such child or the adoption of such child and any such court may include in its decree an order terminating such visitation rights.

(g) Upon motion, the court may order the payment of fees for another party, the attorney for the minor child, the guardian ad litem, or any expert by any party in accordance with such party’s financial ability.

§ 46b-59a. Mediation of disputes re enforcement of visitation rights

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

The Office of the Chief Court Administrator may establish programs of mediation for the timely resolution of disputes involving the enforcement of visitation rights.

§ 46b-59b. Court may not grant visitation to parent convicted of murder. Exception

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Notwithstanding any provisions of this chapter, no court shall make an order granting the right of visitation to a parent who has been convicted of murder under section 53a-54a, 53a-54b, 53a-54c or 53a-54d, or in any other jurisdiction, of any crime the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of such crimes, unless the child who is the subject of the visitation order is of sufficient age to signify such child’s wishes and such child assents to such order. Until any such visitation order is granted, no person shall visit, with the child present, such parent who has been convicted of murder without the consent of the child’s parent, guardian or legal custodian.

§ 46b-60. Orders re children and alimony in annulment cases

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

In connection with any petition for annulment under this chapter, the superior court may make such order regarding any child of the marriage and concerning alimony as it might make in an action for dissolution of marriage. The issue of any void or voidable marriage shall be deemed legitimate. Any child born before, on or after October 1, 1976, whose birth occurred prior to the marriage of his parents shall be deemed a child of the marriage.

§ 46b-61. Orders re children where parents live separately. Commencement of proceedings

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) In all cases in which the parents of a minor child live separately, the superior court for the judicial district where either parent resides may, on the application of either parent and after notice is given to the other parent, make any order as to the custody, care, education, visitation and support of any minor child of the parents, subject to the provisions of sections 46b-54, 46b-56, 46b-57 and 46b-66. Proceedings to obtain such orders shall be commenced by service of an application, a summons and an order to show cause. An applicant shall file the accompanying documents with the court not later than the first date for which the matter appears on the docket.

(b) As used in this section, “accompanying documents” means documents that establish an existing legal relationship between the parents and the child for whom an application for custody, care, education, visitation and support is made under this section. “Accompanying documents” include, but are not limited to, a copy of a birth certificate naming the applicant and the respondent as the parents of the child, a copy of a properly executed acknowledgment of paternity, a court order or decree naming the legally responsible parents, including adoptive parents, a gestational agreement as defined in section 7-36, documents showing that the minor child was born during the parents’ wedlock or other sufficient evidence within the discretion of the court.

§ 46b-62. Orders for payment of attorney's fees in certain actions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) In any proceeding seeking relief under the provisions of this chapter and sections 17b-743, 17b-744, 45a-257, 46b-1, 46b-6, 1 to 78, inclusive, of public act 15-71, 47-14g, 51-348a and 52-362, the court may order either spouse or, if such proceeding concerns the custody, care, education, visitation or support of a minor child, either parent to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b-82. If, in any proceeding under this chapter and said sections, the court appoints counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child, the court may order the father, mother or an intervening party, individually or in any combination, to pay the reasonable fees of such counsel or guardian ad litem or may order the payment of such counsel’s or guardian ad litem’s fees in whole or in part from the estate of the child. If the child is receiving or has received state aid or care, the compensation of such counsel or guardian ad litem shall be established and paid by the Public Defender Services Commission.
(b) If, in any proceeding under this chapter and sections 17b-743, 17b-744, 45a-257, 46b-1, 46b-6, 1 to 78, inclusive, of public act 15-71, 47-14g, 51-348a and 52-362, the court appoints counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child, the court may not order the father, mother or an intervening party, individually or in any combination, to pay the reasonable fees of such counsel or guardian ad litem from a college savings account, including any account established pursuant to any qualified tuition program, as defined in Section 529(b) of the Internal Revenue Code,1 that has been established for the benefit of the minor child. If the court determines that the father, mother or an intervening party does not have the ability to pay such reasonable fees, the court shall not order that such reasonable fees be paid by such persons through the use of a credit card. In addition, any order for the payment of such reasonable fees shall be limited to income or assets that are not exempt property under sections 52-352a and 52-352b.
(c) In any proceeding under this chapter and sections 17b-743, 17b-744, 45a-257, 46b-1, 46b-6, 1 to 78, inclusive, of public act 15-71, 47-14g, 51-348a and 52-362, in which the court appoints counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child, the court may order that the fees to be paid to such counsel or guardian ad litem be calculated on a sliding-scale basis after giving due consideration to the income and assets of the parties to the proceeding.
(d) The Judicial Branch shall develop and implement a methodology for calculating, on a sliding-scale basis, the fees owing to counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child appointed in any proceeding under this chapter and sections 17b-743, 17b-744, 45a-257, 46b-1, 46b-6, 1 to 78, inclusive, of public act 15-71, 47-14g, 51-348a and 52-362.

Part III. Support of Child and Spouse. Transfer of Property.

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 46b-82. Alimony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) At the time of entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b-81. The order may direct that security be given therefor on such terms as the court may deem desirable, including an order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party. The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable. In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s securing employment.

(b) If the court, following a trial or hearing on the merits, enters an order pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or section 46b-86, and such order by its terms will terminate only upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the alimony recipient, the court shall articulate with specificity the basis for such order.

(c) Any postjudgment procedure afforded by chapter 9061 shall be available to secure the present and future financial interests of a party in connection with a final order for the periodic payment of alimony.

§ 46b-83. Alimony, support and use of family home or other residential dwelling unit awarded pendente lite. Voluntary leaving of family home by one parent

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) At any time after the return day of a complaint under section 46b-45 or 46b-56 or after filing an application under section 46b-61, and after hearing, alimony and support pendente lite may be awarded to either of the parties from the date of the filing of an application therefor with the Superior Court. Full credit shall be given for all sums paid to one party by the other from the date of the filing of such a motion to the date of rendition of such order. In making an order for alimony pendente lite, the court shall consider all factors enumerated in section 46b-82, except the grounds for the complaint or cross complaint, to be considered with respect to a permanent award of alimony. In making an order for support pendente lite, the court shall consider all factors enumerated insection 46b-84. The court may also award exclusive use of the family home or any other dwelling unit which is available for use as a residence pendente lite to either of the parties as is just and equitable without regard to the respective interests of the parties in the property.

(b) In any proceeding brought under section 46b-45, 46b-56 or 46b-61 involving a minor child, if one of the parents residing in the family home leaves such home voluntarily and not subject to court order, and if the court finds that the voluntary leaving of the family home by such parent served the best interests of the child, the court may consider such voluntary leaving as a factor when making or modifying any order pursuant to section 46b-56.

§ 46b-84. Parents' obligation for maintenance of minor child. Order for health insurance coverage

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Upon or subsequent to the annulment or dissolution of any marriage or the entry of a decree of legal separation or divorce, the parents of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain the child according to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of maintenance. Any postjudgment procedure afforded by chapter 9061 shall be available to secure the present and future financial interests of a party in connection with a final order for the periodic payment of child support.
(b) If there is an unmarried child of the marriage who has attained the age of eighteen and is a full-time high school student, the parents shall maintain the child according to their respective abilities if the child is in need of maintenance until such child completes the twelfth grade or attains the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first. The provisions of this subsection shall apply only in cases where the decree of dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment is entered on or after July 1, 1994.
(c) The court may make appropriate orders of support of any child with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, or a mental disability or physical disability, as defined in subdivision (15) of section 46a-51, who resides with a parent and is principally dependent upon such parent for maintenance until such child attains the age of twenty-one. The child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a shall not apply to orders entered under this subsection. The provisions of this subsection shall apply only in cases where the decree of dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment is entered on or after October 1, 1997, or where the initial support orders in actions not claiming any such decree are entered on or after October 1, 1997.
(d) In determining whether a child is in need of maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide such maintenance and the amount thereof, the court shall consider the age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of the child.
(e) At any time at which orders are entered in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, annulment, legal separation, custody, or support, whether before, at the time of, or after entry of a decree or judgment, if health insurance coverage for a child is ordered by the court to be maintained, the court shall provide in the order that (1) the signature of the custodial parent or custodian of the insured dependent shall constitute a valid authorization to the insurer for purposes of processing an insurance reimbursement payment to the provider of the medical services, to the custodial parent or to the custodian, (2) neither parent shall prevent or interfere with the timely processing of any insurance reimbursement claim and (3) if the parent receiving an insurance reimbursement payment is not the parent or custodian who is paying the bill for the services of the medical provider, the parent receiving such insurance reimbursement payment shall promptly pay to the parent or custodian paying such bill any insurance reimbursement for such services. For purposes of subdivision (1), the custodial parent or custodian is responsible for providing the insurer with a certified copy of the order of dissolution or other order requiring maintenance of insurance for a child provided if such custodial parent or custodian fails to provide the insurer with a copy of such order, the Commissioner of Social Services may provide the insurer with a copy of such order. Such insurer may thereafter rely on such order and is not responsible for inquiring as to the legal sufficiency of the order. The custodial parent or custodian shall be responsible for providing the insurer with a certified copy of any order which materially alters the provision of the original order with respect to the maintenance of insurance for a child. If presented with an insurance reimbursement claim signed by the custodial parent or custodian, such insurer shall reimburse the provider of the medical services, if payment is to be made to such provider under the policy, or shall otherwise reimburse the custodial parent or custodian.
(f) (1) After the granting of a decree annulling or dissolving the marriage or ordering a legal separation, and upon complaint or motion with order and summons made to the Superior Court by either parent or by the Commissioner of Administrative Services in any case arising under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the court shall inquire into the child’s need of maintenance and the respective abilities of the parents to supply maintenance. The court shall make and enforce the decree for the maintenance of the child as it considers just, and may direct security to be given therefor, including an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party. The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable.
(2) The court shall include in each support order a provision for the health care coverage of the child who is subject to the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section. Such provision may include an order for either parent or both parents to provide such coverage under any or all of subparagraphs (A), (B) or (C) of this subdivision.
(A) The provision for health care coverage may include an order for either parent to name any child as a beneficiary of any medical or dental insurance or benefit plan carried by such parent or available to such parent at a reasonable cost, as described in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision. If such order in a IV-D support case requires the parent to maintain insurance available through an employer, the order shall be enforced using a National Medical Support Notice as provided in section 46b-88.
(B) The provision for health care coverage may include an order for either parent to: (i) Apply for and maintain coverage on behalf of the child under HUSKY B;2 or (ii) provide cash medical support, as described in subparagraphs (E) and (F) of this subdivision. An order under this subparagraph shall be made only if the cost to the parent obligated to maintain the coverage under HUSKY B or provide cash medical support is reasonable, as described in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision. An order under clause (i) of this subparagraph shall be made only if insurance coverage as described in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision is unavailable at reasonable cost to either parent, or inaccessible to the child.
(C) An order for payment of the child’s medical and dental expenses, other than those described in clause (ii) of subparagraph (E) of this subdivision, that are not covered by insurance or reimbursed in any other manner shall be entered in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a.
(D) Health care coverage shall be deemed reasonable in cost if: (i) The parent obligated to maintain such coverage would qualify as a low-income obligor under the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a, based solely on such parent’s income, and the cost does not exceed five per cent of such parent’s net income; or (ii) the parent obligated to maintain such coverage would not qualify as a low-income obligor under such guidelines and the cost does not exceed seven and one-half per cent of such parent’s net income. In either case, net income shall be determined in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a. If a parent obligated to maintain insurance must obtain coverage for himself or herself to comply with the order to provide coverage for the child, reasonable cost shall be determined based on the combined cost of coverage for such parent and such child.
(E) Cash medical support means: (i) An amount ordered to be paid toward the cost of premiums for health insurance coverage provided by a public entity, including HUSKY A3 or B, except as provided in subparagraph (F) of this subdivision, or by another parent through employment or otherwise, or (ii) an amount ordered to be paid, either directly to a medical provider or to the person obligated to pay such provider, toward any ongoing extraordinary medical and dental expenses of the child that are not covered by insurance or reimbursed in any other manner, provided such expenses are documented and identified specifically on the record. Cash medical support, as described in clauses (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph may be ordered in lieu of an order under subparagraph (A) of this subdivision to be effective until such time as health insurance that is accessible to the child and reasonable in cost becomes available, or in addition to an order under subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, provided the combined cost of insurance and cash medical support is reasonable, as defined in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision. An order for cash medical support shall be payable to the state or the custodial party, as their interests may appear, provided an order under clause (i) of this subparagraph shall be effective only as long as health insurance coverage is maintained. Any unreimbursed medical and dental expenses not covered by an order issued pursuant to clause (ii) of this subparagraph are subject to an order for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this subdivision.
(F) Cash medical support to offset the cost of any insurance payable under HUSKY A or B, shall not be ordered against a noncustodial parent who is a low-income obligor, as defined in the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a, or against a custodial parent of children covered under HUSKY A or B.
(g) Whenever an obligor is before the court in proceedings to establish, modify or enforce a support order, and such order is not secured by an income withholding order, the court may require the obligor to execute a bond or post other security sufficient to perform such order for support, provided the court finds that such a bond is available for purchase within the financial means of the obligor. Upon failure of such obligor to comply with such support order, the court may order the bond or the security forfeited and the proceeds thereof distributed as required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.4 In any IV-D case in which the obligor is found by the court to owe past-due support, the court may issue an order for the periodic payment of such support or, if such obligor is not incapacitated, order such obligor to participate in work activities which may include, but shall not be limited to, job search, training, work experience and participation in the job training and retraining program established by the Labor Commissioner pursuant to section 31-3t.
(h) In IV-D support cases, as defined in subdivision (13) of subsection (b) of section 46b-231, a copy of any support order established or modified pursuant to this section or, in the case of a motion for modification of an existing support order, a notice of determination that there should be no change in the amount of the support order, shall be provided to each party and the state case registry within fourteen days after issuance of such order or determination.

Chapter 815p. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Part 1. General Provisions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 46b-115. Short title: Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

§ 46b-115a. Definitions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

As used in this chapter:
(1) “Abandoned” means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision;
(2) “Child” means an individual who has not attained eighteen years of age;
(3) “Child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual;
(4) “Child custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation or enforcement under sections 46b-115u to 46b-115gg, inclusive;
(5) “Commencement” means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding;
(6) “Court” means any entity, including the Superior Court or Probate Court in this state, if such entity has jurisdiction to establish, enforce or modify a child custody determination;
(7) “Home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months old, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any such parent or person acting as a parent. A period of temporary absence of any such person is counted as part of the period;
(8) “Initial determination” means the first child custody determination concerning a particular child;
(9) “Issuing court” means the court that has made a child custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter;
(10) “Issuing state” means the state in which a child custody determination has been made;
(11) “Modification” means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the prior custody determination;
(12) “Person” has the same meaning as provided in subsection (k) of section 1-1 and includes a public agency;
(13) “Person acting as a parent” means a person, other than a parent, who: (A) Has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence, any part of which period occurred within one year immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding, and (B) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the laws of this state;
(14) “Physical custody” means the physical care and supervision of a child;
(15) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

§ 46b-115b. Proceedings governed by other law

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

The chapter does not govern an adoption proceeding or a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical care for a child.

§ 46b-115c. Application to Indian tribes

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC Section 1901 et seq., is not subject to this chapter to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.

§ 46b-115d. International application of chapter

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

For purposes of this chapter, any child custody order of a foreign country shall be treated in the manner provided in section 46b-115hh.

§ 46b-115e. Effect of child custody determination

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

A child custody determination made by a court of this state that had jurisdiction under this chapter binds all persons who have been served in accordance with the laws of this state or notified in accordance with section 46b-115g or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to those persons, the determination is conclusive as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified.

§ 46b-115f. Priority

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

If a question of the existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this chapter is raised in a child custody proceeding, the question, upon request of a party, must be given calendar priority and handled expeditiously.

§ 46b-115g. Notice to persons outside state; submission to jurisdiction

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this state shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and may be: (1) By personal delivery outside this state in the manner prescribed for service of process within this state; (2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service of process in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; (3) any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a receipt; or (4) as directed by the court including publication, if other means of notification are ineffective.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by any provision of the general statutes, notice under this section shall be served, mailed or delivered or last published at least twelve days before any hearing in this state.

(c) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee.

(d) Except as otherwise provided by any provision of the general statutes, notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court.

§ 46b-115h. Communication between courts

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter.

(b) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.

(c) Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of the communication.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a record must be made of a communication under this section. The parties must be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record.

(e) For the purposes of this section, “record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

§ 46b-115i. Taking testimony in another state

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child custody proceeding, guardian ad litem or legal representative of the child may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which the testimony is taken.

(b) A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.

(c) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.

§ 46b-115j. Cooperation between courts; preservation of records

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to: (1) Hold an evidentiary hearing; (2) order a person to produce or give evidence pursuant to procedures of that state; (3) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child involved in a pending proceeding; (4) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and (5) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without the child.

(b) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may hold a hearing or enter an order described in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under subsections (a) and (b) of this section may be assessed against the parties.

(d) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings, evaluations and other pertinent records with respect to a child custody proceeding until the child attains eighteen years of age. Upon appropriate request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall forward a certified copy of those records.

Part II. Jurisdiction

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 46b-115k. Initial child custody jurisdiction

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination if:

(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the child custody proceeding;

(2) This state was the home state of the child within six months of the commencement of the child custody proceeding, the child is absent from the state, and a parent or a person acting as a parent continues to reside in this state;

(3) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivisions (1) or (2) of this subsection, the child and at least one parent or person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence, and there is substantial evidence available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships;

(4) A court of another state which is the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115q or section 46b-115r, the child and at least one parent or person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence, and there is substantial evidence available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships;

(5) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, of this subsection have declined jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine custody under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115q or section 46b-115r; or

(6) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under subdivisions (1) to (5), inclusive, of this subsection.

(b) Subsection (a) of this section is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.

(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.

§ 46b-115l. Jurisdiction

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, a court of this state which has made a child custody determination pursuant to sections 46b-115k to 46b-115m, inclusive, has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: (1) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state; or (2) a court of this state determines that (A) this state is not the home state of the child, (B) a parent or a person acting as a parent continues to reside in this state but the child no longer has a significant relationship with such parent or person, and (C) substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships.

(b) A court of this state which has made a child custody determination but does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 46b-115k.

§ 46b-115m. Modification of custody determination of another state

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, a court of this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, of subsection (a) of section 46b-115k and one of the following occurs: (1) The court of the other state determines that it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115l; (2) a court of another state determines that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115q; or (3) a court of this state or another state determines that the child, the child’s parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, a court of this state may modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state if: (1) The child resides in this state with a parent; (2) the child has been, or is under a threat of being, abused or mistreated by a person who resides in the state which would have jurisdiction under the provisions of this chapter; and (3) the court of this state determines that it is in the child’s best interest to modify the child custody determination.

§ 46b-115n. Temporary emergency jurisdiction

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and (1) the child has been abandoned, or (2) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, a sibling or a parent has been, or is under a threat of being, abused or mistreated. As used in this subsection with respect to a child, “abused” shall have the same meaning as in section 46b-120.

(b) If there is no previous child custody determination that is enforceable under this chapter and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m, a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m. A child custody determination made under this section shall be a final determination if: (1) A child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m; (2) this state has become the home state of the child; and (3) the child custody determination provides that it is a final determination.

(c) If there is a previous child custody determination that is enforceable under this chapter or if a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m, the court of this state which issues an order pursuant to this section shall specify that such order is effective for a period of time which the court deems adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain such order from the other state which has jurisdiction. Such order shall be effective for that period of time specified in the order or until an order is obtained from the other state whichever occurs first.

(d) If the court, in any proceeding commenced pursuant to this section, is informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced, or that a child custody determination has been made, by a court of another state having jurisdiction pursuant to a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m, such court shall immediately communicate with the court of the other state and take appropriate action, including the making of temporary orders for a specified period of time, to resolve the emergency and to protect the safety of the child and the parties.

§ 46b-115o. Notice and opportunity to be heard; joinder

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Before a child custody determination is made under this chapter, notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the standard established in section 46b-115g shall be given to the parties, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of the child.

(b) This chapter does not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

(c) The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a child custody proceeding under this chapter are governed by section 46b-57.

§ 46b-115p. Simultaneous proceedings

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding in this state a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction pursuant to a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m, a court of this state shall not exercise jurisdiction. A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction if the proceeding in the other state has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because such court has determined pursuant to a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115q, that a court in this state is a more convenient forum.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, the court shall, after review of relevant information provided to it, determine whether a child custody proceeding has been commenced in another state. If such proceeding has been commenced, the court in this state shall take appropriate action to communicate with the other court and to resolve which court shall have jurisdiction. If the court of this state determines that the court of the other state has jurisdiction pursuant to a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding while the court of the other state determines whether the court of this state is the more appropriate forum. If the court of the other state determines that the court of this state is not a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, the court, in a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, shall after review of relevant information provided to it, determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. If the court determines that such enforcement proceeding has commenced, the court may (1) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of the court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement; (2) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or (3) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, the court, in a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination, shall proceed, with regard to simultaneous proceedings, in accordance with the provisions of section 46b-115z.

§ 46b-115q. Inconvenient forum

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A court of this state which has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon a motion of a party, the guardian ad litem for the child or the attorney for the child, the court’s own motion or a request of another court.

(b) In determining whether a court of this state is an inconvenient forum and that it is more appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors including: (1) Whether family violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; (2) the length of time the child has resided outside this state; (3) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction; (4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties; (5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; (6) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child; (7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and (8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.

(c) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.

(d) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for dissolution of marriage, divorce or another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the dissolution of marriage, divorce or other proceeding.

§ 46b-115r. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct; assessment of fees and costs

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:

(1) The parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction;

(2) A court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under a statute similar to section 46b-115q; or

(3) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in sections 46b-115k to 46b-115m, inclusive.

(b) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m.

(c) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, it shall assess against the party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction reasonable expenses including costs, communication expenses, attorneys’ fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the assessment would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs or expenses against the state unless authorized by law.

§ 46b-115s. Information required by the court

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable and not confidential under state law, under oath as to the child’s present address or location, the places where the child has lived during the past five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during the past five years. The pleading or affidavit must state whether the party:

(1) Has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation with the child and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the date of the child custody determination;

(2) Knows of any civil or criminal proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to family violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights and adoptions, and if so, identify the court, the case number and the nature of the proceeding; and

(3) Knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or visitation with, the child and if so, the names and addresses of those persons.

(b) If the information required by subsection (a) of this section is not provided, the court upon motion of a party or on its own motion may stay the proceeding until such information is provided.

(c) If the party provides any of the information required in subdivisions (1) to (3) of subsection (a) of this section, such party shall also provide any additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information provided and other matters pertinent to the court’s jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.

(d) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this state or another state that could affect the current proceeding.

(e) If a party under oath alleges in an affidavit or a pleading or on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator that the health, safety or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of location information, the information must be sealed and shall not be disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court, after a hearing, determines that it is in the interest of justice that such disclosure be made. The party making such allegation shall (1) provide obvious notice to the clerk of the court that such allegation is being made; (2) not file location information that poses the risk unless ordered by the court; (3) identify, in writing, documents previously filed with the court that contain location information that poses the risk; and (4) if, at the time the allegation is made, the party is not represented by counsel in the proceeding, provide the clerk of the court with a mailing address that may be disclosed to the public. Except as otherwise provided by rule of court, as used in this subsection, “obvious notice” means notice as provided on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator or a notice to the clerk of the court which is set forth in the bottom margin of the first page of such filed document.

§ 46b-115t. Appearance of parties and child

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) In a child custody proceeding in this state, the court may order a party to the proceeding who is in this state to appear before the court in person with or without the child. The court may order any person who is in this state and who has physical custody or control of the child to appear in person with the child.

(b) If the court orders the appearance of a party who is outside this state, the court may order that a notice is given in accordance with section 46b-115g and that such notice include a statement directing the party to appear in person with or without the child and informing the party that failure to appear may result in a decision adverse to such party.

(c) The court may enter any orders necessary to ensure the safety of the child or of any person ordered to appear pursuant to this section.

(d) The court may order a party to pay for reasonable and necessary travel and expenses of a party to the child custody proceeding or the child who is outside the state.

Part III. Enforcement

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 46b-115u. Definitions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

As used in sections 46b-115u to 46b-115gg, inclusive, “petitioner” means a person who seeks enforcement of a child custody determination, and “respondent” means a person against whom a proceeding has been commenced for enforcement of a child custody determination.

§ 46b-115v. Enforcement under Hague Convention

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

A court of this state may enforce an order by a federal court or another state court for the return of a child made pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in accordance with section 46b-115jj.

§ 46b-115w. Registration of child custody determination

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the Superior Court in this state: (1) A letter or other document requesting registration; (2) two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the petitioner the order has not been modified; and (3) except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115s, the name and address of the petitioner and any parent or person acting as parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered.

(b) On receipt of the documents required by subsection (a) of this section, the registering court shall cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form.

(c) Within five days after the registering court’s receipt of the documents required by subsection (a) of this section, the petitioner shall notify the persons named pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section of the registration of the documents by certified mail, return receipt requested at their respective last-known addresses or by personal service, and provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with this section. The notice required in this subsection shall state that: (1) A registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this state; (2) a hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be requested within twenty days after service of notice; and (3) failure to contest the registration will, upon proof of notice, result in confirmation of the child custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted.

(d) A hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination shall be requested within twenty days after service of the notice. Such hearing shall be held within twenty days of the receipt of such request. At that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the respondent establishes that: (1) The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m; (2) the child custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so pursuant to a statute substantially similar to sections 46b-115k to 46b-115m, inclusive; or (3) the respondent was entitled to notice of the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought, but such notice was not given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice.

(e) If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law with respect to those who have received proper notice and all persons served must be notified of the confirmation by the petitioner.

(f) Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

§ 46b-115x. Enforcement of child custody determination

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

A court of this state shall recognize and enforce, but not modify except in accordance with section 46b-115m, a child custody determination of a court of another state if (1) the court of the other state exercised jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m, the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this chapter and the determination has not been modified in accordance with this chapter, or (2) the child custody determination was registered in this state pursuant to section 46b-115w. A child custody determination which satisfies the criteria in subdivision (1) or (2) of this section shall have the same effect and shall be enforced in the same manner as a child custody determination rendered by the Superior Court.

§ 46b-115y. Temporary visitation order

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A court of this state which does not have jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination may issue a temporary order enforcing (1) the visitation schedule made by the court of another state, or (2) the visitation provisions of a child custody determination of another state which does not provide for a specific visitation schedule.

(b) If a court of this state makes an order pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, it shall specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other court or the period expires, whichever comes first.

§ 46b-115z. Simultaneous proceedings

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

If a proceeding for enforcement under this chapter is commenced in a court of this state and the court determines that a proceeding to modify the determination is pending in a court of another state having jurisdiction to modify the determination under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m, the enforcing court shall immediately communicate with the modifying court. The court of this state shall proceed with the action for enforcement of the child custody determination unless the court, after consultation with the modifying court, stays or dismisses the proceeding.

§ 46b-115aa. Expedited enforcement of child custody determination

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A petitioner seeking to enforce a child custody determination must verify the petition and attach copies of certified copies of all orders or notice sought to be enforced and of any order confirming registration if such child custody determination has been registered.

(b) A petition for enforcement of a child custody determination shall state: (1) Whether the court that issued the determination identified the jurisdictional basis it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what the basis was; (2) whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court whose decision must be enforced under this chapter and, if so, identify the court, the case number and the nature of the proceeding; (3) whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings relating to family violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights and adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding; (4) the present physical address of the child and the respondent, if known; (5) whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the child and attorneys’ fees are sought, including a request for assistance from law enforcement officials, and, if so, the relief sought; and (6) if the child custody determination has been registered and confirmed under section 46b-115w, the date and place of registration.

(c) Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing, the time and place of which shall be specified, and may enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the child. The order shall advise the respondent that at the hearing, the court will order that the petitioner take immediate physical custody of the child and the payment of fees, costs and expenses under section 46b-115ee, and any other relief that the court may deem appropriate, unless the respondent appears and establishes that: (1) The child custody determination has not been registered and confirmed pursuant to section 46b-115w and (A) the court issuing the order for which enforcement is sought did not have jurisdiction under section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m or a provision substantially similar to said sections; (B) the child custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under sections 46b-115k to 46b-115t, inclusive; or (C) the respondent was entitled to notice, but notice of the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought was not given in accordance with section 46b-115g or in a manner reasonably calculated to provide actual notice; or (2) the child custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed pursuant to section 46b-115w, but has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m or a provision substantially similar to said sections. The hearing must be held on the next business day after service of the order unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The court may extend the date of the hearing at the request of the petitioner.

§ 46b-115bb. Service of petition and order

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115dd, the petition and order shall be served upon the respondent and any person who has physical custody of the child by personal service.

§ 46b-115cc. Hearing and order

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Unless the court issues a temporary emergency order pursuant to section 46b-115n, the court shall enforce the child custody determination and if appropriate, order the petitioner to take immediate physical custody of the child unless the respondent establishes that: (1) The child custody determination has not been registered and confirmed pursuant to section 46b-115w and (A) the court issuing the order for which enforcement is sought did not have jurisdiction under section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m or a provision substantially similar to said sections; (B) the child custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m or a provision substantially similar to said sections; or (C) the respondent was entitled to notice, but notice of the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought was not given in accordance with section 46b-115g or in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or (2) the child custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed pursuant to section 46b-115w, but has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under section 46b-115k, 46b-115l or 46b-115m.

(b) The court shall award the fees, costs and expenses as provided in section 46b-115ee and may grant additional relief, including a request for the assistance of law enforcement officials.

(c) If a party called to testify refuses to answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the court may draw an adverse inference from the refusal.

(d) A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses and a defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child may not be invoked in a proceeding under sections 46b-115u to 46b-115gg, inclusive.

§ 46b-115dd. Order to take physical custody of child

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Upon the filing of a petition seeking enforcement of a child custody determination, the petitioner may file a verified application for the issuance of an order to take physical custody of the child if the child will suffer imminent, serious physical harm or will be removed from the state. The application for the order shall include the statements required by subsection (b) of section 46b-115aa. If the court, after reviewing the petition, testimony of the petitioner or other witnesses and other facts before it, finds there is a substantial likelihood that the child will suffer imminent serious physical harm or be removed from this state, it may issue an order to an appropriate law enforcement official to take physical custody of the child and place the child in the care of an appropriate person pending a hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. In making the decision on placement of the child, the court may impose conditions to ensure the appearance of the child and the person with whom the child is placed at the hearing. Such order shall include the court’s findings and the facts upon which the court made its findings. The petition and the order shall be served upon the respondent at the time the child is taken into physical custody or immediately thereafter.

(b) The court shall hold a hearing on the petition on the next business day after the order and the petition is served unless there are compelling circumstances.

§ 46b-115ee. Costs, fees and expenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

The court shall award the prevailing party necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, communication expenses, attorneys’ fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees or expenses are sought establishes that the award would be clearly inappropriate.

§ 46b-115ff. Recognition and enforcement of order issued by another state

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

A court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an enforcement order issued by another state in accordance with statutes substantially similar to this chapter which enforces a child custody determination by a court of another state unless the order has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under sections 46b-115k to 46b-115t, inclusive.

§ 46b-115gg. Appeals

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

An order enforcing a child custody determination may not be stayed pending appeal unless the court enters a temporary emergency order under section 46b-115n.

Part IV. Foreign Child Custody

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 46b-115hh. Definitions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

As used in sections 46b-115ii and 46b-115jj: “Foreign child custody determination” means any judgment, decree or other order of a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction of a foreign state providing for legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.

§ 46b-115ii. Foreign child custody determination

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

A court of this state shall treat a foreign child custody determination made under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this chapter, including reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard to all affected persons, as a child custody determination of another state under sections 46b-115 to 46b-115t, inclusive, unless such determination was rendered under child custody law which violates fundamental principles of human rights or unless such determination is repugnant to the public policy of this state.

§ 46b-115jj. Enforcement of foreign child custody order re return of child under Hague Convention

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

A court of this state shall enforce a foreign child custody determination or an order of a federal court or another state court for return of a child under The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction made under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this chapter, including reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard to all affected persons, as a child custody determination of another state under sections 46b-115u to 46b-115gg, inclusive, unless such determination was rendered under child custody law which violates fundamental principles of human rights or unless such determination is repugnant to the public policy of this state.

Title 47A. Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Chapter 830. Rights and Responsibilities of Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 47a-11e. Termination of rental agreement because of family violence

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter and chapter 831, [FN1] for rental agreements entered into or renewed on or after January 1, 2011, any tenant who (1) is a victim of family violence, as defined in section 46b-38a, and (2) reasonably believes it is necessary to vacate the dwelling unit due to fear of imminent harm to the tenant or a dependent of the tenant because of family violence, may terminate his or her rental agreement with the landlord for the dwelling unit that the tenant occupies without penalty or liability for the remaining term of the rental agreement by giving written notice to the landlord at least thirty days prior to the date the tenant intends to terminate the rental agreement. Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter and chapter 831, for rental agreements entered into or renewed on or after January 1, 2014, any tenant who (A) is a victim of sexual assault under any provision of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a, or is the parent or guardian with physical custody of a dependent who is the victim of sexual assault under section 53a-70c, and (B) reasonably believes it is necessary to vacate the dwelling unit due to fear of imminent harm to the tenant or a dependent of the tenant because of such sexual assault, may terminate his or her rental agreement with the landlord for the dwelling unit that the tenant occupies without penalty or liability for the remaining term of the rental agreement by giving written notice to the landlord at least thirty days prior to the date the tenant intends to terminate the rental agreement.

(b) Such notice shall include: (1) A statement made under oath or affirmation that (A) the tenant or a dependent of the tenant is a victim of family violence or sexual assault, as the case may be; (B) the tenant intends to terminate the rental agreement and the date of such intended termination; and (C) the tenant has vacated the premises and removed all of his or her possessions and personal effects or, prior to the date of such termination, will vacate the premises and remove all of his or her possessions and personal effects and, if such possessions and personal effects have not been removed by the date of such termination, has abandoned such possessions and personal effects; and (2) (A) a copy of a police or court record detailing an act of family violence or sexual assault against the tenant or the tenant’s dependent that is dated not more than ninety days prior to the date of the tenant’s notice, or (B) a signed written statement from an employee of the Office of Victim Services within the Judicial Department or the Office of Victim Advocate detailing an act of family violence or sexual assault against the tenant or the tenant’s dependent that is dated not more than thirty days prior to the date of the tenant’s notice.

(c) The tenant’s termination of his or her rental agreement with the landlord pursuant to this section shall not relieve (1) the tenant from liability to the landlord for any rent arrearage incurred prior to such termination of the rental agreement or from liability to the landlord for property damage caused by the tenant, or (2) any other tenant from liability to the landlord under the rental agreement.

(d) If the tenant terminates his or her rental agreement with the landlord pursuant to this section, any occupant without the right or privilege to occupy such dwelling unit shall vacate the premises prior to the date of such termination.

(e) If such tenant or occupant fails to vacate the premises as of the date of such termination, the landlord may bring an action pursuant to chapter 832. [FN2]

(f) The landlord may bring an action in the housing session of the Superior Court for injunctive relief to prevent the termination of the rental agreement if the requirements set forth in this section for such termination have not been satisfied.

Title 51. Courts

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Chapter 870. Judicial Department

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 51-5c. Automated registry of protective orders. Policies and procedures for operation of registry

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) The Chief Court Administrator shall establish and maintain an automated registry of protective orders that shall contain (1) protective or restraining orders issued by courts of this state, including, but not limited to, orders issued pursuant to sections 46b-15, 46b-16a, 46b-38c, 53a-40e, 54-1k, 54-82q and 54-82r, and (2) foreign orders of protection that have been registered in this state pursuant to section 46b-15a. The registry shall clearly indicate the date of commencement, the termination date, if specified, and the duration of any order contained therein. The Chief Court Administrator shall adopt policies and procedures for the operation of the registry, which shall include policies and procedures governing the disclosure of information in the registry to the judges of the Superior Court and employees of the Judicial Department.
(b) (1) The following information contained in the registry of protective orders shall not be subject to disclosure and may be accessed only in accordance with this section, unless otherwise ordered by the court: (A) Any information that would identify a person protected by an order contained in the registry; (B) any information that is confidential pursuant to state or federal law, including, but not limited to, any information that is confidential pursuant to a court order; and (C) any information entered in the registry pursuant to an ex parte order prior to a hearing by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
(2) Any judge of the Superior Court or any employee of the Judicial Department who is authorized by policies and procedures adopted by the Chief Court Administrator pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall have access to such information. The Chief Court Administrator may grant access to such information to personnel of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, the Department of Correction, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, the Psychiatric Security Review Board, the Division of Criminal Justice, any municipal or tribal police department within this state or any other agency, organization or person determined by the Chief Court Administrator, pursuant to policies and procedures adopted by the Chief Court Administrator, to have a legitimate interest in the information contained in the registry. Any person who obtains such information pursuant to this subdivision may use and disclose the information only in the performance of such person’s duties.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the information contained in the registry shall be provided to and may be accessed through the Connecticut on-line law enforcement communications teleprocessing system maintained by the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection. Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit public access to the Connecticut on-line law enforcement communications teleprocessing system.
(c) Any person protected by an order contained in the registry of protective orders may make a request in writing, on a form prescribed by the Chief Court Administrator, that the registry not disclose such protected person’s name and address except to the law enforcement agency for the town in which (1) such protected person resides, (2) such protected person is employed, or (3) the person subject to the order resides.
(d) Any person who has reason to believe that information concerning such person which is contained in the registry of protective orders is not consistent with a valid court order may submit a written request for verification of such information to the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district in which such order was issued. If the clerk finds that such information contained in the registry is not consistent with such order, the clerk shall promptly cause such information to be removed from the registry.
(e) The orders and other information required or permitted to be contained in the registry of protective orders may be entered in the registry in any written or electronic form approved by the Chief Court Administrator. For the purposes of this section, an order is contained in the registry if the information contained in such order and information concerning the issuance of such order is entered in the registry in a manner approved by the Chief Court Administrator pursuant to this subsection.

Chapter 890. Judicial Districts, Geographical Areas, Civil and Criminal Venue, Filing and Designation of Court Location

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 51-345. Venue in civil actions and housing matters. Return of civil process

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) Except as provided in section 51-348 and subsections (b) to (h), inclusive, of this section, all civil process shall be made returnable to a judicial district, as follows:

(1) If all of the parties reside outside this state, to the judicial district where (A) the injury occurred, (B) the transaction occurred, or (C) the property is located or lawfully attached.

(2) If the defendant is not a resident, to the judicial district where the attached property is located.

(3) If either or both the plaintiff or the defendant are residents of this state, to the judicial district where either the plaintiff or the defendant resides, except:

(A) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Manchester, East Windsor, South Windsor or Enfield, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Hartford or the judicial district of Tolland.

(B) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Plymouth, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of New Britain or the judicial district of Waterbury.

(C) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Bethany, Milford, West Haven or Woodbridge, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of New Haven or the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford.

(D) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Southbury, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford or the judicial district of Waterbury.

(E) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Darien, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Weston, Westport or Wilton, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk or the judicial district of Fairfield.

(F) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Watertown or Woodbury, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Waterbury or the judicial district of Litchfield.

(G) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Avon, Canton, Farmington or Simsbury, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Hartford or the judicial district of New Britain.

(H) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Newington, Rocky Hill or Wethersfield, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Hartford or the judicial district of New Britain, except for actions where venue is in the geographical area as provided in section 51-348 or in rules of court.

(I) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Cromwell, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Hartford or the judicial district of Middlesex.

(J) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of New Milford, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Danbury or the judicial district of Litchfield.

(K) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Windham or Ashford, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Windham or the judicial district of Tolland.

(b) In all actions involving the title to land, for trespass to land and to foreclose or redeem mortgages or liens upon real property, civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the real property is located, either entirely or in part, except:

(1) If the land is located in the town of Manchester, East Windsor, South Windsor or Enfield and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Manchester, East Windsor, South Windsor or Enfield, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Hartford or the judicial district of Tolland.

(2) If the land is located in the town of Plymouth and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Plymouth, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of New Britain or the judicial district of Waterbury.

(3) If the land is located in the town of Bethany, Milford, West Haven or Woodbridge and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Bethany, Milford, West Haven or Woodbridge, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of New Haven or the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford.

(4) If the land is located in the town of Southbury and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Southbury, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford or the judicial district of Waterbury.

(5) If the land is located in the town of Weston, Westport or Wilton and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in any one of these towns, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk or the judicial district of Fairfield.

(6) If the land is located in the town of Watertown or Woodbury and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Watertown or Woodbury, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Waterbury or the judicial district of Litchfield.

(7) If the land is located in the town of Avon, Canton, Farmington or Simsbury and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Avon, Canton, Farmington or Simsbury, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Hartford or the judicial district of New Britain.

(8) If the land is located in the town of Newington, Rocky Hill or Wethersfield and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Newington, Rocky Hill or Wethersfield, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Hartford or the judicial district of New Britain, except for actions where venue is in the geographical area as provided in section 51-348 or in rules of court.

(9) If the land is located in the town of New Milford and either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of New Milford, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Danbury or the judicial district of Litchfield.

(c) In all actions by a corporation, except actions made returnable under subsection (b), (d) or (g) of this section, civil process shall be made returnable as follows:

(1) If the plaintiff is either a domestic corporation or a United States corporation and the defendant is a resident, either (A) to the judicial district where the plaintiff has an office or place of business or (B) to the judicial district where the defendant resides.

(2) If the plaintiff is either a domestic corporation or a United States corporation and the defendant is a corporation, domestic or foreign, to the judicial district where (A) the plaintiff has an office or place of business, (B) the injury occurred, (C) the transaction occurred, or (D) the property is located or lawfully attached.

(3) If the plaintiff is a foreign corporation and the defendant is a resident, to the judicial district where the defendant resides.

(4) If the plaintiff is a foreign corporation and the defendant is a corporation, domestic or foreign, to the judicial district where (A) the injury occurred, (B) the transaction occurred, or (C) the property is located or lawfully attached.

(d) In all actions involving consumer transactions, civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides or where the transaction occurred. For the purposes of this subsection, “consumer transaction” means a transaction in which a natural person obligates himself or herself to pay for goods sold or leased, services rendered or moneys loaned for personal, family or household purposes.

(e) In all actions for the partition or sale of any property, civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the parties, or one of them, reside; but, if none of them resides in this state, then to the judicial district where all or a part of the property is located.

(f) In all actions by a nonresident executor, trustee under a will or administrator, civil process shall be made returnable to the same judicial district as would be proper if the plaintiff resided in the town where the Probate Court which granted administration is held.

(g) Venue for small claims matters shall be at Superior Court facilities designated by the Chief Court Administrator to hear such matters. In small claims matters, civil process shall be made returnable to the Superior Court facility designated by the Chief Court Administrator to serve the small claims area where the plaintiff resides, where the defendant resides or is doing business or where the transaction or injury occurred. If the plaintiff is a domestic corporation, a United States corporation, a foreign corporation or a limited liability company, civil process shall be made returnable to a Superior Court facility designated by the Chief Court Administrator to serve the small claims area where the defendant resides or is doing business or where the transaction or injury occurred.

(h) (1) In all actions involving housing matters, as defined in section 47a-68, civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the premises are located, except that actions described in subdivision (6) of section 47a-68 shall be heard in the geographical area where the premises are located unless otherwise provided in subsection (d) of section 51-348.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection concerning the judicial district to which civil process shall be made returnable:

(A) If the premises are located in Avon, Canton, Farmington, Newington, Rocky Hill, Simsbury or Wethersfield, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Hartford or the judicial district of New Britain.

(B) If the premises are located in Ansonia, Beacon Falls, Derby, Oxford, Seymour or Shelton, the action shall be made returnable to the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford. After the filing of the action, the plaintiff or the defendant may request a change in venue to the judicial district of New Haven or the judicial district of Waterbury.(C) If the premises are located in Milford, Orange or West Haven, the action shall be made returnable to the judicial district of New Haven.

Title 53A. Penal Code

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Chapter 950. Penal Code: General Provisions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-3. Definitions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Ex

cept where different meanings are expressly specified, the following terms have the following meanings when used in this title:

(1) “Person” means a human being, and, where appropriate, a public or private corporation, a limited liability company, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality;

(2) “Possess” means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property;

(3) “Physical injury” means impairment of physical condition or pain;

(4) “Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ;

(5) “Deadly physical force” means physical force which can be reasonably expected to cause death or serious physical injury;

(6) “Deadly weapon” means any weapon, whether loaded or unloaded, from which a shot may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, gravity knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, or metal knuckles. The definition of “deadly weapon” in this subdivision shall be deemed not to apply to section 29-38 or 53-206;

(7) “Dangerous instrument” means any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used or attempted or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury, and includes a “vehicle” as that term is defined in this section and includes a dog that has been commanded to attack, except a dog owned by a law enforcement agency of the state or any political subdivision thereof or of the federal government when such dog is in the performance of its duties under the direct supervision, care and control of an assigned law enforcement officer;

(8) “Vehicle” means a “motor vehicle” as defined in section 14-1, a snowmobile, any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or sail;

(9) “Peace officer” means a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or an organized local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal while exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in the performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a conservation officer or special conservation officer, as defined in section 26-5, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, 29-18a or 29-19, an adult probation officer, an official of the Department of Correction authorized by the Commissioner of Correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility, any investigator in the investigations unit of the office of the State Treasurer, an inspector of motor vehicles in the Department of Motor Vehicles, who is certified under the provisions of sections 7-294a to 7-294e, inclusive, a United States marshal or deputy marshal, any special agent of the federal government authorized to enforce the provisions of Title 21 of the United States Code, or a member of a law enforcement unit of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe or the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut created and governed by a memorandum of agreement under section 47-65c who is certified as a police officer by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council pursuant to sections 7-294a to 7-294e, inclusive;

(10) “Firefighter” means any agent of a municipality whose duty it is to protect life and property therein as a member of a duly constituted fire department whether professional or volunteer;

(11) A person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct;

(12) A person acts “knowingly” with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists;

(13) A person acts “recklessly” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation;

(14) A person acts with “criminal negligence” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation;

(15) “Machine gun” means a weapon of any description, irrespective of size, by whatever name known, loaded or unloaded, from which a number of shots or bullets may be rapidly or automatically discharged from a magazine with one continuous pull of the trigger and includes a submachine gun;

(16) “Rifle” means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed metallic cartridge to fire only a single projectile through a rifled bore for each single pull of the trigger;

(17) “Shotgun” means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun shell to fire through a smooth bore either a number of ball shot or a single projectile for each single pull of the trigger;

(18) “Pistol” or “revolver” means any firearm having a barrel less than twelve inches;

(19) “Firearm” means any sawed-off shotgun, machine gun, rifle, shotgun, pistol, revolver or other weapon, whether loaded or unloaded from which a shot may be discharged;

(20) “Electronic defense weapon” means a weapon which by electronic impulse or current is capable of immobilizing a person temporarily, but is not capable of inflicting death or serious physical injury, including a stun gun or other conductive energy device;

(21) “Martial arts weapon” means a nunchaku, kama, kasari-fundo, octagon sai, tonfa or chinese star;

(22) “Employee of an emergency medical service organization” means an ambulance driver, emergency medical technician or paramedic as defined in section 19a-175;(23) “Railroad property” means all tangible property owned, leased or operated by a railroad carrier including, but not limited to, a right-of-way, track, roadbed, bridge, yard, shop, station, tunnel, viaduct, trestle, depot, warehouse, terminal or any other structure or appurtenance or equipment owned, leased or used in the operation of a railroad carrier including a train, locomotive, engine, railroad car, signals or safety device or work equipment or rolling stock.

Chapter 952. Penal Code: Offenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Part I. Definition and Classification

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-25. Felony: Definition, classification, designation

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year is a felony.

(b) Felonies are classified for the purposes of sentence as follows: (1) Class A, (2) class B, (3) class C, (4) class D, (5) class E, (6) unclassified, and (7) capital felonies under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012.

(c) The particular classification of each felony defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section defining it.

(d) Any offense defined in any section of the general statutes which, by virtue of an expressly specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection (a) of this section, but for which a particular classification is not expressly designated, shall be deemed: (1) A class E felony if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is in excess of one year but not more than three years; or (2) an unclassified felony if the maximum term of imprisonment is otherwise within the definition set forth in subsection (a) of this section.

Part II. Sentences and Sentencing Procedure

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-35a. Imprisonment for felony committed on or after July 1, 1981. Definite sentence. Authorized term

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and, unless the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically provides otherwise, the term shall be fixed by the court as follows:

(1) (A) For a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a, or (B) for the class A felony of murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect on or after April 25, 2012, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release;

(2) For the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor more than life;

(3) For the class A felony of aggravated sexual assault of a minor under section 53a-70c, a term not less than twenty-five years or more than fifty years;

(4) For a class A felony other than an offense specified in subdivision (2) or (3) of this section, a term not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years;

(5) For the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than five years nor more than forty years;

(6) For a class B felony other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than one year nor more than twenty years;

(7) For a class C felony, a term not less than one year nor more than ten years;

(8) For a class D felony, a term not more than five years;

(9) For a class E felony, a term not more than three years; and

(10) For an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime.

Part V. Assault and Related Offenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-59. Assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (2) with intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or (4) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person and while aided by two or more other persons actually present, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.

(b) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony provided (1) any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and (2) any person found guilty under subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim of the offense is a person under ten years of age or if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in section 53a-146, and the actor knew the victim was a witness.

§ 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) the actor recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (4) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, the actor intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to such person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or (5) the actor is a parolee from a correctional institution and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, the actor causes physical injury to such employee or member; or (6) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person by rendering such other person unconscious, and without provocation by such other person, the actor causes such injury to such other person by striking such other person on the head; or (7) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person by striking or kicking such person in the head while such person is in a lying position.

(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony or, if the offense resulted in serious physical injury, a class C felony.

§ 53a-61. Assault in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.

(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which may not be suspended or reduced.

§ 53a-61a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor: One year not suspendable

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the third degree when such person commits assault in the third degree under section 53a-61 and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with intellectual disability.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the third degree and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the third degree upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with intellectual disability, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person with intellectual disability.

(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which shall not be suspended or reduced.

§ 53a-61aa. Threatening in the first degree: Class D or class C felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person (1) (A) threatens to commit any crime involving the use of a hazardous substance with the intent to terrorize another person, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, evacuation or inconvenience; (2) (A) threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience; (3) commits threatening in the second degree as provided in section 53a-62, and in the commission of such offense such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person’s words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm; or (4) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection with the intent to cause an evacuation of a building or the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section 19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities. No person shall be found guilty of threatening in the first degree under subdivision (3) of this subsection and threatening in the second degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “hazardous substance” means any physical, chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity, concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health and “religiously-affiliated community center” means real property used for the provision of recreational, social or educational services that is owned or leased by a nonprofit organization that holds such property out as being affiliated with an organized religion.

(c) Threatening in the first degree is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section is a class C felony.

§ 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2) (A) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (B) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, or (3) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection and the person threatened is in a building or on the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section 19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “religiously-affiliated community center” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-61aa.

(c) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class D felony.

§ 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person.

(b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

§ 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.

(b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

Part VI. Sex Offenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse.
(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the offense is a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age or the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section. Any person found guilty under said subdivision (1) or (2) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age or of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under sixteen years of age.
(3) Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least ten years, a portion of which may be suspended, except as provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, or a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of section 53a-29 and except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a court may suspend a portion of a sentence imposed under this subsection and impose a period of supervised probation pursuant to subsection (f) of section 53a-29.

§ 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70, and in the commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person’s words or conduct that such person possesses a deadly weapon, (2) with intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of the victim’s body, such person causes such injury to such victim, (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life such person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to the victim, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such victim, or (4) such person is aided by two or more other persons actually present. No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and aggravated sexual assault in the first degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony. Any person found guilty under this section of a class B felony shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least ten years, five years of which may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(2) Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age. Any person found guilty under this section of a class A felony shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, except that, if such person committed sexual assault in the first degree by violating subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-70, as amended by this act, and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, twenty years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of section 53a-29 and except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a court may suspend a portion of a sentence imposed under this subdivision and impose a period of probation pursuant to subsection (f) of section 53a-29, or may impose a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28.

§ 53a-71. Sexual assault in the second degree: Class C or B felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen years of age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more than three years older than such other person; or (2) such other person is impaired because of mental disability or disease to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse; or (3) such other person is physically helpless; or (4) such other person is less than eighteen years old and the actor is such person’s guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such person’s welfare; or (5) such other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (6) the actor is a psychotherapist and such other person is (A) a patient of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs during the psychotherapy session, (B) a patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (7) the actor accomplishes the sexual intercourse by means of false representation that the sexual intercourse is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (8) the actor is a school employee and such other person is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor; or (9) the actor is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction and such other person is a recipient of coaching or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age; or (10) the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor’s professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person’s participation in a program or activity, and such other person is under eighteen years of age; or (11) such other person is placed or receiving services under the direction of the Commissioner of Developmental Services in any public or private facility or program and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person.

(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which nine months of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

§ 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D or C felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) subjects another person to sexual contact and such other person is mentally incapacitated or impaired because of mental disability or disease to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (3) engages in sexual intercourse with another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class D felony or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class C felony.

§ 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1) Such person subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such other person, or (B) thirteen years of age or older but under fifteen years of age and the actor is more than three years older than such other person, or (C) physically helpless, or (D) less than eighteen years old and the actor is such other person’s guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such other person’s welfare, or (E) in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person’s consent; or (3) such person engages in sexual contact with an animal or dead body; or (4) such person is a psychotherapist and subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) a patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs during the psychotherapy session, or (B) a patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (5) such person subjects another person to sexual contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by means of false representation that the sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (6) such person is a school employee and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor; or (7) such person is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a recipient of coaching or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age; or (8) such person subjects another person to sexual contact and (A) the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor’s professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person’s participation in a program or activity, and (B) such other person is under eighteen years of age; or (9) such person subjects another person to sexual contact who is placed or receiving services under the direction of the Commissioner of Developmental Services in any public or private facility or program and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person.(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class D felony.

Part VII. Kidnapping and Related Offenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-91. Definitions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

The following definitions are applicable to this part:

(1) “Restrain” means to restrict a person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As used herein “without consent” means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.

(2) “Abduct” means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (B) using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.

(3) “Relative” means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.

§ 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B) to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of a government function.

(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.

§ 53a-92a. Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm: Class A felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm when such person commits kidnapping in the first degree as provided in section 53a-92, and in the commission of said crime such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person’s words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm is a class A felony.

§ 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person.

(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

§ 53a-94a. Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the second degree, as provided in section 53a-94, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or uses or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

§ 53a-95. Unlawful restraint in the first degree: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.

(b) Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a class D felony.

§ 53a-96. Unlawful restraint in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the second degree when he restrains another person.

(b) Unlawful restraint in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

§ 53a-97. Custodial interference in the first degree: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree when he commits custodial interference in the second degree as provided in section 53a-98: (1) Under circumstances which expose the child or person taken or enticed from lawful custody or the child held after a request by the lawful custodian for his return to a risk that his safety will be endangered or his health materially impaired; or (2) by taking, enticing or detaining the child or person out of this state.

(b) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class D felony.

§ 53a-98. Custodial interference in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when: (1) Being a relative of a child who is less than sixteen years old and intending to hold such child permanently or for a protracted period and knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; (2) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person or any person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution; or (3) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he holds, keeps or otherwise refuses to return a child who is less than sixteen years old to such child’s lawful custodian after a request by such custodian for the return of such child.

(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

§ 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of substitution of children when, having been temporarily entrusted with a child less than one year old and, intending to deceive a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of such child, he substitutes, produces or returns to such parent, guardian or custodian a child other than the one entrusted.

(b) Substitution of children is a class D felony.

Part VIII. Burglary, Criminal Trespass, Arson, Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-100. Definitions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) The following definitions are applicable to this part: (1) “Building” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, railroad car or other structure or vehicle or any building with a valid certificate of occupancy. Where a building consists of separate units, such as, but not limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building; (2) “dwelling” means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present; (3) “night” means the period between thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise; and (4) “public land” means a state park, state forest or municipal park or any other publicly-owned land that is open to the public for active or passive recreation.

(b) The following definition is applicable to sections 53a-100aa to 53a-106, inclusive: A person “enters or remains unlawfully” in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.

§ 53a-100aa. Home invasion: Class A felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of home invasion when such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein, and, in the course of committing the offense: (1) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, such person or another participant in the crime commits or attempts to commit a felony against the person of another person other than a participant in the crime who is actually present in such dwelling, or (2) such person is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.

(b) An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing” the offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.

(c) Home invasion is a class A felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

§ 53a-101. Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when (1) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or (2) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and, in the course of committing the offense, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone, or (3) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein.

(b) An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing” the offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.

(c) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

§ 53a-102. Burglary in the second degree: Class C felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.

(b) Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.

§ 53a-103. Burglary in the third degree: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.

(b) Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.

§ 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when: (1) Knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated to such person by the owner of the premises or other authorized person; or (2) such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-16a, 46b-38c, 54-1k, or 54-82r by the Superior Court; or (3) such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person; or (4) knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains on public land after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated to such person by an authorized official of the state or a municipality, as the case may be.

(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

§ 53a-108. Criminal trespass in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, (1) such person enters or remains in a building, or (2) such person enters or remains on public land.

(b) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

§ 53a-109. Criminal trespass in the third degree: Class C misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so: (1) Such person enters or remains in premises which are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or are fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, or which belong to the state and are appurtenant to any state institution; or (2) such person enters or remains in any premises for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing; or (3) such person enters or remains on public land which is posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.

(b) Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class C misdemeanor.

Part IX. Larceny, Robbery and Related Offenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-119. Larceny defined

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

A person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner. Larceny includes, but is not limited to:

(1) Embezzlement. A person commits embezzlement when he wrongfully appropriates to himself or to another property of another in his care or custody.

(2) Obtaining property by false pretenses. A person obtains property by false pretenses when, by any false token, pretense or device, he obtains from another any property, with intent to defraud him or any other person.

(3) Obtaining property by false promise. A person obtains property by false promise when, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by means of a representation, express or implied, that he or a third person will in the future engage in particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or does not believe that the third person intends to engage in such conduct. In any prosecution for larceny based upon a false promise, the defendant’s intention or belief that the promise would not be performed may not be established by or inferred from the fact alone that such promise was not performed.

(4) Acquiring property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake. A person who comes into control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the recipient is guilty of larceny if, with purpose to deprive the owner thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to it.

(5) Extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: (A) Cause physical injury to some person in the future; or (B) cause damage to property; or (C) engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or (D) accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or (E) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or (F) cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person’s business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed extortion when the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or (G) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or (H) use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or (I) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.

(6) Defrauding of public community. A person is guilty of defrauding a public community who (A) authorizes, certifies, attests or files a claim for benefits or reimbursement from a local, state or federal agency which he knows is false; or (B) knowingly accepts the benefits from a claim he knows is false; or (C) as an officer or agent of any public community, with intent to prejudice it, appropriates its property to the use of any person or draws any order upon its treasury or presents or aids in procuring to be allowed any fraudulent claim against such community. For purposes of this subdivision such order or claim shall be deemed to be property.

(7) Theft of services. A person is guilty of theft of services when: (A) With intent to avoid payment for restaurant services rendered, or for services rendered to him as a transient guest at a hotel, motel, inn, tourist cabin, rooming house or comparable establishment, he avoids such payment by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, by stealth, or by any misrepresentation of fact which he knows to be false; or (B) (i) except as provided in section 3 of public act 14-199 of the 2014 February Regular Session, with intent to obtain railroad, subway, bus, air, taxi or any other public transportation service without payment of the lawful charge therefor or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such transportation service which has been rendered to him, he obtains such service or avoids payment therefor by force, intimidation, stealth, deception or mechanical tampering, or by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, or (ii) with intent to obtain the use of equipment, including a motor vehicle, without payment of the lawful charge therefor, or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such use which has been permitted him, he obtains such use or avoids such payment therefor by means of any false or fraudulent representation, fraudulent concealment, false pretense or personation, trick, artifice or device, including, but not limited to, a false representation as to his name, residence, employment, or driver’s license; or (C) obtaining or having control over labor in the employ of another person, or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another person, knowing that he is not entitled to the use thereof, and with intent to derive a commercial or other substantial benefit for himself or a third person, he uses or diverts to the use of himself or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities.

(8) Receiving stolen property. A person is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen property if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property knowing that it has probably been stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with purpose to restore it to the owner. A person who accepts or receives the use or benefit of a public utility commodity which customarily passes through a meter, knowing such commodity (A) has been diverted therefrom, (B) has not been correctly registered or (C) has not been registered at all by a meter, is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen property.

(9) Shoplifting. A person is guilty of shoplifting who intentionally takes possession of any goods, wares or merchandise offered or exposed for sale by any store or other mercantile establishment with the intention of converting the same to his own use, without paying the purchase price thereof. A person intentionally concealing unpurchased goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store, shall be prima facie presumed to have so concealed such article with the intention of converting the same to his own use without paying the purchase price thereof.

(10) Conversion of a motor vehicle. A person is guilty of conversion of a motor vehicle who, after renting or leasing a motor vehicle under an agreement in writing which provides for the return of such vehicle to a particular place at a particular time, fails to return the vehicle to such place within the time specified, and who thereafter fails to return such vehicle to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand to him for the return of the vehicle by registered mail addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement or, in the absence of such address, to his last-known address as recorded in the records of the motor vehicle department of the state in which he is licensed to operate a motor vehicle. It shall be a complete defense to any civil action arising out of or involving the arrest or detention of any person to whom such demand was sent by registered mail that he failed to return the vehicle to any place of business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the mailing of such demand.

(11) Obtaining property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine. A person obtains property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when such person obtains property by knowingly using in a fraudulent manner an automated teller machine with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person. In any prosecution for larceny based upon fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the machine was located. In any prosecution for larceny based upon more than one instance of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, (A) all such instances in any six-month period may be combined and charged as one offense, with the value of all property obtained thereby being accumulated, and (B) the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in any of the towns in which a machine which was fraudulently used was located. For the purposes of this subsection, “automated teller machine” means an unmanned device at which banking transactions including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers may be conducted, and includes, without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale terminal as defined in section 36a-2.

(12) Library theft. A person is guilty of library theft when (A) he conceals on his person or among his belongings a book or other archival library materials, belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility with the intention of removing the same from the library facility without authority or without authority removes a book or other archival library materials from such library facility or (B) he mutilates a book or other archival library materials belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility, so as to render it unusable or reduce its value. The term “book or other archival library materials” includes any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual material in any format, magnetic or other tape, electronic data-processing record, artifact or other documentary, written or printed material regardless of physical form or characteristics, or any part thereof, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of a library facility. The term “library facility” includes any public library, any library of an educational institution, organization or society, any museum, any repository of public records and any archives.

(13) Conversion of leased property. (A) A person is guilty of conversion of leased personal property who, with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third person, after renting or leasing such property under an agreement in writing which provides for the return of such property to a particular place at a particular time, sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property or any part thereof, and who thereafter fails to return such property to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the lessor within one hundred ninety-two hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand to him for the return of the property by registered or certified mail addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement, unless a more recent address is known to the lessor. Acknowledgment of the receipt of such written demand by the lessee shall not be necessary to establish that one hundred ninety-two hours have passed since such written demand was sent. (B) Any person, being in possession of personal property other than wearing apparel, received upon a written lease, who, with intent to defraud, sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property, or any part thereof, shall be prima facie presumed to have done so with the intention of converting such property to his own use. (C) A person who uses a false or fictitious name or address in obtaining such leased personal property shall be prima facie presumed to have obtained such leased personal property with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third person. (D) “Leased personal property”, as used in this subdivision, means any personal property received pursuant to a written contract, by which one owning such property, the lessor, grants to another, the lessee, the right to possess, use and enjoy such personal property for a specified period of time for a specified sum, but does not include personal property that is rented or leased pursuant to chapter 743i. [FN1]

(14) Failure to pay prevailing rate of wages. A person is guilty of failing to pay the prevailing rate of wages when he (A) files a certified payroll, in accordance with section 31-53 which he knows is false, in violation of section 53a-157a, and (B) fails to pay to an employee or to an employee welfare fund the amount attested to in the certified payroll with the intent to convert such amount to his own use or to the use of a third party.

(15) Theft of utility service. A person is guilty of theft of utility service when he intentionally obtains electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service that is available only for compensation: (A) By deception or threat or by false token, slug or other means including, but not limited to, electronic or mechanical device or unauthorized use of a confidential identification or authorization code or through fraudulent statements, to avoid payment for the service by himself or another person; or (B) by tampering or making connection with or disconnecting the meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment or by manufacturing, modifying, altering, programming, reprogramming or possessing any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof or by disguising the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by a supplier of electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service, without the consent of such supplier, in order to avoid payment for the service by himself or another person; or (C) with intent to avoid payment by himself or another person for a prospective or already rendered service the charge or compensation for which is measured by a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service, by tampering with such meter or device or by attempting in any manner to prevent such meter or device from performing its measuring function, without the consent of the supplier of the service. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person to whom the service is billed has the intent to obtain the service and to avoid making payment for the service if, without the consent of the supplier of the service: (i) Any meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment has been tampered with or connected or disconnected, (ii) any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof has been modified, altered, programmed, reprogrammed or possessed, (iii) the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by the supplier of the service have been disguised, or (iv) a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service has been tampered with or prevented from performing its measuring function. The presumption does not apply if the person to whose service the condition applies has received such service for less than thirty-one days or until the service supplier has made at least one meter or service reading and provided a billing statement to the person as to whose service the condition applies. The presumption does not apply with respect to wireless radio communications.

(16) Air bag fraud. A person is guilty of air bag fraud when such person, with intent to defraud another person, obtains property from such other person or a third person by knowingly selling, installing or reinstalling any object, including any counterfeit air bag or nonfunctional air bag, as such terms are defined in section 14-106d, in lieu of an air bag that was designed in accordance with federal safety requirements as provided in 49 CFR 571.208, as amended, and which is proper for the make, model and year of the vehicle, as part of the vehicle inflatable restraint system.

(17) Theft of motor fuel. A person is guilty of theft of motor fuel when such person (A) delivers or causes to be delivered motor fuel, as defined in section 14-327a, into the fuel tank of a vehicle or into a portable container, or into both, on the premises of a retail dealer, as defined in section 14-318, and (B) with the intent to appropriate such motor fuel to himself or a third person, leaves such premises without paying the purchase price for such motor fuel.

(18) Failure to repay surplus Citizens’ Election Fund grant funds. A person is guilty of failure to repay surplus Citizens’ Election Fund grant funds when such person fails to return to the Citizens’ Election Fund any surplus funds from a grant made pursuant to sections 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, not later than ninety days after the primary or election for which the grant is made.

§ 53a-129a. Identity theft defined

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person commits identity theft when such person knowingly uses personal identifying information of another person to obtain or attempt to obtain money, credit, goods, services, property or medical information without the consent of such other person.

(b) As used in this section, “personal identifying information” means any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual including, but not limited to, such individual’s name, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, motor vehicle operator’s license number, Social Security number, employee identification number, employer or taxpayer identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, health insurance identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation.

§ 53a-129b. Identity theft in the first degree: Class B felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the first degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a, of another person and (1) such other person is under sixty years of age, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds ten thousand dollars, or (2) such other person is sixty years of age or older, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds five thousand dollars.

(b) Identity theft in the first degree is a class B felony.

§ 53a-129c. Identity theft in the second degree: Class C felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the second degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a, of another person and such other person is under sixty years of age, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds five thousand dollars, or such other person is sixty years of age or older.

(b) Identity theft in the second degree is a class C felony.

§ 53a-129d. Identity theft in the third degree: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the third degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a.

(b) Identity theft in the third degree is a class D felony.

§ 53a-130. Criminal impersonation: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when such person: (1) Impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another; or (2) pretends to be a state marshal with intent to obtain a benefit or induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense; or (3) pretends to be a representative of some person or organization and does an act in such pretended capacity with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another; or (4) pretends to be a public servant other than a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or shield by which such public servant is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense; or (5) with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, uses an electronic device to impersonate another and such act results in personal injury or financial loss to another or the initiation of judicial proceedings against another.

(b) The provisions of subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his or her official duties.

(c) Criminal impersonation is a class A misdemeanor.

Part XIII. Riot and Related Offenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-175. Riot in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of riot in the first degree when simultaneously with six or more other persons he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm, and in the course of and as a result of such conduct, a person other than one of the participants suffers physical injury or substantial property damage occurs.

(b) Riot in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

§ 53a-176. Riot in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of riot in the second degree when, simultaneously with two or more other persons, he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.

(b) Riot in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

§ 53a-178. Inciting to riot: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of inciting to riot when he advocates, urges or organizes six or more persons to engage in tumultuous and violent conduct of a kind likely to cause public alarm.

(b) Inciting to riot is a class A misdemeanor.

Part XIV. Breach of the Peace, Harassment and Related Offenses(Refs & Annos)

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-181c. Stalking in the first degree: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when such person commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section 53a-181d and (1) such person has previously been convicted of a violation of section 53a-181d, or (2) such conduct violates a court order in effect at the time of the offense, or (3) the other person is under sixteen years of age.

(b) Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony.

§ 53a-181d. Stalking in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) For the purposes of this section, “course of conduct” means two or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which a person directly, indirectly or through a third party, by any action, method, device or means, including, but not limited to, electronic or social media, (1) follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates with or sends unwanted gifts to, a person, or (2) interferes with a person’s property, and “emotional distress” means significant mental or psychological suffering or distress that may or may not require medical or other professional treatment or counseling.

(b) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when:

(1) Such person knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to (A) fear for such person’s physical safety or the physical safety of a third person, or (B) suffer emotional distress; or

(2) Such person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear that such person’s employment, business or career is threatened, where (A) such conduct consists of the actor telephoning to, appearing at or initiating communication or contact at such other person’s place of employment or business, provided the actor was previously and clearly informed to cease such conduct, and (B) such conduct does not consist of constitutionally protected activity.

(c) Stalking in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

§ 53a-182b. Harassment in the first degree: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of harassment in the first degree when, with the intent to harass, annoy, alarm or terrorize another person, he threatens to kill or physically injure that person or any other person, and communicates such threat by telephone, or by telegraph, mail, computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm and has been convicted of a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or 53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216. For the purposes of this section, “convicted” means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) For purposes of this section, such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the telephone call was made or where it was received.

(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by one or more psychiatrists.

(d) Harassment in the first degree is a class D felony.

§ 53a-183. Harassment in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when: (1) By telephone, he addresses another in or uses indecent or obscene language; or (2) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or (3) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.

(b) For purposes of this section such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the telephone call was made, or at the place where it was received.

(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by one or more psychiatrists.

(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.

Part XVII. Tampering with Private Communications, Eavesdropping, Voyeurism and Unlawful Dissemination of Intimate Messages

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-188. Tampering with private communications: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of tampering with private communications when: (1) Knowing that he does not have the consent of the sender or receiver, he obtains from an employee, officer or representative of a telephone or telegraph corporation, by connivance, deception, intimidation or in any other manner, information with respect to the contents or nature of a telephonic or telegraphic communication; or (2) knowing that he does not have the consent of the sender or receiver, and being an employee, officer or representative of a telephone or telegraph corporation, he knowingly divulges to another person the contents or nature of a telephonic or telegraphic communication.

(b) Tampering with private communications is a class A misdemeanor.

§ 53a-189. Eavesdropping: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in wiretapping or mechanical overhearing of a conversation.

(b) Eavesdropping is a class D felony.

§ 53a-189a. Voyeurism: Class D or C felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of voyeurism when, (1) with malice, such person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise records the image of another person (A) without the knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, (2) with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person or any other person, such person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise records the image of another person (A) without the knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, (3) with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person, commits simple trespass, as provided in section 53a-110a, and observes, in other than a casual or cursory manner, another person (A) without the knowledge or consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is inside a dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, and not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, or (4) with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person or any other person, such person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise records the genitals, pubic area or buttocks of another person or the undergarments or stockings that clothe the genitals, pubic area or buttocks of another person (A) without the knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while such genitals, pubic area, buttocks, undergarments or stockings are not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether such other person is or is not in a public place.

(b) For purposes of this section, “in plain view” does not include any view that is achieved by photographing, filming, videotaping or otherwise recording under or around a person’s clothing, and “public place” means public place, as defined in section 53a-186.

(c) Voyeurism is (1) a class D felony for a first offense, except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, (2) a class C felony for any subsequent offense, and (3) a class C felony for a first offense when (A) such person has been previously convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (f) of section 53a-29, or (B) the intended subject of the offense is a person under sixteen years of age.(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 54-193, no person may be prosecuted for an offense under subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section except within five years from the date of the offense, or within five years from the date the subject of the offense discovers the existence of the photograph, film, videotape or other recording that constitutes a violation of subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section, whichever is later.

§ 53a-189b. Disseminating voyeuristic material: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of disseminating voyeuristic material when such person disseminates a photograph, film, videotape or other recorded image of another person without the consent of such other person and knowing that such photograph, film, videotape or image was taken, made or recorded in violation of section 53a-189a.

(b) Disseminating voyeuristic material is a class D felony.

§ 53a-189c. Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image: Class A misdemeanor

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of unlawful dissemination of an intimate image when (1) such person intentionally disseminates by electronic or other means a photograph, film, videotape or other recorded image of (A) the genitals, pubic area or buttocks of another person with less than a fully opaque covering of such body part, or the breast of such other person who is female with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion of such breast below the top of the nipple, or (B) another person engaged in sexual intercourse, as defined in section 53a-193, (2) such person disseminates such image without the consent of such other person, knowing that such other person understood that the image would not be so disseminated, and (3) such other person suffers harm as a result of such dissemination. For purposes of this subsection, “disseminate” means to sell, give, provide, lend, trade, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate, present, exhibit, advertise or otherwise offer.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this subsection shall not apply to:

(1) Any image described in subsection (a) of this section of such other person if such image resulted from voluntary exposure or engagement in sexual intercourse by such other person, in a public place, as defined in section 53a-181, or in a commercial setting;

(2) Any image described in subsection (a) of this section of such other person, if such other person is not clearly identifiable; or

(3) Any image described in subsection (a) of this section of such other person, if the dissemination of such image serves the public interest.

(c) Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image is a class A misdemeanor.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability on the provider of an interactive computer service, as defined in 47 USC 230, an information service, as defined in 47 USC 153, or a telecommunications service, as defined in section 16-247a, for content provided by another person.

Part XIX. Coercion

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-192. Coercion: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of coercion when he compels or induces another person to engage in conduct which such other person has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which such other person has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in such other person a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will: (1) Commit any criminal offense; or (2) accuse any person of a criminal offense; or (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair any person’s credit or business repute; or (4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.

(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution based on subdivision (2), (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section that the actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other person to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting from further misbehavior or making good a wrong done.

(c) Coercion is a class A misdemeanor except, if the threat is to commit a felony, coercion is a class D felony.

Part XXI. Miscellaneous Offenses

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 53a-217. Criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon: Class D felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon when such person possesses a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon and (1) has been convicted of a felony committed prior to, on or after October 1, 2013, or of a violation of section 21a-279, 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d committed on or after October 1, 2013, (2) has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120, (3) has been discharged from custody within the preceding twenty years after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, (4) knows that such person is subject to (A) a restraining or protective order of a court of this state that has been issued against such person, after notice has been provided to such person, in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, or (B) a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, (5) (A) has been confined on or after October 1, 2013, in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding sixty months by order of a probate court, or with respect to any person who holds a valid permit or certificate that was issued or renewed under the provisions of section 29-28 or 29-36f in effect prior to October 1, 2013, such person has been confined in such hospital within the preceding twelve months, or (B) has been voluntarily admitted on or after October 1, 2013, to a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding six months for care and treatment of a psychiatric disability, unless the person (i) was voluntarily admitted solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person as those terms are defined in section 17a-680, or (ii) is a police officer who was voluntarily admitted and had his or her firearm, ammunition or electronic defense weapon used in the performance of the police officer’s official duties returned in accordance with section 4 of public act 19-17, (6) knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to subsection (d) of section 29-38c after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, or (7) is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing or receiving a firearm pursuant to 18 USC 922(g)(4). For the purposes of this section, “convicted” means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, “ammunition” means a loaded cartridge, consisting of a primed case, propellant or projectile, designed for use in any firearm, and a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year may be imposed shall be deemed an unclassified felony.(b) Criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon is a class C felony, for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

§ 53a-217c. Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver: Class C felony

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver when such person possesses a pistol or revolver, as defined in section 29-27, and (1) has been convicted of a felony committed prior to, on or after October 1, 2013, or of a violation of section 21a-279, 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d committed on or after October 1, 1994, (2) has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120, (3) has been discharged from custody within the preceding twenty years after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, (4) (A) has been confined prior to October 1, 2013, in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding twelve months by order of a probate court, or has been confined on or after October 1, 2013, in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding sixty months by order of a probate court, or, with respect to any person who holds a valid permit or certificate that was issued or renewed under the provisions of section 29-28 or 29-36f in effect prior to October 1, 2013, such person has been confined in such hospital within the preceding twelve months, or (B) has been voluntarily admitted on or after October 1, 2013, to a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding six months for care and treatment of a psychiatric disability, unless the person (i) was voluntarily admitted solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person as those terms are defined in section 17a-680, or (ii) is a police officer who was voluntarily admitted and had his or her firearm, ammunition or electronic defense weapon used in the performance of the police officer’s official duties returned in accordance with section 4 of public act 19-17, (5) knows that such person is subject to (A) a restraining or protective order of a court of this state that has been issued against such person, after notice has been provided to such person, in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, or (B) a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, (6) knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to subsection (d) of section 29-38c after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, (7) is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing or receiving a firearm pursuant to 18 USC 922(g)(4), or (8) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States. For the purposes of this section, “convicted” means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.(b) Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver is a class C felony, for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

Rules for the Superior Court

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

General Provisions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

Chapter 4. Pleadings

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

§ 4-5. Notice Required for Ex Parte Temporary Injunctions

Updated: 
October 29, 2020

(a) No temporary injunction shall be granted without notice to each opposing party unless the applicant certifies one of the following to the court in writing:

(1) facts showing that within a reasonable time prior to presenting the application the applicant gave notice to each opposing party of the time when and the place where the application would be presented and provided a copy of the application; or

(2) the applicant in good faith attempted but was unable to give notice to an opposing party or parties, specifying the efforts made to contact such party or parties; or

(3) facts establishing good cause why the applicant should not be required to give notice to each opposing party.

(b) When an application for a temporary injunction is granted without notice or without a hearing, the court shall schedule an expeditious hearing as to whether the temporary injunction should remain in effect. Any temporary injunction which was granted without a hearing shall automatically expire thirty days following its issuance, unless the court, following a hearing, determines that said injunction should remain in effect.

(c) For purposes of this rule, notice to the opposing party means notice to the opposing party’s attorney if the applicant knows who the opposing party’s attorney is; if the applicant does not know who the opposing party’s attorney is, notice shall be given to the opposing party. If the temporary injunction is sought against the state of Connecticut, a city or town, or an officer or agency thereof, notice shall be given to the attorney general to the city or town attorney or corporation counsel, as the case may be.

(d) This section shall not apply to applications for relief from physical abuse filed pursuant to Gen. Stat. sec. 46b-15 or to motions for orders of temporary custody in juvenile matters filed pursuant to Gen. Stat. Sec. 46b-129.