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Legal Information: Illinois

Statutes: Illinois

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Statutes: Illinois

Chapter 430. Public Safety

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 65. Firearms Owners Identification Card Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

65/8. Grounds for denial and revocation

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 8. Grounds for denial and revocation. The Department of State Police has authority to deny an application for or to revoke and seize a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card previously issued under this Act only if the Department finds that the applicant or the person to whom such card was issued is or was at the time of issuance:

(a) A person under 21 years of age who has been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a traffic offense or adjudged delinquent;

(b) This subsection (b) applies through the 180th day following the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 101st General Assembly. A person under 21 years of age who does not have the written consent of his parent or guardian to acquire and possess firearms and firearm ammunition, or whose parent or guardian has revoked such written consent, or where such parent or guardian does not qualify to have a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card;

(b-5) This subsection (b-5) applies on and after the 181st day following the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 101st General Assembly. A person under 21 years of age who is not an active duty member of the United States Armed Forces and does not have the written consent of his or her parent or guardian to acquire and possess firearms and firearm ammunition, or whose parent or guardian has revoked such written consent, or where such parent or guardian does not qualify to have a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card;

(c) A person convicted of a felony under the laws of this or any other jurisdiction;

(d) A person addicted to narcotics;

(e) A person who has been a patient of a mental health facility within the past 5 years or a person who has been a patient in a mental health facility more than 5 years ago who has not received the certification required under subsection (u) of this Section. An active law enforcement officer employed by a unit of government who is denied, revoked, or has his or her Firearm Owner’s Identification Card seized under this subsection (e) may obtain relief as described in subsection (c-5) of Section 10 of this Act if the officer did not act in a manner threatening to the officer, another person, or the public as determined by the treating clinical psychologist or physician, and the officer seeks mental health treatment;

(f) A person whose mental condition is of such a nature that it poses a clear and present danger to the applicant, any other person or persons or the community;

(g) A person who has an intellectual disability;

(h) A person who intentionally makes a false statement in the Firearm Owner’s Identification Card application;

(i) An alien who is unlawfully present in the United States under the laws of the United States;

(i-5) An alien who has been admitted to the United States under a non-immigrant visa (as that term is defined in Section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26))), except that this subsection (i-5) does not apply to any alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States under a non-immigrant visa if that alien is:

(1) admitted to the United States for lawful hunting or sporting purposes;

(2) an official representative of a foreign government who is:

(A) accredited to the United States Government or the Government’s mission to an international organization having its headquarters in the United States; or

(B) en route to or from another country to which that alien is accredited;

(3) an official of a foreign government or distinguished foreign visitor who has been so designated by the Department of State;

(4) a foreign law enforcement officer of a friendly foreign government entering the United States on official business; or

(5) one who has received a waiver from the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(y)(3);

(j) (Blank);

(k) A person who has been convicted within the past 5 years of battery, assault, aggravated assault, violation of an order of protection, or a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction, in which a firearm was used or possessed;

(l) A person who has been convicted of domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, or a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction committed before, on or after January 1, 2012 (the effective date of Public Act 97-158). If the applicant or person who has been previously issued a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card under this Act knowingly and intelligently waives the right to have an offense described in this paragraph (l) tried by a jury, and by guilty plea or otherwise, results in a conviction for an offense in which a domestic relationship is not a required element of the offense but in which a determination of the applicability of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) is made under Section 112A-11.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, an entry by the court of a judgment of conviction for that offense shall be grounds for denying an application for and for revoking and seizing a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card previously issued to the person under this Act;

(m) (Blank);

(n) A person who is prohibited from acquiring or possessing firearms or firearm ammunition by any Illinois State statute or by federal law;

(o) A minor subject to a petition filed under Section 5-520 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 alleging that the minor is a delinquent minor for the commission of an offense that if committed by an adult would be a felony;

(p) An adult who had been adjudicated a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for the commission of an offense that if committed by an adult would be a felony;

(q) A person who is not a resident of the State of Illinois, except as provided in subsection (a-10) of Section 4;

(r) A person who has been adjudicated as a person with a mental disability;

(s) A person who has been found to have a developmental disability;

(t) A person involuntarily admitted into a mental health facility; or

(u) A person who has had his or her Firearm Owner’s Identification Card revoked or denied under subsection (e) of this Section or item (iv) of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Section 4 of this Act because he or she was a patient in a mental health facility as provided in subsection (e) of this Section, shall not be permitted to obtain a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, after the 5-year period has lapsed, unless he or she has received a mental health evaluation by a physician, clinical psychologist, or qualified examiner as those terms are defined in the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, and has received a certification that he or she is not a clear and present danger to himself, herself, or others. The physician, clinical psychologist, or qualified examiner making the certification and his or her employer shall not be held criminally, civilly, or professionally liable for making or not making the certification required under this subsection, except for willful or wanton misconduct. This subsection does not apply to a person whose firearm possession rights have been restored through administrative or judicial action under Section 10 or 11 of this Act.

Upon revocation of a person’s Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, the Department of State Police shall provide notice to the person and the person shall comply with Section 9.5 of this Act.

65/8.2. Firearm Owner's Identification Card denial or revocation

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 8.2. Firearm Owner’s Identification Card denial or revocation. The Department of State Police shall deny an application or shall revoke and seize a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card previously issued under this Act if the Department finds that the applicant or person to whom such card was issued is or was at the time of issuance subject to an existing order of protection or firearms restraining order.

Act 67. Firearms Restraining Order Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

67/5. Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020
§ 5. Definitions. As used in this Act:
“Family member of the respondent” means a spouse, parent, child, or step-child of the respondent, any other person related by blood or present marriage to the respondent, or a person who shares a common dwelling with the respondent.
“Firearms restraining order” means an order issued by the court, prohibiting and enjoining a named person from having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving any firearms.
“Intimate partner” means a spouse, former spouse, a person with whom the respondent has or allegedly has a child in common, or a person with whom the respondent has or has had a dating or engagement relationship.
“Petitioner” means:
(1) a family member of the respondent as defined in this Act; or
(2) a law enforcement officer who files a petition alleging that the respondent poses a danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm.
“Respondent” means the person alleged in the petition to pose a danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm.

67/10. Commencement of action; procedure

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 10. Commencement of action; procedure.

(a) An action for a firearms restraining order is commenced by filing a verified petition for a firearms restraining order in any circuit court.

(b) A petition for a firearms restraining order may be filed in any county where the respondent resides.

(c) No fee shall be charged by the clerk for filing, amending, vacating, certifying, or photocopying petitions or orders; or for issuing alias summons; or for any related filing service. No fee shall be charged by the sheriff or other law enforcement for service by the sheriff or other law enforcement of a petition, rule, motion, or order in an action commenced under this Section.

(d) The court shall provide, through the office of the clerk of the court, simplified forms and clerical assistance to help with the writing and filing of a petition under this Section by any person not represented by counsel. In addition, that assistance may be provided by the State’s Attorney.

67/25. Process

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 25. Process. The summons shall be in the form prescribed by Supreme Court Rule 101(d), except that it shall require the respondent to answer or appear within 7 days. Attachments to the summons or notice shall include the petition for the firearms restraining order and supporting affidavits, if any, and any emergency firearms restraining order that has been issued. The enforcement of an order under Section 35 shall not be affected by the lack of service, delivery, or notice, provided the requirements of subsection (f) of that Section are otherwise met.

67/30. Service of notice of hearings

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 30. Service of notice of hearings. Except as provided in Section 25, notice of hearings on petitions or motions shall be served in accordance with Supreme Court Rules 11 and 12, unless notice is excused by Section 35 of this Act, or by the Code of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court Rules, or local rules.

67/35. Ex parte orders and emergency hearings

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 35. Ex parte orders and emergency hearings.

(a) A petitioner may request an emergency firearms restraining order by filing an affidavit or verified pleading alleging that the respondent poses an immediate and present danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm. The petition shall also describe the type and location of any firearm or firearms presently believed by the petitioner to be possessed or controlled by the respondent.

(b) If the respondent is alleged to pose an immediate and present danger of causing personal injury to an intimate partner, or an intimate partner is alleged to have been the target of a threat or act of violence by the respondent, the petitioner shall make a good faith effort to provide notice to any and all intimate partners of the respondent. The notice must include that the petitioner intends to petition the court for an emergency firearms restraining order, and, if the petitioner is a law enforcement officer, referral to relevant domestic violence or stalking advocacy or counseling resources, if appropriate. The petitioner shall attest to having provided the notice in the filed affidavit or verified pleading. If, after making a good faith effort, the petitioner is unable to provide notice to any or all intimate partners, the affidavit or verified pleading should describe what efforts were made.

(c) Every person who files a petition for an emergency firearms restraining order, knowing the information provided to the court at any hearing or in the affidavit or verified pleading to be false, is guilty of perjury under Section 32-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(d) An emergency firearms restraining order shall be issued on an ex parte basis, that is, without notice to the respondent.

(e) An emergency hearing held on an ex parte basis shall be held the same day that the petition is filed or the next day that the court is in session.

(f) If a circuit or associate judge finds probable cause to believe that the respondent poses an immediate and present danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm, the circuit or associate judge shall issue an emergency order.

(f-5) If the court issues an emergency firearms restraining order, it shall, upon a finding of probable cause that the respondent possesses firearms, issue a search warrant directing a law enforcement agency to seize the respondent’s firearms. The court may, as part of that warrant, direct the law enforcement agency to search the respondent’s residence and other places where the court finds there is probable cause to believe he or she is likely to possess the firearms.

(g) An emergency firearms restraining order shall require:

(1) the respondent to refrain from having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving additional firearms for the duration of the order; and

(2) the respondent to turn over to the local law enforcement agency any Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and concealed carry license in his or her possession. The local law enforcement agency shall immediately mail the card and concealed carry license to the Department of State Police Firearm Services Bureau for safekeeping. The firearm or firearms and Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and concealed carry license, if unexpired, shall be returned to the respondent after the firearms restraining order is terminated or expired.

(h) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (h-5) of this Section, upon expiration of the period of safekeeping, if the firearms or Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and concealed carry license cannot be returned to the respondent because the respondent cannot be located, fails to respond to requests to retrieve the firearms, or is not lawfully eligible to possess a firearm, upon petition from the local law enforcement agency, the court may order the local law enforcement agency to destroy the firearms, use the firearms for training purposes, or use the firearms for any other application as deemed appropriate by the local law enforcement agency.

(h-5) A respondent whose Firearm Owner’s Identification Card has been revoked or suspended may petition the court, if the petitioner is present in court or has notice of the respondent’s petition, to transfer the respondent’s firearm to a person who is lawfully able to possess the firearm if the person does not reside at the same address as the respondent. Notice of the petition shall be served upon the person protected by the emergency firearms restraining order. While the order is in effect, the transferee who receives the respondent’s firearms must swear or affirm by affidavit that he or she shall not transfer the firearm to the respondent or to anyone residing in the same residence as the respondent.

(h-6) If a person other than the respondent claims title to any firearms surrendered under this Section, he or she may petition the court, if the petitioner is present in court or has notice of the petition, to have the firearm returned to him or her. If the court determines that person to be the lawful owner of the firearm, the firearm shall be returned to him or her, provided that:

(1) the firearm is removed from the respondent’s custody, control, or possession and the lawful owner agrees to store the firearm in a manner such that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm; and

(2) the firearm is not otherwise unlawfully possessed by the owner.

The person petitioning for the return of his or her firearm must swear or affirm by affidavit that he or she: (i) is the lawful owner of the firearm; (ii) shall not transfer the firearm to the respondent; and (iii) will store the firearm in a manner that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm.

(i) In accordance with subsection (e) of this Section, the court shall schedule a full hearing as soon as possible, but no longer than 14 days from the issuance of an ex parte firearms restraining order, to determine if a 6-month firearms restraining order shall be issued. The court may extend an ex parte order as needed, but not to exceed 14 days, to effectuate service of the order or if necessary to continue protection. The court may extend the order for a greater length of time by mutual agreement of the parties.

67/40. Six-month orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 40. Six-month orders.

(a) A petitioner may request a 6-month firearms restraining order by filing an affidavit or verified pleading alleging that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm. The petition shall also describe the number, types, and locations of any firearms presently believed by the petitioner to be possessed or controlled by the respondent.

(b) If the respondent is alleged to pose a significant danger of causing personal injury to an intimate partner, or an intimate partner is alleged to have been the target of a threat or act of violence by the respondent, the petitioner shall make a good faith effort to provide notice to any and all intimate partners of the respondent. The notice must include that the petitioner intends to petition the court for a 6-month firearms restraining order, and, if the petitioner is a law enforcement officer, referral to relevant domestic violence or stalking advocacy or counseling resources, if appropriate. The petitioner shall attest to having provided the notice in the filed affidavit or verified pleading. If, after making a good faith effort, the petitioner is unable to provide notice to any or all intimate partners, the affidavit or verified pleading should describe what efforts were made.

(c) Every person who files a petition for a 6-month firearms restraining order, knowing the information provided to the court at any hearing or in the affidavit or verified pleading to be false, is guilty of perjury under Section 32-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(d) Upon receipt of a petition for a 6-month firearms restraining order, the court shall order a hearing within 30 days.

(e) In determining whether to issue a firearms restraining order under this Section, the court shall consider evidence including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) The unlawful and reckless use, display, or brandishing of a firearm by the respondent.

(2) The history of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force by the respondent against another person.

(3) Any prior arrest of the respondent for a felony offense.

(4) Evidence of the abuse of controlled substances or alcohol by the respondent.

(5) A recent threat of violence or act of violence by the respondent directed toward himself, herself, or another.

(6) A violation of an emergency order of protection issued under Section 217 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or Section 112A-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 or of an order of protection issued under Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or Section 112A-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(7) A pattern of violent acts or violent threats, including, but not limited to, threats of violence or acts of violence by the respondent directed toward himself, herself, or another.

(f) At the hearing, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent poses a significant danger of personal injury to himself, herself, or another by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm.

(g) If the court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence to issue a firearms restraining order, the court shall issue a firearms restraining order that shall be in effect for 6 months subject to renewal under Section 45 of this Act or termination under that Section.

(g-5) If the court issues a 6-month firearms restraining order, it shall, upon a finding of probable cause that the respondent possesses firearms, issue a search warrant directing a law enforcement agency to seize the respondent’s firearms. The court may, as part of that warrant, direct the law enforcement agency to search the respondent’s residence and other places where the court finds there is probable cause to believe he or she is likely to possess the firearms.

(h) A 6-month firearms restraining order shall require:

(1) the respondent to refrain from having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving additional firearms for the duration of the order; and

(2) the respondent to turn over to the local law enforcement agency any firearm or Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and concealed carry license in his or her possession. The local law enforcement agency shall immediately mail the card and concealed carry license to the Department of State Police Firearm Services Bureau for safekeeping. The firearm or firearms and Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and concealed carry license, if unexpired, shall be returned to the respondent after the firearms restraining order is terminated or expired.

(i) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (i-5) of this Section, upon expiration of the period of safekeeping, if the firearms or Firearm Owner’s Identification Card cannot be returned to the respondent because the respondent cannot be located, fails to respond to requests to retrieve the firearms, or is not lawfully eligible to possess a firearm, upon petition from the local law enforcement agency, the court may order the local law enforcement agency to destroy the firearms, use the firearms for training purposes, or use the firearms for any other application as deemed appropriate by the local law enforcement agency.

(i-5) A respondent whose Firearm Owner’s Identification Card has been revoked or suspended may petition the court, if the petitioner is present in court or has notice of the respondent’s petition, to transfer the respondent’s firearm to a person who is lawfully able to possess the firearm if the person does not reside at the same address as the respondent. Notice of the petition shall be served upon the person protected by the emergency firearms restraining order. While the order is in effect, the transferee who receives the respondent’s firearms must swear or affirm by affidavit that he or she shall not transfer the firearm to the respondent or to anyone residing in the same residence as the respondent.

(i-6) If a person other than the respondent claims title to any firearms surrendered under this Section, he or she may petition the court, if the petitioner is present in court or has notice of the petition, to have the firearm returned to him or her. If the court determines that person to be the lawful owner of the firearm, the firearm shall be returned to him or her, provided that:

(1) the firearm is removed from the respondent’s custody, control, or possession and the lawful owner agrees to store the firearm in a manner such that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm; and

(2) the firearm is not otherwise unlawfully possessed by the owner.

The person petitioning for the return of his or her firearm must swear or affirm by affidavit that he or she: (i) is the lawful owner of the firearm; (ii) shall not transfer the firearm to the respondent; and (iii) will store the firearm in a manner that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm.

(j) If the court does not issue a firearms restraining order at the hearing, the court shall dissolve any emergency firearms restraining order then in effect.

(k) When the court issues a firearms restraining order under this Section, the court shall inform the respondent that he or she is entitled to one hearing during the period of the order to request a termination of the order, under Section 45 of this Act, and shall provide the respondent with a form to request a hearing.

67/45. Termination and renewal

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 45. Termination and renewal.

(a) A person subject to a firearms restraining order issued under this Act may submit one written request at any time during the effective period of the order for a hearing to terminate the order.

(1) The respondent shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent does not pose a danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm.

(2) If the court finds after the hearing that the respondent has met his or her burden, the court shall terminate the order.

(b) A petitioner may request a renewal of a firearms restraining order at any time within the 3 months before the expiration of a firearms restraining order.

(1) A court shall, after notice and a hearing, renew a firearms restraining order issued under this part if the petitioner proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent continues to pose a danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm.

(2) In determining whether to renew a firearms restraining order issued under this Act, the court shall consider evidence of the facts identified in subsection (e) of Section 40 of this Act and any other evidence of an increased risk for violence.

(3) At the hearing, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent continues to pose a danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm.

(4) The renewal of a firearms restraining order issued under this Section shall be in effect for 6 months, subject to termination by further order of the court at a hearing held under this Section and further renewal by further order of the court under this Section.

67/50. Notice of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 50. Notice of orders.

(a) Entry and issuance. Upon issuance of any firearms restraining order, the clerk shall immediately, or on the next court day if an emergency firearms restraining order is issued in accordance with Section 35 of this Act (emergency firearms restraining order): (i) enter the order on the record and file it in accordance with the circuit court procedures and (ii) provide a file stamped copy of the order to the respondent, if present, and to the petitioner.

(b) Filing with sheriff. The clerk of the issuing judge shall, or the petitioner may, on the same day that a firearms restraining order is issued, file a certified copy of that order with the sheriff or other law enforcement officials charged with maintaining Department of State Police records or charged with serving the order upon the respondent. If the order was issued in accordance with Section 35 of this Act (emergency firearms restraining order), the clerk shall, on the next court day, file a certified copy of the order with the sheriff or other law enforcement officials charged with maintaining Department of State Police records.

(c) Service by sheriff. Unless the respondent was present in court when the order was issued, the sheriff or other law enforcement official shall promptly serve that order upon the respondent and file proof of the service, in the manner provided for service of process in civil proceedings. Instead of serving the order upon the respondent, however, the sheriff, other law enforcement official, or other persons defined in Section 112A-22.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 may serve the respondent with a short form notification as provided in that Section. If process has not yet been served upon the respondent, it shall be served with the order or short form notification if the service is made by the sheriff, or other law enforcement official.

(d) Any order renewing or terminating any firearms restraining order shall be promptly recorded, issued, and served as provided in this Section.

67/65. Enforcement; sanctions for violation of order

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 65. Enforcement; sanctions for violation of order. A respondent who knowingly violates a firearms restraining order is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. Prosecution for a violation of a firearms restraining order shall not bar concurrent prosecution for any other crime, including any crime that may have been committed at the time of the violation of the firearms restraining order.

Chapter 720. Criminal Offenses

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 5. Criminal Code

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Title I. General Provisions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article 2. General Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/2-7. Felony

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

“Felony” means an offense for which a sentence to death or to a term of imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or more is provided.

Title III. Specific Offenses

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Part B. Offenses Directed Against the Person

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article 10. Kidnapping and Related Offenses

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/10-1. Kidnapping

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits the offense of kidnapping when he or she knowingly:
(1) and secretly confines another against his or her will;
(2) by force or threat of imminent force carries another from one place to another with intent secretly to confine that other person against his or her will; or
(3) by deceit or enticement induces another to go from one place to another with intent secretly to confine that other person against his or her will.
(b) Confinement of a child under the age of 13 years, or of a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability, is against that child’s or person’s will within the meaning of this Section if that confinement is without the consent of that child’s or person’s parent or legal guardian.
(c) Sentence. Kidnapping is a Class 2 felony.

5/10-3. Unlawful Restraint

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 10-3. Unlawful restraint.

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful restraint when he or she knowingly without legal authority detains another.

(b) Sentence. Unlawful restraint is a Class 4 felony.

5/10-5. Child abduction

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) For purposes of this Section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) “Child” means a person who, at the time the alleged violation occurred, was under the age of 18 or was a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability.
(2) “Detains” means taking or retaining physical custody of a child, whether or not the child resists or objects.
(2.1) “Express consent” means oral or written permission that is positive, direct, and unequivocal, requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.
(2.2) “Luring” means any knowing act to solicit, entice, tempt, or attempt to attract the minor.
(3) “Lawful custodian” means a person or persons granted legal custody of a child or entitled to physical possession of a child pursuant to a court order. It is presumed that, when the parties have never been married to each other, the mother has legal custody of the child unless a valid court order states otherwise. If an adjudication of paternity has been completed and the father has been assigned support obligations or visitation rights, such a paternity order should, for the purposes of this Section, be considered a valid court order granting custody to the mother.
(4) “Putative father” means a man who has a reasonable belief that he is the father of a child born of a woman who is not his wife.
(5) “Unlawful purpose” means any misdemeanor or felony violation of State law or a similar federal or sister state law or local ordinance.
(b) A person commits the offense of child abduction when he or she does any one of the following:
(1) Intentionally violates any terms of a valid court order granting sole or joint custody, care, or possession to another by concealing or detaining the child or removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court.
(2) Intentionally violates a court order prohibiting the person from concealing or detaining the child or removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court.
(3) Intentionally conceals, detains, or removes the child without the consent of the mother or lawful custodian of the child if the person is a putative father and either: (A) the paternity of the child has not been legally established or (B) the paternity of the child has been legally established but no orders relating to custody have been entered. Notwithstanding the presumption created by paragraph (3) of subsection (a), however, a mother commits child abduction when she intentionally conceals or removes a child, whom she has abandoned or relinquished custody of, from an unadjudicated father who has provided sole ongoing care and custody of the child in her absence.
(4) Intentionally conceals or removes the child from a parent after filing a petition or being served with process in an action affecting marriage or paternity but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody.
(5) At the expiration of visitation rights outside the State, intentionally fails or refuses to return or impedes the return of the child to the lawful custodian in Illinois.
(6) Being a parent of the child, and if the parents of that child are or have been married and there has been no court order of custody, knowingly conceals the child for 15 days, and fails to make reasonable attempts within the 15-day period to notify the other parent as to the specific whereabouts of the child, including a means by which to contact the child, or to arrange reasonable visitation or contact with the child. It is not a violation of this Section for a person fleeing domestic violence to take the child with him or her to housing provided by a domestic violence program.
(7) Being a parent of the child, and if the parents of the child are or have been married and there has been no court order of custody, knowingly conceals, detains, or removes the child with physical force or threat of physical force.
(8) Knowingly conceals, detains, or removes the child for payment or promise of payment at the instruction of a person who has no legal right to custody.
(9) Knowingly retains in this State for 30 days a child removed from another state without the consent of the lawful custodian or in violation of a valid court order of custody.
(10) Intentionally lures or attempts to lure a child: (A) under the age of 17 or (B) while traveling to or from a primary or secondary school into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place without the consent of the child’s parent or lawful custodian for other than a lawful purpose. For the purposes of this item (10), the trier of fact may infer that luring or attempted luring of a child under the age of 17 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place without the express consent of the child’s parent or lawful custodian or with the intent to avoid the express consent of the child’s parent or lawful custodian was for other than a lawful purpose.
(11) With the intent to obstruct or prevent efforts to locate the child victim of a child abduction, knowingly destroys, alters, conceals, or disguises physical evidence or furnishes false information.
(c) It is an affirmative defense to subsections (b)(1) through (b)(10) of this Section that:
(1) the person had custody of the child pursuant to a court order granting legal custody or visitation rights that existed at the time of the alleged violation;
(2) the person had physical custody of the child pursuant to a court order granting legal custody or visitation rights and failed to return the child as a result of circumstances beyond his or her control, and the person notified and disclosed to the other parent or legal custodian the specific whereabouts of the child and a means by which the child could be contacted or made a reasonable attempt to notify the other parent or lawful custodian of the child of those circumstances and made the disclosure within 24 hours after the visitation period had expired and returned the child as soon as possible;
(3) the person was fleeing an incidence or pattern of domestic violence; or
(4) the person lured or attempted to lure a child under the age of 17 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place for a lawful purpose in prosecutions under paragraph (10) of subsection (b).
(d) A person convicted of child abduction under this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony. A person convicted of child abduction under subsection (b)(10) shall undergo a sex offender evaluation prior to a sentence being imposed. A person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of paragraph (10) of subsection (b) of this Section is guilty of a Class 3 felony. A person convicted of child abduction under subsection (b)(10) when the person has a prior conviction of a sex offense as defined in the Sex Offender Registration Act or any substantially similar federal, Uniform Code of Military Justice, sister state, or foreign government offense is guilty of a Class 2 felony. It is a factor in aggravation under subsections (b)(1) through (b)(10) of this Section for which a court may impose a more severe sentence under Section 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1) or Article 4.5 of Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections1 if, upon sentencing, the court finds evidence of any of the following aggravating factors:
(1) that the defendant abused or neglected the child following the concealment, detention, or removal of the child;
(2) that the defendant inflicted or threatened to inflict physical harm on a parent or lawful custodian of the child or on the child with intent to cause that parent or lawful custodian to discontinue criminal prosecution of the defendant under this Section;
(3) that the defendant demanded payment in exchange for return of the child or demanded that he or she be relieved of the financial or legal obligation to support the child in exchange for return of the child;
(4) that the defendant has previously been convicted of child abduction;
(5) that the defendant committed the abduction while armed with a deadly weapon or the taking of the child resulted in serious bodily injury to another; or
(6) that the defendant committed the abduction while in a school, regardless of the time of day or time of year; in a playground; on any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity; on the real property of a school; or on a public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school or playground. For purposes of this paragraph (6), “playground” means a piece of land owned or controlled by a unit of local government that is designated by the unit of local government for use solely or primarily for children’s recreation; and “school” means a public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university.
(e) The court may order the child to be returned to the parent or lawful custodian from whom the child was concealed, detained, or removed. In addition to any sentence imposed, the court may assess any reasonable expense incurred in searching for or returning the child against any person convicted of violating this Section.
(f) Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to limit the court’s contempt power.
(g) Every law enforcement officer investigating an alleged incident of child abduction shall make a written police report of any bona fide allegation and the disposition of that investigation. Every police report completed pursuant to this Section shall be compiled and recorded within the meaning of Section 5.1 of the Criminal Identification Act.2
(h) Whenever a law enforcement officer has reasons to believe a child abduction has occurred, she or he shall provide the lawful custodian a summary of her or his rights under this Code, including the procedures and relief available to her or him.
(i) If during the course of an investigation under this Section the child is found in the physical custody of the defendant or another, the law enforcement officer shall return the child to the parent or lawful custodian from whom the child was concealed, detained, or removed, unless there is good cause for the law enforcement officer or the Department of Children and Family Services to retain temporary protective custody of the child pursuant to the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act.3

5/10-5.5. Unlawful visitation or parenting time interference

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) As used in this Section, the terms “child”, “detain”, and “lawful custodian” have the meanings ascribed to them in Section 10-5 of this Code.

(b) Every person who, in violation of the visitation, parenting time, or custody time provisions of a court order relating to child custody, detains or conceals a child with the intent to deprive another person of his or her rights to visitation, parenting time, or custody time commits the offense of unlawful visitation or parenting time interference.

(c) A person committing unlawful visitation or parenting time interference is guilty of a petty offense. Any person violating this Section after 2 prior convictions of unlawful visitation interference or unlawful visitation or parenting time interference, however, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(d) Any law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing an act in violation of this Section shall issue to that person a notice to appear.

(e) The notice shall:

(1) be in writing;

(2) state the name of the person and his or her address, if known;

(3) set forth the nature of the offense;

(4) be signed by the officer issuing the notice; and

(5) request the person to appear before a court at a certain time and place.

(f) Upon failure of the person to appear, a summons or warrant of arrest may be issued.

(g) It is an affirmative defense that:

(1) a person or lawful custodian committed the act to protect the child from imminent physical harm, provided that the defendant’s belief that there was physical harm imminent was reasonable and that the defendant’s conduct in withholding visitation rights, parenting time, or custody time was a reasonable response to the harm believed imminent;

(2) the act was committed with the mutual consent of all parties having a right to custody and visitation of the child or parenting time with the child; or

(3) the act was otherwise authorized by law.

Article 11. Sex Offenses

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Subdivision 5. Major Sex Offenses

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/11-1.20. Criminal Sexual Assault

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and:

(1) uses force or threat of force;

(2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent;

(3) is a family member of the victim, and the victim is under 18 years of age; or

(4) is 17 years of age or over and holds a position of trust, authority, or supervision in relation to the victim, and the victim is at least 13 years of age but under 18 years of age.

(b) Sentence.

(1) Criminal sexual assault is a Class 1 felony, except that:

(A) A person who is convicted of the offense of criminal sexual assault as defined in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) after having previously been convicted of the offense of criminal sexual assault or the offense of exploitation of a child, or who is convicted of the offense of criminal sexual assault as defined in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) after having previously been convicted under the laws of this State or any other state of an offense that is substantially equivalent to the offense of criminal sexual assault or to the offense of exploitation of a child, commits a Class X felony for which the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years and not more than 60 years, except that if the person is under the age of 18 years at the time of the offense, he or she shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections. The commission of the second or subsequent offense is required to have been after the initial conviction for this paragraph (A) to apply.

(B) A person who has attained the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense and who is convicted of the offense of criminal sexual assault as defined in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) after having previously been convicted of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault or the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or who is convicted of the offense of criminal sexual assault as defined in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) after having previously been convicted under the laws of this State or any other state of an offense that is substantially equivalent to the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault or the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment. The commission of the second or subsequent offense is required to have been after the initial conviction for this paragraph (B) to apply. An offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense covered by this subparagraph (B) shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections.1

(C) A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of paragraph (a)(3) or (a)(4) or under any similar statute of this State or any other state for any offense involving criminal sexual assault that is substantially equivalent to or more serious than the sexual assault prohibited under paragraph (a)(3) or (a)(4) is a Class X felony.

5/11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense:

(1) the person displays, threatens to use, or uses a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, or any other object fashioned or used in a manner that leads the victim, under the circumstances, reasonably to believe that the object is a dangerous weapon;

(2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10);

(3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person;

(4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony;

(5) the victim is 60 years of age or older;

(6) the victim is a person with a physical disability;

(7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim’s consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes;

(8) the person is armed with a firearm;

(9) the person personally discharges a firearm during the commission of the offense; or

(10) the person personally discharges a firearm during the commission of the offense, and that discharge proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person.

(b) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person is under 17 years of age and: (i) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who is under 9 years of age; or (ii) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who is at least 9 years of age but under 13 years of age and the person uses force or threat of force to commit the act.

(c) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who is a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability.

(d) Sentence.

(1) Aggravated criminal sexual assault in violation of paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of subsection (a) or in violation of subsection (b) or (c) is a Class X felony. A violation of subsection (a)(1) is a Class X felony for which 10 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(8) is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(9) is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(10) is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life imprisonment shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. An offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of aggravated criminal sexual assault in violation of paragraphs (1) through (10) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections.1

(2) A person who has attained the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense and who is convicted of a second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, or who is convicted of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault after having previously been convicted of the offense of criminal sexual assault or the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or who is convicted of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault after having previously been convicted under the laws of this or any other state of an offense that is substantially equivalent to the offense of criminal sexual assault, the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault or the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment. The commission of the second or subsequent offense is required to have been after the initial conviction for this paragraph (2) to apply. An offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense covered by this paragraph (2) shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections.

5/11-1.40. Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that person is 17 years of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused, or an act of sexual penetration, and:

(1) the victim is under 13 years of age; or

(2) the victim is under 13 years of age and that person:

(A) is armed with a firearm;

(B) personally discharges a firearm during the commission of the offense;

(C) causes great bodily harm to the victim that:

(i) results in permanent disability; or

(ii) is life threatening; or

(D) delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim’s consent or by threat or deception, for other than medical purposes.

(b) Sentence.

(1) A person convicted of a violation of subsection (a)(1) commits a Class X felony, for which the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and not more than 60 years. A person convicted of a violation of subsection (a)(2)(A) commits a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A person convicted of a violation of subsection (a)(2)(B) commits a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A person who has attained the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense and who is convicted of a violation of subsection (a)(2)(C) commits a Class X felony for which the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 50 years or up to a term of natural life imprisonment. An offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child in violation of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), and (a)(2)(C) shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections.1

(1.1) A person convicted of a violation of subsection (a)(2)(D) commits a Class X felony for which the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 50 years and not more than 60 years. An offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child in violation of subsection (a)(2)(D) shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(1.2) A person who has attained the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense and convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child committed against 2 or more persons regardless of whether the offenses occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment and an offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(2) A person who has attained the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense and who is convicted of a second or subsequent offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or who is convicted of the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child after having previously been convicted of the offense of criminal sexual assault or the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, or who is convicted of the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child after having previously been convicted under the laws of this State or any other state of an offense that is substantially equivalent to the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault or the offense of criminal sexual assault, shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment. The commission of the second or subsequent offense is required to have been after the initial conviction for this paragraph (2) to apply. An offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense covered by this paragraph (2) shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections.

5/11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person:

(1) commits an act of sexual conduct by the use of force or threat of force; or

(2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent.

(b) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person is under 17 years of age and commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of age.

(c) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the person is less than 5 years older than the victim.

(d) Sentence. Criminal sexual abuse for a violation of subsection (b) or (c) of this Section is a Class A misdemeanor. Criminal sexual abuse for a violation of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this Section is a Class 4 felony. A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of subsection (a) of this Section is a Class 2 felony. For purposes of this Section it is a second or subsequent conviction if the accused has at any time been convicted under this Section or under any similar statute of this State or any other state for any offense involving sexual abuse or sexual assault that is substantially equivalent to or more serious than the sexual abuse prohibited under this Section.

5/11-1.60. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense:

(1) the person displays, threatens to use, or uses a dangerous weapon or any other object fashioned or used in a manner that leads the victim, under the circumstances, reasonably to believe that the object is a dangerous weapon;

(2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim;

(3) the victim is 60 years of age or older;

(4) the victim is a person with a physical disability;

(5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person;

(6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or

(7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim’s consent or by threat or deception.

(b) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is under 18 years of age and the person is a family member.

(c) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if:

(1) that person is 17 years of age or over and: (i) commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is under 13 years of age; or (ii) commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the person uses force or threat of force to commit the act; or

(2) that person is under 17 years of age and: (i) commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is under 9 years of age; or (ii) commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of age and the person uses force or threat of force to commit the act.

(d) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the person is at least 5 years older than the victim.

(e) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability.

(f) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 18 years of age and the person is 17 years of age or over and holds a position of trust, authority, or supervision in relation to the victim.

(g) Sentence. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a Class 2 felony.

Subdivision 20. Pornography Offenses

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/11-23.5. Non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Definitions. For the purposes of this Section:

“Computer”, “computer program”, and “data” have the meanings ascribed to them in Section 17-0.5 of this Code.

“Image” includes a photograph, film, videotape, digital recording, or other depiction or portrayal of an object, including a human body.

“Intimate parts” means the fully unclothed, partially unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic area, anus, or if the person is female, a partially or fully exposed nipple, including exposure through transparent clothing.

“Sexual act” means sexual penetration, masturbation, or sexual activity.

“Sexual activity” means any:

(1) knowing touching or fondling by the victim or another person or animal, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus, or breast of the victim or another person or animal for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal; or

(2) any transfer or transmission of semen upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the victim, for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or another; or

(3) an act of urination within a sexual context; or

(4) any bondage, fetter, or sadism masochism; or

(5) sadomasochism abuse in any sexual context.

(b) A person commits non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images when he or she:

(1) intentionally disseminates an image of another person:

(A) who is at least 18 years of age; and

(B) who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image; and

(C) who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or in part; and

(2) obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and

(3) knows or should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination.

(c) The following activities are exempt from the provisions of this Section:

(1) The intentional dissemination of an image of another identifiable person who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed when the dissemination is made for the purpose of a criminal investigation that is otherwise lawful.

(2) The intentional dissemination of an image of another identifiable person who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed when the dissemination is for the purpose of, or in connection with, the reporting of unlawful conduct.

(3) The intentional dissemination of an image of another identifiable person who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed when the images involve voluntary exposure in public or commercial settings.

(4) The intentional dissemination of an image of another identifiable person who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed when the dissemination serves a lawful public purpose.

(d) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to impose liability upon the following entities solely as a result of content or information provided by another person:

(1) an interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2);

(2) a provider of public mobile services or private radio services, as defined in Section 13-214 of the Public Utilities Act; or

(3) a telecommunications network or broadband provider.

(e) A person convicted under this Section is subject to the forfeiture provisions in Article 124B of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(f) Sentence. Non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images is a Class 4 felony.

Article 12. Bodily Harm

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Subdivision 5. Assault and Battery

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/12-1. Assault

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits an assault when, without lawful authority, he or she knowingly engages in conduct which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery.

(b) Sentence. Assault is a Class C misdemeanor.

(c) In addition to any other sentence that may be imposed, a court shall order any person convicted of assault to perform community service for not less than 30 and not more than 120 hours, if community service is available in the jurisdiction and is funded and approved by the county board of the county where the offense was committed. In addition, whenever any person is placed on supervision for an alleged offense under this Section, the supervision shall be conditioned upon the performance of the community service.

This subsection does not apply when the court imposes a sentence of incarceration.

5/12-2. Aggravated assault

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Offense based on location of conduct. A person commits aggravated assault when he or she commits an assault against an individual who is on or about a public way, public property, a public place of accommodation or amusement, a sports venue, or in a church, synagogue, mosque, or other building, structure, or place used for religious worship.

(b) Offense based on status of victim. A person commits aggravated assault when, in committing an assault, he or she knows the individual assaulted to be any of the following:

(1) A person with a physical disability or a person 60 years of age or older and the assault is without legal justification.

(2) A teacher or school employee upon school grounds or grounds adjacent to a school or in any part of a building used for school purposes.

(3) A park district employee upon park grounds or grounds adjacent to a park or in any part of a building used for park purposes.

(4) A community policing volunteer, private security officer, or utility worker:

(i) performing his or her official duties;

(ii) assaulted to prevent performance of his or her official duties; or

(iii) assaulted in retaliation for performing his or her official duties.

(4.1) A peace officer, fireman, emergency management worker, or emergency medical services personnel:

(i) performing his or her official duties;

(ii) assaulted to prevent performance of his or her official duties; or

(iii) assaulted in retaliation for performing his or her official duties.

(5) A correctional officer or probation officer:

(i) performing his or her official duties;

(ii) assaulted to prevent performance of his or her official duties; or

(iii) assaulted in retaliation for performing his or her official duties.

(6) A correctional institution employee, a county juvenile detention center employee who provides direct and continuous supervision of residents of a juvenile detention center, including a county juvenile detention center employee who supervises recreational activity for residents of a juvenile detention center, or a Department of Human Services employee, Department of Human Services officer, or employee of a subcontractor of the Department of Human Services supervising or controlling sexually dangerous persons or sexually violent persons:

(i) performing his or her official duties;

(ii) assaulted to prevent performance of his or her official duties; or

(iii) assaulted in retaliation for performing his or her official duties.

(7) An employee of the State of Illinois, a municipal corporation therein, or a political subdivision thereof, performing his or her official duties.

(8) A transit employee performing his or her official duties, or a transit passenger.

(9) A sports official or coach actively participating in any level of athletic competition within a sports venue, on an indoor playing field or outdoor playing field, or within the immediate vicinity of such a facility or field.

(10) A person authorized to serve process under Section 2-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure1 or a special process server appointed by the circuit court, while that individual is in the performance of his or her duties as a process server.

(c) Offense based on use of firearm, device, or motor vehicle. A person commits aggravated assault when, in committing an assault, he or she does any of the following:

(1) Uses a deadly weapon, an air rifle as defined in Section 24.8-0.1 of this Act, or any device manufactured and designed to be substantially similar in appearance to a firearm, other than by discharging a firearm.

(2) Discharges a firearm, other than from a motor vehicle.

(3) Discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle.

(4) Wears a hood, robe, or mask to conceal his or her identity.

(5) Knowingly and without lawful justification shines or flashes a laser gun sight or other laser device attached to a firearm, or used in concert with a firearm, so that the laser beam strikes near or in the immediate vicinity of any person.

(6) Uses a firearm, other than by discharging the firearm, against a peace officer, community policing volunteer, fireman, private security officer, emergency management worker, emergency medical services personnel, employee of a police department, employee of a sheriff’s department, or traffic control municipal employee:

(i) performing his or her official duties;

(ii) assaulted to prevent performance of his or her official duties; or

(iii) assaulted in retaliation for performing his or her official duties.

(7) Without justification operates a motor vehicle in a manner which places a person, other than a person listed in subdivision (b)(4), in reasonable apprehension of being struck by the moving motor vehicle.

(8) Without justification operates a motor vehicle in a manner which places a person listed in subdivision (b)(4), in reasonable apprehension of being struck by the moving motor vehicle.

(9) Knowingly video or audio records the offense with the intent to disseminate the recording.

(d) Sentence. Aggravated assault as defined in subdivision (a), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(7), (b)(8), (b)(9), (c)(1), (c)(4), or (c)(9) is a Class A misdemeanor, except that aggravated assault as defined in subdivision (b)(4) and (b)(7) is a Class 4 felony if a Category I, Category II, or Category III weapon is used in the commission of the assault. Aggravated assault as defined in subdivision (b)(4.1), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(10), (c)(2), (c)(5), (c)(6), or (c)(7) is a Class 4 felony. Aggravated assault as defined in subdivision (c)(3) or (c)(8) is a Class 3 felony.

(e) For the purposes of this Section, “Category I weapon”, “Category II weapon, and “Category III weapon” have the meanings ascribed to those terms in Section 33A-1 of this Code.

5/12-3. Battery

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.

(b) Sentence.

Battery is a Class A misdemeanor.

5/12-3.2. Domestic battery

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits domestic battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means:
(1) Causes bodily harm to any family or household member;
(2) Makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with any family or household member.
(b) Sentence. Domestic battery is a Class A misdemeanor. Domestic battery is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has any prior conviction under this Code for violation of an order of protection (Section 12-3.4 or 12-30), or any prior conviction under the law of another jurisdiction for an offense which is substantially similar. Domestic battery is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has any prior conviction under this Code for first degree murder (Section 9-1), attempt to commit first degree murder (Section 8-4), aggravated domestic battery (Section 12-3.3), aggravated battery (Section 12-3.05 or 12-4), heinous battery (Section 12-4.1), aggravated battery with a firearm (Section 12-4.2), aggravated battery with a machine gun or a firearm equipped with a silencer (Section 12-4.2-5), aggravated battery of a child (Section 12-4.3), aggravated battery of an unborn child (subsection (a-5) of Section 12-3.1, or Section 12-4.4), aggravated battery of a senior citizen (Section 12-4.6), stalking (Section 12-7.3), aggravated stalking (Section 12-7.4), criminal sexual assault (Section 11-1.20 or 12-13), aggravated criminal sexual assault (Section 11-1.30 or 12-14), kidnapping (Section 10-1), aggravated kidnapping (Section 10-2), predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (Section 11-1.40 or 12-14.1), aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Section 11-1.60 or 12-16), unlawful restraint (Section 10-3), aggravated unlawful restraint (Section 10-3.1), aggravated arson (Section 20-1.1), or aggravated discharge of a firearm (Section 24-1.2), or any prior conviction under the law of another jurisdiction for any offense that is substantially similar to the offenses listed in this Section, when any of these offenses have been committed against a family or household member. Domestic battery is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has one or 2 prior convictions under this Code for domestic battery (Section 12-3.2), or one or 2 prior convictions under the law of another jurisdiction for any offense which is substantially similar. Domestic battery is a Class 3 felony if the defendant had 3 prior convictions under this Code for domestic battery (Section 12-3.2), or 3 prior convictions under the law of another jurisdiction for any offense which is substantially similar. Domestic battery is a Class 2 felony if the defendant had 4 or more prior convictions under this Code for domestic battery (Section 12-3.2), or 4 or more prior convictions under the law of another jurisdiction for any offense which is substantially similar. In addition to any other sentencing alternatives, for any second or subsequent conviction of violating this Section, the offender shall be mandatorily sentenced to a minimum of 72 consecutive hours of imprisonment. The imprisonment shall not be subject to suspension, nor shall the person be eligible for probation in order to reduce the sentence.
(c) Domestic battery committed in the presence of a child. In addition to any other sentencing alternatives, a defendant who commits, in the presence of a child, a felony domestic battery (enhanced under subsection (b)), aggravated domestic battery (Section 12-3.3), aggravated battery (Section 12-3.05 or 12-4), unlawful restraint (Section 10-3), or aggravated unlawful restraint (Section 10-3.1) against a family or household member shall be required to serve a mandatory minimum imprisonment of 10 days or perform 300 hours of community service, or both. The defendant shall further be liable for the cost of any counseling required for the child at the discretion of the court in accordance with subsection (b) of Section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections.1 For purposes of this Section, “child” means a person under 18 years of age who is the defendant’s or victim’s child or step-child or who is a minor child residing within or visiting the household of the defendant or victim.
(d) Upon conviction of domestic battery, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing, substantially as follows: “An individual convicted of domestic battery may be subject to federal criminal penalties for possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving any firearm or ammunition in violation of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) and (9)).” A notation shall be made in the court file that the admonition was given.

5/12-3.3. Aggravated domestic battery

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person who, in committing a domestic battery, knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement commits aggravated domestic battery.

(a-5) A person who, in committing a domestic battery, strangles another individual commits aggravated domestic battery. For the purposes of this subsection (a-5), “strangle” means intentionally impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of an individual by applying pressure on the throat or neck of that individual or by blocking the nose or mouth of that individual.

(b) Sentence. Aggravated domestic battery is a Class 2 felony. Any order of probation or conditional discharge entered following a conviction for an offense under this Section must include, in addition to any other condition of probation or conditional discharge, a condition that the offender serve a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than 60 consecutive days. A person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section must be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years or an extended term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years and not more than 14 years.

(c) Upon conviction of aggravated domestic battery, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing, substantially as follows: “An individual convicted of aggravated domestic battery may be subject to federal criminal penalties for possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving any firearm or ammunition in violation of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) and (9)).” A notation shall be made in the court file that the admonition was given.

5/12-3.4. Violation of an order of protection

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 12-3.4. Violation of an order of protection.

(a) A person commits violation of an order of protection if:

(1) He or she knowingly commits an act which was prohibited by a court or fails to commit an act which was ordered by a court in violation of:

(i) a remedy in a valid order of protection authorized under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (14), or (14.5) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986,1

(ii) a remedy, which is substantially similar to the remedies authorized under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (14) or (14.5) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, in a valid order of protection, which is authorized under the laws of another state, tribe or United States territory,

(iii) any other remedy when the act constitutes a crime against the protected parties as the term protected parties is defined in Section 112A-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963;2 and

(2) Such violation occurs after the offender has been served notice of the contents of the order, pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 19863 or any substantially similar statute of another state, tribe or United States territory, or otherwise has acquired actual knowledge of the contents of the order.

An order of protection issued by a state, tribal or territorial court related to domestic or family violence shall be deemed valid if the issuing court had jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of the state, tribe or territory. There shall be a presumption of validity where an order is certified and appears authentic on its face. For purposes of this Section, an “order of protection” may have been issued in a criminal or civil proceeding.

(a-5) Failure to provide reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be an affirmative defense to any charge or process filed seeking enforcement of a foreign order of protection.

(b) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to diminish the inherent authority of the courts to enforce their lawful orders through civil or criminal contempt proceedings.

(c) The limitations placed on law enforcement liability by Section 305 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 apply to actions taken under this Section.

(d) Violation of an order of protection is a Class A misdemeanor. Violation of an order of protection is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has any prior conviction under this Code for domestic battery (Section 12-3.2) or violation of an order of protection (Section 12-3.4 or 12-30) or any prior conviction under the law of another jurisdiction for an offense that could be charged in this State as a domestic battery or violation of an order of protection. Violation of an order of protection is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has any prior conviction under this Code for first degree murder (Section 9-1), attempt to commit first degree murder (Section 8-4), aggravated domestic battery (Section 12-3.3), aggravated battery (Section 12-3.05 or 12-4), heinous battery (Section 12-4.1), aggravated battery with a firearm (Section 12-4.2), aggravated battery with a machine gun or a firearm equipped with a silencer (Section 12-4.2-5), aggravated battery of a child (Section 12-4.3), aggravated battery of an unborn child (subsection (a-5) of Section 12-3.1, or Section 12-4.4), aggravated battery of a senior citizen (Section 12-4.6), stalking (Section 12-7.3), aggravated stalking (Section 12-7.4), criminal sexual assault (Section 11-1.20 or 12-13), aggravated criminal sexual assault (Section 11-1.30 or 12-14), kidnapping (Section 10-1), aggravated kidnapping (Section 10-2), predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (Section 11-1.40 or 12-14.1), aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Section 11-1.60 or 12-16), unlawful restraint (Section 10-3), aggravated unlawful restraint (Section 10-3.1), aggravated arson (Section 20-1.1), aggravated discharge of a firearm (Section 24-1.2), or a violation of any former law of this State that is substantially similar to any listed offense, or any prior conviction under the law of another jurisdiction for an offense that could be charged in this State as one of the offenses listed in this Section, when any of these offenses have been committed against a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. The court shall impose a minimum penalty of 24 hours imprisonment for defendant’s second or subsequent violation of any order of protection; unless the court explicitly finds that an increased penalty or such period of imprisonment would be manifestly unjust. In addition to any other penalties, the court may order the defendant to pay a fine as authorized under Section 5-9-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections4 or to make restitution to the victim under Section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections.5

(e) (Blank).(f) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party to violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

5/12-3.8. Violation of a civil no contact order

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits violation of a civil no contact order if:

(1) he or she knowingly commits an act which was prohibited by a court or fails to commit an act which was ordered in violation of:

(A) a remedy of a valid civil no contact order authorized under Section 213 of the Civil No Contact Order Act or Section 112A-14.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; or

(B) a remedy, which is substantially similar to the remedies authorized under Section 213 of the Civil No Contact Order Act or Section 112A-14.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or in a valid civil no contact order, which is authorized under the laws of another state, tribe, or United States territory; and

(2) the violation occurs after the offender has been served notice of the contents of the order under the Civil No Contact Order Act, Article 112A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or any substantially similar statute of another state, tribe, or United States territory, or otherwise has acquired actual knowledge of the contents of the order.

A civil no contact order issued by a state, tribal, or territorial court shall be deemed valid if the issuing court had jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of the state, tribe, or territory. There shall be a presumption of validity when an order is certified and appears authentic on its face.

(a-3) For purposes of this Section, a “civil no contact order” may have been issued in a criminal or civil proceeding.

(a-5) Failure to provide reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be an affirmative defense to any charge or process filed seeking enforcement of a foreign civil no contact order.

(b) Prosecution for a violation of a civil no contact order shall not bar a concurrent prosecution for any other crime, including any crime that may have been committed at the time of the violation of the civil no contact order.

(c) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to diminish the inherent authority of the courts to enforce their lawful orders through civil or criminal contempt proceedings.

(d) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party to violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

(e) Sentence. A violation of a civil no contact order is a Class A misdemeanor for a first violation, and a Class 4 felony for a second or subsequent violation.

5/12-3.9. Violation of a stalking no contact order

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits violation of a stalking no contact order if:

(1) he or she knowingly commits an act which was prohibited by a court or fails to commit an act which was ordered by a court in violation of:

(A) a remedy in a valid stalking no contact order of protection authorized under Section 80 of the Stalking No Contact Order Act or Section 112A-14.7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; or

(B) a remedy, which is substantially similar to the remedies authorized under Section 80 of the Stalking No Contact Order Act or Section 112A-14.7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or in a valid stalking no contact order, which is authorized under the laws of another state, tribe, or United States territory; and

(2) the violation occurs after the offender has been served notice of the contents of the order, under the Stalking No Contact Order Act, Article 112A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or any substantially similar statute of another state, tribe, or United States territory, or otherwise has acquired actual knowledge of the contents of the order.

A stalking no contact order issued by a state, tribal, or territorial court shall be deemed valid if the issuing court had jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of the state, tribe, or territory. There shall be a presumption of validity when an order is certified and appears authentic on its face.

(a-3) For purposes of this Section, a “stalking no contact order” may have been issued in a criminal or civil proceeding.

(a-5) Failure to provide reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be an affirmative defense to any charge or process filed seeking enforcement of a foreign stalking no contact order.

(b) Prosecution for a violation of a stalking no contact order shall not bar a concurrent prosecution for any other crime, including any crime that may have been committed at the time of the violation of the civil no contact order.

(c) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to diminish the inherent authority of the courts to enforce their lawful orders through civil or criminal contempt proceedings.

(d) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party to violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

(e) Sentence. A violation of a stalking no contact order is a Class A misdemeanor for a first violation, and a Class 4 felony for a second or subsequent violation.

Subdivision 15. Intimidation

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/12-6. Intimidation

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits intimidation when, with intent to cause another to perform or to omit the performance of any act, he or she communicates to another, directly or indirectly by any means, a threat to perform without lawful authority any of the following acts:

(1) Inflict physical harm on the person threatened or any other person or on property; or

(2) Subject any person to physical confinement or restraint; or

(3) Commit a felony or Class A misdemeanor; or

(4) Accuse any person of an offense; or

(5) Expose any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or

(6) Take action as a public official against anyone or anything, or withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding; or

(7) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action.

(b) Sentence.

Intimidation is a Class 3 felony for which an offender may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 2 years and not more than 10 years.

5/12-7.3. Stalking

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits stalking when he or she knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to:

(1) fear for his or her safety or the safety of a third person; or

(2) suffer other emotional distress.

(a-3) A person commits stalking when he or she, knowingly and without lawful justification, on at least 2 separate occasions follows another person or places the person under surveillance or any combination thereof and:

(1) at any time transmits a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint and the threat is directed towards that person or a family member of that person; or

(2) places that person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint to or of that person or a family member of that person.

(a-5) A person commits stalking when he or she has previously been convicted of stalking another person and knowingly and without lawful justification on one occasion:

(1) follows that same person or places that same person under surveillance; and

(2) transmits a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint to that person or a family member of that person.

(b) Sentence. Stalking is a Class 4 felony; a second or subsequent conviction is a Class 3 felony.

(c) Definitions. For purposes of this Section:

(1) “Course of conduct” means 2 or more acts, including but not limited to acts in which a defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about, a person, engages in other non-consensual contact, or interferes with or damages a person’s property or pet. A course of conduct may include contact via electronic communications.

(2) “Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writings, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system. “Electronic communication” includes transmissions by a computer through the Internet to another computer.

(3) “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm.

(4) “Family member” means a parent, grandparent, brother, sister, or child, whether by whole blood, half-blood, or adoption and includes a step-grandparent, step-parent, step-brother, step-sister or step-child. “Family member” also means any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior 6 months, regularly resided in the household.

(5) “Follows another person” means (i) to move in relative proximity to a person as that person moves from place to place or (ii) to remain in relative proximity to a person who is stationary or whose movements are confined to a small area. “Follows another person” does not include a following within the residence of the defendant.

(6) “Non-consensual contact” means any contact with the victim that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, including but not limited to being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; or placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim.

(7) “Places a person under surveillance” means: (1) remaining present outside the person’s school, place of employment, vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence of the defendant; or (2) placing an electronic tracking device on the person or the person’s property.

(8) “Reasonable person” means a person in the victim’s situation.

(9) “Transmits a threat” means a verbal or written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal or written statements or conduct.

(d) Exemptions.

(1) This Section does not apply to any individual or organization (i) monitoring or attentive to compliance with public or worker safety laws, wage and hour requirements, or other statutory requirements, or (ii) picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute, including any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, and pension or retirement provisions, the making or maintaining of collective bargaining agreements, and the terms to be included in those agreements.

(2) This Section does not apply to an exercise of the right to free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful.

(3) Telecommunications carriers, commercial mobile service providers, and providers of information services, including, but not limited to, Internet service providers and hosting service providers, are not liable under this Section, except. for willful and wanton misconduct, by virtue of the transmission, storage, or caching of electronic communications or messages of others or by virtue of the provision of other related telecommunications, commercial mobile services, or information services used by others in violation of this Section.

(d-5) The incarceration of a person in a penal institution who commits the course of conduct or transmits a threat is not a bar to prosecution under this Section.

(d-10) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party to violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

5/12-7.4. Aggravated stalking

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits aggravated stalking when he or she commits stalking and:

(1) causes bodily harm to the victim;

(2) confines or restrains the victim; or

(3) violates a temporary restraining order, an order of protection, a stalking no contact order, a civil no contact order, or an injunction prohibiting the behavior described in subsection (b)(1) of Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986. [FN1]

(a-1) A person commits aggravated stalking when he or she is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act or has been previously required to register under that Act and commits the offense of stalking when the victim of the stalking is also the victim of the offense for which the sex offender is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act or a family member of the victim.

(b) Sentence. Aggravated stalking is a Class 3 felony; a second or subsequent conviction is a Class 2 felony.

(c) Exemptions.

(1) This Section does not apply to any individual or organization (i) monitoring or attentive to compliance with public or worker safety laws, wage and hour requirements, or other statutory requirements, or (ii) picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute including any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, and pension or retirement provisions, the managing or maintenance of collective bargaining agreements, and the terms to be included in those agreements.

(2) This Section does not apply to an exercise of the right of free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful.

(3) Telecommunications carriers, commercial mobile service providers, and providers of information services, including, but not limited to, Internet service providers and hosting service providers, are not liable under this Section, except for willful and wanton misconduct, by virtue of the transmission, storage, or caching of electronic communications or messages of others or by virtue of the provision of other related telecommunications, commercial mobile services, or information services used by others in violation of this Section.

(d) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party to violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

5/12-7.5. Cyberstalking

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Note from WomensLaw: Parts of this statute may have been struck down as unconstitutional. For more information please see People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, or speak with a lawyer in Illinois for advice on how this may affect enforcement of parts of this law.

§ 12-7.5. Cyberstalking.

(a) A person commits cyberstalking when he or she engages in a course of conduct using electronic communication directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that would cause a reasonable person to:

(1) fear for his or her safety or the safety of a third person; or

(2) suffer other emotional distress.

(a-3) A person commits cyberstalking when he or she, knowingly and without lawful justification, on at least 2 separate occasions, harasses another person through the use of electronic communication and:

(1) at any time transmits a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint and the threat is directed towards that person or a family member of that person; or

(2) places that person or a family member of that person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint; or

(3) at any time knowingly solicits the commission of an act by any person which would be a violation of this Code directed towards that person or a family member of that person.

(a-4) A person commits cyberstalking when he or she knowingly, surreptitiously, and without lawful justification, installs or otherwise places electronic monitoring software or spyware on an electronic communication device as a means to harass another person and:

(1) at any time transmits a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint and the threat is directed towards that person or a family member of that person;

(2) places that person or a family member of that person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint; or

(3) at any time knowingly solicits the commission of an act by any person which would be a violation of this Code directed towards that person or a family member of that person.

For purposes of this Section, an installation or placement is not surreptitious if:

(1) with respect to electronic software, hardware, or computer applications, clear notice regarding the use of the specific type of tracking software or spyware is provided by the installer in advance to the owners and primary users of the electronic software, hardware, or computer application; or

(2) written or electronic consent of all owners and primary users of the electronic software, hardware, or computer application on which the tracking software or spyware will be installed has been sought and obtained through a mechanism that does not seek to obtain any other approvals or acknowledgement from the owners and primary users.

(a-5) A person commits cyberstalking when he or she, knowingly and without lawful justification, creates and maintains an Internet website or webpage which is accessible to one or more third parties for a period of at least 24 hours, and which contains statements harassing another person and:

(1) which communicates a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint, where the threat is directed towards that person or a family member of that person, or

(2) which places that person or a family member of that person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint, or

(3) which knowingly solicits the commission of an act by any person which would be a violation of this Code directed towards that person or a family member of that person.

(b) Sentence. Cyberstalking is a Class 4 felony; a second or subsequent conviction is a Class 3 felony.

(c) For purposes of this Section:

(1) “Course of conduct” means 2 or more acts, including but not limited to acts in which a defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about, a person, engages in other non-consensual contact, or interferes with or damages a person’s property or pet. The incarceration in a penal institution of a person who commits the course of conduct is not a bar to prosecution under this Section.

(2) “Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writings, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system. “Electronic communication” includes transmissions through an electronic device including, but not limited to, a telephone, cellular phone, computer, or pager, which communication includes, but is not limited to, e-mail, instant message, text message, or voice mail.

(2.1) “Electronic communication device” means an electronic device, including, but not limited to, a wireless telephone, personal digital assistant, or a portable or mobile computer.

(2.2) “Electronic monitoring software or spyware” means software or an application that surreptitiously tracks computer activity on a device and records and transmits the information to third parties with the intent to cause injury or harm. For the purposes of this paragraph (2.2), “intent to cause injury or harm” does not include activities carried out in furtherance of the prevention of fraud or crime or of protecting the security of networks, online services, applications, software, other computer programs, users, or electronic communication devices or similar devices.

(3) “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm.

(4) “Harass” means to engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that alarms, torments, or terrorizes that person.

(5) “Non-consensual contact” means any contact with the victim that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, including but not limited to being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; or placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim.

(6) “Reasonable person” means a person in the victim’s circumstances, with the victim’s knowledge of the defendant and the defendant’s prior acts.

(7) “Third party” means any person other than the person violating these provisions and the person or persons towards whom the violator’s actions are directed.

(d) Telecommunications carriers, commercial mobile service providers, and providers of information services, including, but not limited to, Internet service providers and hosting service providers, are not liable under this Section, except for willful and wanton misconduct, by virtue of the transmission, storage, or caching of electronic communications or messages of others or by virtue of the provision of other related telecommunications, commercial mobile services, or information services used by others in violation of this Section.

(e) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party to violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

(f) It is not a violation of this Section to:

(1) provide, protect, maintain, update, or upgrade networks, online services, applications, software, other computer programs, electronic communication devices, or similar devices under the terms of use applicable to those networks, services, applications, software, programs, or devices;

(2) interfere with or prohibit terms or conditions in a contract or license related to networks, online services, applications, software, other computer programs, electronic communication devices, or similar devices; or(3) create any liability by reason of terms or conditions adopted, or technical measures implemented, to prevent the transmission of unsolicited electronic mail or communications.

Article 14. Eavesdropping

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/14-1. Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Eavesdropping device.

An eavesdropping device is any device capable of being used to hear or record oral conversation or intercept, or transcribe electronic communications whether such conversation or electronic communication is conducted in person, by telephone, or by any other means; Provided, however, that this definition shall not include devices used for the restoration of the deaf or hard-of-hearing to normal or partial hearing.

(b) Eavesdropper.

An eavesdropper is any person, including any law enforcement officer and any party to a private conversation, who operates or participates in the operation of any eavesdropping device contrary to the provisions of this Article or who acts as a principal, as defined in this Article.

(c) Principal.

A principal is any person who:

(1) Knowingly employs another who illegally uses an eavesdropping device in the course of such employment; or

(2) Knowingly derives any benefit or information from the illegal use of an eavesdropping device by another; or

(3) Directs another to use an eavesdropping device illegally on his or her behalf.

(d) Private conversation.

For the purposes of this Article, “private conversation” means any oral communication between 2 or more persons, whether in person or transmitted between the parties by wire or other means, when one or more of the parties intended the communication to be of a private nature under circumstances reasonably justifying that expectation. A reasonable expectation shall include any expectation recognized by law, including, but not limited to, an expectation derived from a privilege, immunity, or right established by common law, Supreme Court rule, or the Illinois or United States Constitution.

(e) Private electronic communication.

For purposes of this Article, “private electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio, pager, computer, electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system, when the sending or receiving party intends the electronic communication to be private under circumstances reasonably justifying that expectation. A reasonable expectation shall include any expectation recognized by law, including, but not limited to, an expectation derived from a privilege, immunity, or right established by common law, Supreme Court rule, or the Illinois or United States Constitution. Electronic communication does not include any communication from a tracking device.

(f) Bait car.

For purposes of this Article, “bait car” means any motor vehicle that is not occupied by a law enforcement officer and is used by a law enforcement agency to deter, detect, identify, and assist in the apprehension of an auto theft suspect in the act of stealing a motor vehicle.

(g) Surreptitious.

For purposes of this Article, “surreptitious” means obtained or made by stealth or deception, or executed through secrecy or concealment.

5/14-2. Elements of the offense; affirmative defense

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and intentionally:

(1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to the private conversation;

(2) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of transmitting or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all other parties to the private conversation;

(3) Intercepts, records, or transcribes, in a surreptitious manner, any private electronic communication to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all parties to the private electronic communication;

(4) Manufactures, assembles, distributes, or possesses any electronic, mechanical, eavesdropping, or other device knowing that or having reason to know that the design of the device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious overhearing, transmitting, or recording of private conversations or the interception, or transcription of private electronic communications and the intended or actual use of the device is contrary to the provisions of this Article; or

(5) Uses or discloses any information which he or she knows or reasonably should know was obtained from a private conversation or private electronic communication in violation of this Article, unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties.

(a-5) It does not constitute a violation of this Article to surreptitiously use an eavesdropping device to overhear, transmit, or record a private conversation, or to surreptitiously intercept, record, or transcribe a private electronic communication, if the overhearing, transmitting, recording, interception, or transcription is done in accordance with Article 108A or Article 108B of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.1

(b) It is an affirmative defense to a charge brought under this Article relating to the interception of a privileged communication that the person charged:

1. was a law enforcement officer acting pursuant to an order of interception, entered pursuant to Section 108A-1 or 108B-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; and

2. at the time the communication was intercepted, the officer was unaware that the communication was privileged; and

3. stopped the interception within a reasonable time after discovering that the communication was privileged; and

4. did not disclose the contents of the communication.

(c) It is not unlawful for a manufacturer or a supplier of eavesdropping devices, or a provider of wire or electronic communication services, their agents, employees, contractors, or venders to manufacture, assemble, sell, or possess an eavesdropping device within the normal course of their business for purposes not contrary to this Article or for law enforcement officers and employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections to manufacture, assemble, purchase, or possess an eavesdropping device in preparation for or within the course of their official duties.

(d) The interception, recording, or transcription of an electronic communication by an employee of a penal institution is not prohibited under this Act, provided that the interception, recording, or transcription is:

(1) otherwise legally permissible under Illinois law;

(2) conducted with the approval of the penal institution for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a State criminal law or a penal institution rule or regulation with respect to inmates in the institution; and

(3) within the scope of the employee’s official duties.

For the purposes of this subsection (d), “penal institution” has the meaning ascribed to it in clause (c)(1) of Section 31A-1.1.

(e) Nothing in this Article shall prohibit any individual, not a law enforcement officer, from recording a law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duties in a public place or in circumstances in which the officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy. However, an officer may take reasonable action to maintain safety and control, secure crime scenes and accident sites, protect the integrity and confidentiality of investigations, and protect the public safety and order.

Part C. Offenses Directed Against Property

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article 16. Theft and Related Offenses

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Subdivision 15. Identity Theft

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/16-30. Identity theft; aggravated identity theft

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits identity theft when he or she knowingly:

(1) uses any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another person to fraudulently obtain credit, money, goods, services, or other property;

(2) uses any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another with intent to commit any felony not set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection (a);

(3) obtains, records, possesses, sells, transfers, purchases, or manufactures any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another with intent to commit any felony;

(4) uses, obtains, records, possesses, sells, transfers, purchases, or manufactures any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another knowing that such personal identifying information or personal identification documents were stolen or produced without lawful authority;

(5) uses, transfers, or possesses document-making implements to produce false identification or false documents with knowledge that they will be used by the person or another to commit any felony;

(6) uses any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another to portray himself or herself as that person, or otherwise, for the purpose of gaining access to any personal identifying information or personal identification document of that person, without the prior express permission of that person;

(7) uses any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another for the purpose of gaining access to any record of the actions taken, communications made or received, or other activities or transactions of that person, without the prior express permission of that person;

(7.5) uses, possesses, or transfers a radio frequency identification device capable of obtaining or processing personal identifying information from a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag or transponder with knowledge that the device will be used by the person or another to commit a felony violation of State law or any violation of this Article; or

(8) in the course of applying for a building permit with a unit of local government, provides the license number of a roofing or fire sprinkler contractor whom he or she does not intend to have perform the work on the roofing or fire sprinkler portion of the project; it is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this paragraph (8) that the building permit applicant promptly informed the unit of local government that issued the building permit of any change in the roofing or fire sprinkler contractor.

(b) Aggravated identity theft. A person commits aggravated identity theft when he or she commits identity theft as set forth in subsection (a) of this Section:

(1) against a person 60 years of age or older or a person with a disability; or

(2) in furtherance of the activities of an organized gang.

A defense to aggravated identity theft does not exist merely because the accused reasonably believed the victim to be a person less than 60 years of age. For the purposes of this subsection, “organized gang” has the meaning ascribed in Section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act.

(c) Knowledge shall be determined by an evaluation of all circumstances surrounding the use of the other person’s identifying information or document.

(d) When a charge of identity theft or aggravated identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding a specified value is brought, the value of the credit, money, goods, services, or other property is an element of the offense to be resolved by the trier of fact as either exceeding or not exceeding the specified value.

(e) Sentence.

(1) Identity theft.

(A) A person convicted of identity theft in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced as follows:

(i) Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property not exceeding $300 in value is a Class 4 felony. A person who has been previously convicted of identity theft of less than $300 who is convicted of a second or subsequent offense of identity theft of less than $300 is guilty of a Class 3 felony. A person who has been convicted of identity theft of less than $300 who has been previously convicted of any type of theft, robbery, armed robbery, burglary, residential burglary, possession of burglary tools, home invasion, home repair fraud, aggravated home repair fraud, or financial exploitation of an elderly person or person with a disability is guilty of a Class 3 felony. Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property not exceeding $300 in value when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is a Class 3 felony. A person who has been previously convicted of identity theft of less than $300 who is convicted of a second or subsequent offense of identity theft of less than $300 when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is guilty of a Class 2 felony. A person who has been convicted of identity theft of less than $300 when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country who has been previously convicted of any type of theft, robbery, armed robbery, burglary, residential burglary, possession of burglary tools, home invasion, home repair fraud, aggravated home repair fraud, or financial exploitation of an elderly person or person with a disability is guilty of a Class 2 felony.

(ii) Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $300 and not exceeding $2,000 in value is a Class 3 felony. Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $300 and not exceeding $2,000 in value when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is a Class 2 felony.

(iii) Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $2,000 and not exceeding $10,000 in value is a Class 2 felony. Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $2,000 and not exceeding $10,000 in value when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is a Class 1 felony.

(iv) Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $10,000 and not exceeding $100,000 in value is a Class 1 felony. Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $10,000 and not exceeding $100,000 in value when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is a Class X felony.

(v) Identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $100,000 in value is a Class X felony.

(B) A person convicted of any offense enumerated in paragraphs (2) through (7.5) of subsection (a) is guilty of a Class 3 felony. A person convicted of any offense enumerated in paragraphs (2) through (7.5) of subsection (a) when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is guilty of a Class 2 felony.

(C) A person convicted of any offense enumerated in paragraphs (2) through (5) and (7.5) of subsection (a) a second or subsequent time is guilty of a Class 2 felony. A person convicted of any offense enumerated in paragraphs (2) through (5) and (7.5) of subsection (a) a second or subsequent time when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is guilty of a Class 1 felony.

(D) A person who, within a 12-month period, is found in violation of any offense enumerated in paragraphs (2) through (7.5) of subsection (a) with respect to the identifiers of, or other information relating to, 3 or more separate individuals, at the same time or consecutively, is guilty of a Class 2 felony. A person who, within a 12-month period, is found in violation of any offense enumerated in paragraphs (2) through (7.5) of subsection (a) with respect to the identifiers of, or other information relating to, 3 or more separate individuals, at the same time or consecutively, when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is guilty of a Class 1 felony.

(E) A person convicted of identity theft in violation of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) who uses any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another to purchase methamphetamine manufacturing material as defined in Section 10 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act with the intent to unlawfully manufacture methamphetamine is guilty of a Class 2 felony for a first offense and a Class 1 felony for a second or subsequent offense. A person convicted of identity theft in violation of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) who uses any personal identifying information or personal identification document of another to purchase methamphetamine manufacturing material as defined in Section 10 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act with the intent to unlawfully manufacture methamphetamine when the victim of the identity theft is an active duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or of the Illinois National Guard serving in a foreign country is guilty of a Class 1 felony for a first offense and a Class X felony for a second or subsequent offense.

(F) A person convicted of identity theft in violation of paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony.

(2) Aggravated identity theft.

(A) Aggravated identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property not exceeding $300 in value is a Class 3 felony.

(B) Aggravated identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $300 and not exceeding $10,000 in value is a Class 2 felony.

(C) Aggravated identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $10,000 in value and not exceeding $100,000 in value is a Class 1 felony.

(D) Aggravated identity theft of credit, money, goods, services, or other property exceeding $100,000 in value is a Class X felony.

(E) Aggravated identity theft for a violation of any offense enumerated in paragraphs (2) through (7.5) of subsection (a) of this Section is a Class 2 felony.

(F) Aggravated identity theft when a person who, within a 12-month period, is found in violation of any offense enumerated in paragraphs (2) through (7.5) of subsection (a) of this Section with identifiers of, or other information relating to, 3 or more separate individuals, at the same time or consecutively, is a Class 1 felony.

(G) A person who has been previously convicted of aggravated identity theft regardless of the value of the property involved who is convicted of a second or subsequent offense of aggravated identity theft regardless of the value of the property involved is guilty of a Class X felony.

Article 17. Deception and Fraud

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Subdivision 5. Deception

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/17-2 False Personation; Solicitation

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) False personation; solicitation.

(1) A person commits a false personation when he or she knowingly and falsely represents himself or herself to be a member or representative of any veterans’ or public safety personnel organization or a representative of any charitable organization, or when he or she knowingly exhibits or uses in any manner any decal, badge or insignia of any charitable, public safety personnel, or veterans’ organization when not authorized to do so by the charitable, public safety personnel, or veterans’ organization. “Public safety personnel organization” has the meaning ascribed to that term in Section 1 of the Solicitation for Charity Act.1

(2) A person commits a false personation when he or she knowingly and falsely represents himself or herself to be a veteran in seeking employment or public office. In this paragraph, “veteran” means a person who has served in the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States.

(2.1) A person commits a false personation when he or she knowingly and falsely represents himself or herself to be:

(A) an active-duty member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the National Guard or a veteran of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the National Guard; and

(B) obtains money, property, or another tangible benefit through that false representation.

In this paragraph, “member of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States” means a member of the United States Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; and “veteran” means a person who has served in the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the National Guard.

(2.5) A person commits a false personation when he or she knowingly and falsely represents himself or herself to be:

(A) another actual person and does an act in such assumed character with intent to intimidate, threaten, injure, defraud, or to obtain a benefit from another; or

(B) a representative of an actual person or organization and does an act in such false capacity with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another.

(3) No person shall knowingly use the words “Police”, “Police Department”, “Patrolman”, “Sergeant”, “Lieutenant”, “Peace Officer”, “Sheriff’s Police”, “Sheriff”, “Officer”, “Law Enforcement”, “Trooper”, “Deputy”, “Deputy Sheriff”, “State Police”, or any other words to the same effect (i) in the title of any organization, magazine, or other publication without the express approval of the named public safety personnel organization’s governing board or (ii) in combination with the name of any state, state agency, public university, or unit of local government without the express written authorization of that state, state agency, public university, or unit of local government.

(4) No person may knowingly claim or represent that he or she is acting on behalf of any public safety personnel organization when soliciting financial contributions or selling or delivering or offering to sell or deliver any merchandise, goods, services, memberships, or advertisements unless the chief of the police department, fire department, and the corporate or municipal authority thereof, or the sheriff has first entered into a written agreement with the person or with an organization with which the person is affiliated and the agreement permits the activity and specifies and states clearly and fully the purpose for which the proceeds of the solicitation, contribution, or sale will be used.

(5) No person, when soliciting financial contributions or selling or delivering or offering to sell or deliver any merchandise, goods, services, memberships, or advertisements may claim or represent that he or she is representing or acting on behalf of any nongovernmental organization by any name which includes “officer”, “peace officer”, “police”, “law enforcement”, “trooper”, “sheriff”, “deputy”, “deputy sheriff”, “State police”, or any other word or words which would reasonably be understood to imply that the organization is composed of law enforcement personnel unless:

(A) the person is actually representing or acting on behalf of the nongovernmental organization;

(B) the nongovernmental organization is controlled by and governed by a membership of and represents a group or association of active duty peace officers, retired peace officers, or injured peace officers; and

(C) before commencing the solicitation or the sale or the offers to sell any merchandise, goods, services, memberships, or advertisements, a written contract between the soliciting or selling person and the nongovernmental organization, which specifies and states clearly and fully the purposes for which the proceeds of the solicitation, contribution, or sale will be used, has been entered into.

(6) No person, when soliciting financial contributions or selling or delivering or offering to sell or deliver any merchandise, goods, services, memberships, or advertisements, may knowingly claim or represent that he or she is representing or acting on behalf of any nongovernmental organization by any name which includes the term “fireman”, “fire fighter”, “paramedic”, or any other word or words which would reasonably be understood to imply that the organization is composed of fire fighter or paramedic personnel unless:

(A) the person is actually representing or acting on behalf of the nongovernmental organization;

(B) the nongovernmental organization is controlled by and governed by a membership of and represents a group or association of active duty, retired, or injured fire fighters (for the purposes of this Section, “fire fighter” has the meaning ascribed to that term in Section 2 of the Illinois Fire Protection Training Act)2 or active duty, retired, or injured emergency medical technicians–ambulance, emergency medical technicians–intermediate, emergency medical technicians–paramedic, ambulance drivers, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel; and

(C) before commencing the solicitation or the sale or delivery or the offers to sell or deliver any merchandise, goods, services, memberships, or advertisements, the soliciting or selling person and the nongovernmental organization have entered into a written contract that specifies and states clearly and fully the purposes for which the proceeds of the solicitation, contribution, or sale will be used.

(7) No person may knowingly claim or represent that he or she is an airman, airline employee, airport employee, or contractor at an airport in order to obtain the uniform, identification card, license, or other identification paraphernalia of an airman, airline employee, airport employee, or contractor at an airport.

(8) No person, firm, copartnership, or corporation (except corporations organized and doing business under the Pawners Societies Act) shall knowingly use a name that contains in it the words “Pawners’ Society”.

(b) False personation; public officials and employees. A person commits a false personation if he or she knowingly and falsely represents himself or herself to be any of the following:

(1) An attorney authorized to practice law for purposes of compensation or consideration. This paragraph (b)(1) does not apply to a person who unintentionally fails to pay attorney registration fees established by Supreme Court Rule.

(2) A public officer or a public employee or an official or employee of the federal government.

(2.3) A public officer, a public employee, or an official or employee of the federal government, and the false representation is made in furtherance of the commission of felony.

(2.7) A public officer or a public employee, and the false representation is for the purpose of effectuating identity theft as defined in Section 16-30 of this Code.

(3) A peace officer.

(4) A peace officer while carrying a deadly weapon.

(5) A peace officer in attempting or committing a felony.

(6) A peace officer in attempting or committing a forcible felony.

(7) The parent, legal guardian, or other relation of a minor child to any public official, public employee, or elementary or secondary school employee or administrator.

(7.5) The legal guardian, including any representative of a State or public guardian, of a person with a disability appointed under Article XIa of the Probate Act of 1975.

(8) A fire fighter.

(9) A fire fighter while carrying a deadly weapon.

(10) A fire fighter in attempting or committing a felony.

(11) An emergency management worker of any jurisdiction in this State.

(12) An emergency management worker of any jurisdiction in this State in attempting or committing a felony. For the purposes of this subsection (b), “emergency management worker” has the meaning provided under Section 2-6.6 of this Code.

(b-5) The trier of fact may infer that a person falsely represents himself or herself to be a public officer or a public employee or an official or employee of the federal government if the person:

(1) wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge, insignia, or facsimile thereof by which a public officer or public employee or official or employee of the federal government is lawfully distinguished; or

(2) falsely expresses by word or action that he or she is a public officer or public employee or official or employee of the federal government and is acting with approval or authority of a public agency or department.

(c) Fraudulent advertisement of a corporate name.

(1) A company, association, or individual commits fraudulent advertisement of a corporate name if he, she, or it, not being incorporated, puts forth a sign or advertisement and assumes, for the purpose of soliciting business, a corporate name.

(2) Nothing contained in this subsection (c) prohibits a corporation, company, association, or person from using a divisional designation or trade name in conjunction with its corporate name or assumed name under Section 4.05 of the Business Corporation Act of 1983 or, if it is a member of a partnership or joint venture, from doing partnership or joint venture business under the partnership or joint venture name. The name under which the joint venture or partnership does business may differ from the names of the members. Business may not be conducted or transacted under that joint venture or partnership name, however, unless all provisions of the Assumed Business Name Act have been complied with. Nothing in this subsection (c) permits a foreign corporation to do business in this State without complying with all Illinois laws regulating the doing of business by foreign corporations. No foreign corporation may conduct or transact business in this State as a member of a partnership or joint venture that violates any Illinois law regulating or pertaining to the doing of business by foreign corporations in Illinois.

(3) The provisions of this subsection (c) do not apply to limited partnerships formed under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act or under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001).

(d) False law enforcement badges.

(1) A person commits false law enforcement badges if he or she knowingly produces, sells, or distributes a law enforcement badge without the express written consent of the law enforcement agency represented on the badge or, in case of a reorganized or defunct law enforcement agency, its successor law enforcement agency.

(2) It is a defense to false law enforcement badges that the law enforcement badge is used or is intended to be used exclusively: (i) as a memento or in a collection or exhibit; (ii) for decorative purposes; or (iii) for a dramatic presentation, such as a theatrical, film, or television production.

(e) False medals.

(1) A person commits a false personation if he or she knowingly and falsely represents himself or herself to be a recipient of, or wears on his or her person, any of the following medals if that medal was not awarded to that person by the United States Government, irrespective of branch of service: The Congressional Medal of Honor, The Distinguished Service Cross, The Navy Cross, The Air Force Cross, The Silver Star, The Bronze Star, or the Purple Heart.

(2) It is a defense to a prosecution under paragraph (e)(1) that the medal is used, or is intended to be used, exclusively:

(A) for a dramatic presentation, such as a theatrical, film, or television production, or a historical re-enactment; or

(B) for a costume worn, or intended to be worn, by a person under 18 years of age.

(f) Sentence.

(1) A violation of paragraph (a)(8) is a petty offense subject to a fine of not less than $5 nor more than $100, and the person, firm, copartnership, or corporation commits an additional petty offense for each day he, she, or it continues to commit the violation. A violation of paragraph (c)(1) is a petty offense, and the company, association, or person commits an additional petty offense for each day he, she, or it continues to commit the violation. A violation of paragraph (a)(2.1) or subsection (e) is a petty offense for which the offender shall be fined at least $100 and not more than $200.

(2) A violation of paragraph (a)(1), (a)(3), or (b)(7.5) is a Class C misdemeanor.

(3) A violation of paragraph (a)(2), (a)(2.5), (a)(7), (b)(2), or (b)(7) or subsection (d) is a Class A misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation of subsection (d) is a Class 3 felony.

(4) A violation of paragraph (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), (b)(1), (b)(2.3), (b)(2.7), (b)(3), (b)(8), or (b)(11) is a Class 4 felony.

(5) A violation of paragraph (b)(4), (b)(9), or (b)(12) is a Class 3 felony.

(6) A violation of paragraph (b)(5) or (b)(10) is a Class 2 felony.

(7) A violation of paragraph (b)(6) is a Class 1 felony.

(g) A violation of subsection (a)(1) through (a)(7) or subsection (e) of this Section may be accomplished in person or by any means of communication, including but not limited to the use of an Internet website or any form of electronic communication.

Article 21. Damage and Trespass to Property

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/21-3. Criminal trespass to real property

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits criminal trespass to real property when he or she :

(1) knowingly and without lawful authority enters or remains within or on a building;

(2) enters upon the land of another, after receiving, prior to the entry, notice from the owner or occupant that the entry is forbidden;

(3) remains upon the land of another, after receiving notice from the owner or occupant to depart;

(3.5) presents false documents or falsely represents his or her identity orally to the owner or occupant of a building or land in order to obtain permission from the owner or occupant to enter or remain in the building or on the land; or

(4) enters a field used or capable of being used for growing crops, an enclosed area containing livestock, an agricultural building containing livestock, or an orchard in or on a motor vehicle (including an off-road vehicle, motorcycle, moped, or any other powered two-wheel vehicle) after receiving, prior to the entry, notice from the owner or occupant that the entry is forbidden or remains upon or in the area after receiving notice from the owner or occupant to depart.

For purposes of item (1) of this subsection, this Section shall not apply to being in a building which is open to the public while the building is open to the public during its normal hours of operation; nor shall this Section apply to a person who enters a public building under the reasonable belief that the building is still open to the public.

(b) A person has received notice from the owner or occupant within the meaning of Subsection (a) if he or she has been notified personally, either orally or in writing including a valid court order as defined by subsection (7) of Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 granting remedy (2) of subsection (b) of Section 112A-14 of that Code, or if a printed or written notice forbidding such entry has been conspicuously posted or exhibited at the main entrance to the land or the forbidden part thereof.

(b-5) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b-10), as an alternative to the posting of real property as set forth in subsection (b), the owner or lessee of any real property may post the property by placing identifying purple marks on trees or posts around the area to be posted. Each purple mark shall be:

(1) A vertical line of at least 8 inches in length and the bottom of the mark shall be no less than 3 feet nor more than 5 feet high. Such marks shall be placed no more than 100 feet apart and shall be readily visible to any person approaching the property; or

(2) A post capped or otherwise marked on at least its top 2 inches. The bottom of the cap or mark shall be not less than 3 feet but not more than 5 feet 6 inches high. Posts so marked shall be placed not more than 36 feet apart and shall be readily visible to any person approaching the property. Prior to applying a cap or mark which is visible from both sides of a fence shared by different property owners or lessees, all such owners or lessees shall concur in the decision to post their own property.

Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall be construed to authorize the owner or lessee of any real property to place any purple marks on any tree or post or to install any post or fence if doing so would violate any applicable law, rule, ordinance, order, covenant, bylaw, declaration, regulation, restriction, contract, or instrument.

(b-10) Any owner or lessee who marks his or her real property using the method described in subsection (b-5) must also provide notice as described in subsection (b) of this Section. The public of this State shall be informed of the provisions of subsection (b-5) of this Section by the Illinois Department of Agriculture and the Illinois Department of Natural Resources. These Departments shall conduct an information campaign for the general public concerning the interpretation and implementation of subsection (b-5). The information shall inform the public about the marking requirements and the applicability of subsection (b-5) including information regarding the size requirements of the markings as well as the manner in which the markings shall be displayed. The Departments shall also include information regarding the requirement that, until the date this subsection becomes inoperative, any owner or lessee who chooses to mark his or her property using paint, must also comply with one of the notice requirements listed in subsection (b). The Departments may prepare a brochure or may disseminate the information through agency websites. Non-governmental organizations including, but not limited to, the Illinois Forestry Association, Illinois Tree Farm and the Walnut Council may help to disseminate the information regarding the requirements and applicability of subsection (b-5) based on materials provided by the Departments. This subsection (b-10) is inoperative on and after January 1, 2013.

(b-15) Subsections (b-5) and (b-10) do not apply to real property located in a municipality of over 2,000,000 inhabitants.

(c) This Section does not apply to any person, whether a migrant worker or otherwise, living on the land with permission of the owner or of his or her agent having apparent authority to hire workers on this land and assign them living quarters or a place of accommodations for living thereon, nor to anyone living on the land at the request of, or by occupancy, leasing or other agreement or arrangement with the owner or his or her agent, nor to anyone invited by the migrant worker or other person so living on the land to visit him or her at the place he is so living upon the land.

(d) A person shall be exempt from prosecution under this Section if he or she beautifies unoccupied and abandoned residential and industrial properties located within any municipality. For the purpose of this subsection, “unoccupied and abandoned residential and industrial property” means any real estate (1) in which the taxes have not been paid for a period of at least 2 years; and (2) which has been left unoccupied and abandoned for a period of at least one year; and “beautifies” means to landscape, clean up litter, or to repair dilapidated conditions on or to board up windows and doors.

(e) No person shall be liable in any civil action for money damages to the owner of unoccupied and abandoned residential and industrial property which that person beautifies pursuant to subsection (d) of this Section.

(f) This Section does not prohibit a person from entering a building or upon the land of another for emergency purposes. For purposes of this subsection (f), “emergency” means a condition or circumstance in which an individual is or is reasonably believed by the person to be in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or in which property is or is reasonably believed to be in imminent danger of damage or destruction.

(g) Paragraph (3.5) of subsection (a) does not apply to a peace officer or other official of a unit of government who enters a building or land in the performance of his or her official duties.

(h) Sentence. A violation of subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), or (a)(3.5) is a Class B misdemeanor. A violation of subdivision (a)(4) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(i) Civil liability. A person may be liable in any civil action for money damages to the owner of the land he or she entered upon with a motor vehicle as prohibited under paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Section. A person may also be liable to the owner for court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. The measure of damages shall be: (i) the actual damages, but not less than $250, if the vehicle is operated in a nature preserve or registered area as defined in Sections 3.11 and 3.14 of the Illinois Natural Areas Preservation Act; (ii) twice the actual damages if the owner has previously notified the person to cease trespassing; or (iii) in any other case, the actual damages, but not less than $50. If the person operating the vehicle is under the age of 16, the owner of the vehicle and the parent or legal guardian of the minor are jointly and severally liable. For the purposes of this subsection (i) :

“Land” includes, but is not limited to, land used for crop land, fallow land, orchard, pasture, feed lot, timber land, prairie land, mine spoil nature preserves and registered areas. “Land” does not include driveways or private roadways upon which the owner allows the public to drive.

“Owner” means the person who has the right to possession of the land, including the owner, operator or tenant.

“Vehicle” has the same meaning as provided under Section 1-217 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(j) This Section does not apply to the following persons while serving process:

(1) a person authorized to serve process under Section 2-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure; or

(2) a special process server appointed by the circuit court.

Part D. Offenses Affecting Public Health, Safety and Decency

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article 24. Deadly Weapons

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/24-1.1. Unlawful Use or Possession of Weapons by Felons or Persons in the Custody of the Department of Corrections Facilities

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction. This Section shall not apply if the person has been granted relief by the Director of the Department of State Police under Section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.1
(b) It is unlawful for any person confined in a penal institution, which is a facility of the Illinois Department of Corrections, to possess any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Code or any firearm or firearm ammunition, regardless of the intent with which he possesses it.
(c) It shall be an affirmative defense to a violation of subsection (b), that such possession was specifically authorized by rule, regulation, or directive of the Illinois Department of Corrections or order issued pursuant thereto.
(d) The defense of necessity is not available to a person who is charged with a violation of subsection (b) of this Section.
(e) Sentence. Violation of this Section by a person not confined in a penal institution shall be a Class 3 felony for which the person shall be sentenced to no less than 2 years and no more than 10 years. A second or subsequent violation of this Section shall be a Class 2 felony for which the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years, except as provided for in Section 5-4.5-110 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Violation of this Section by a person not confined in a penal institution who has been convicted of a forcible felony, a felony violation of Article 24 of this Code2 or of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act,3 stalking or aggravated stalking, or a Class 2 or greater felony under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act,4the Cannabis Control Act,5 or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act is a Class 2 felony for which the person shall be sentenced to not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years, except as provided for in Section 5-4.5-110 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Violation of this Section by a person who is on parole or mandatory supervised release is a Class 2 felony for which the person shall be sentenced to not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years, except as provided for in Section 5-4.5-110 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Violation of this Section by a person not confined in a penal institution is a Class X felony when the firearm possessed is a machine gun. Any person who violates this Section while confined in a penal institution, which is a facility of the Illinois Department of Corrections, is guilty of a Class 1 felony, if he possesses any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Code regardless of the intent with which he possesses it, a Class X felony if he possesses any firearm, firearm ammunition or explosive, and a Class X felony for which the offender shall be sentenced to not less than 12 years and not more than 50 years when the firearm possessed is a machine gun. A violation of this Section while wearing or in possession of body armor as defined in Section 33F-1 is a Class X felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years and not more than 40 years. The possession of each firearm or firearm ammunition in violation of this Section constitutes a single and separate violation.

5/24-3.1. Unlawful possession of firearms and firearm ammunition

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful possession of firearms or firearm ammunition when:
(1) He is under 18 years of age and has in his possession any firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person; or
(2) He is under 21 years of age, has been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a traffic offense or adjudged delinquent and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession; or
(3) He is a narcotic addict and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession; or
(4) He has been a patient in a mental institution within the past 5 years and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession. For purposes of this paragraph (4):
“Mental institution” means any hospital, institution, clinic, evaluation facility, mental health center, or part thereof, which is used primarily for the care or treatment of persons with mental illness.
“Patient in a mental institution” means the person was admitted, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to a mental institution for mental health treatment, unless the treatment was voluntary and solely for an alcohol abuse disorder and no other secondary substance abuse disorder or mental illness; or
(5) He is a person with an intellectual disability and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession; or
(6) He has in his possession any explosive bullet.

For purposes of this paragraph “explosive bullet” means the projectile portion of an ammunition cartridge which contains or carries an explosive charge which will explode upon contact with the flesh of a human or an animal. “Cartridge” means a tubular metal case having a projectile affixed at the front thereof and a cap or primer at the rear end thereof, with the propellant contained in such tube between the projectile and the cap.
(b) Sentence.
Unlawful possession of firearms, other than handguns, and firearm ammunition is a Class A misdemeanor. Unlawful possession of handguns is a Class 4 felony. The possession of each firearm or firearm ammunition in violation of this Section constitutes a single and separate violation.
(c) Nothing in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Section prohibits a person under 18 years of age from participating in any lawful recreational activity with a firearm such as, but not limited to, practice shooting at targets upon established public or private target ranges or hunting, trapping, or fishing in accordance with the Wildlife Code or the Fish and Aquatic Life Code.

Chapter 725. Criminal Procedure

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 5. Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Title IV Proceedings to Commence Prosecution

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article 112A. Protective Orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/112A-14. Domestic violence order of protection; remedies

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) (Blank).

(b) The court may order any of the remedies listed in this subsection (b). The remedies listed in this subsection (b) shall be in addition to other civil or criminal remedies available to petitioner.

(1) Prohibition of abuse. Prohibit respondent’s harassment, interference with personal liberty, intimidation of a dependent, physical abuse, or willful deprivation, as defined in this Article, if such abuse has occurred or otherwise appears likely to occur if not prohibited.

(2) Grant of exclusive possession of residence. Prohibit respondent from entering or remaining in any residence, household, or premises of the petitioner, including one owned or leased by respondent, if petitioner has a right to occupancy thereof. The grant of exclusive possession of the residence, household, or premises shall not affect title to real property, nor shall the court be limited by the standard set forth in subsection (c-2) of Section 501 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.1

(A) Right to occupancy. A party has a right to occupancy of a residence or household if it is solely or jointly owned or leased by that party, that party’s spouse, a person with a legal duty to support that party or a minor child in that party’s care, or by any person or entity other than the opposing party that authorizes that party’s occupancy (e.g., a domestic violence shelter). Standards set forth in subparagraph (B) shall not preclude equitable relief.

(B) Presumption of hardships. If petitioner and respondent each has the right to occupancy of a residence or household, the court shall balance (i) the hardships to respondent and any minor child or dependent adult in respondent’s care resulting from entry of this remedy with (ii) the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner’s care resulting from continued exposure to the risk of abuse (should petitioner remain at the residence or household) or from loss of possession of the residence or household (should petitioner leave to avoid the risk of abuse). When determining the balance of hardships, the court shall also take into account the accessibility of the residence or household. Hardships need not be balanced if respondent does not have a right to occupancy.

The balance of hardships is presumed to favor possession by petitioner unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, showing that the hardships to respondent substantially outweigh the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner’s care. The court, on the request of petitioner or on its own motion, may order respondent to provide suitable, accessible, alternate housing for petitioner instead of excluding respondent from a mutual residence or household.

(3) Stay away order and additional prohibitions. Order respondent to stay away from petitioner or any other person protected by the domestic violence order of protection, or prohibit respondent from entering or remaining present at petitioner’s school, place of employment, or other specified places at times when petitioner is present, or both, if reasonable, given the balance of hardships. Hardships need not be balanced for the court to enter a stay away order or prohibit entry if respondent has no right to enter the premises.

(A) If a domestic violence order of protection grants petitioner exclusive possession of the residence, prohibits respondent from entering the residence, or orders respondent to stay away from petitioner or other protected persons, then the court may allow respondent access to the residence to remove items of clothing and personal adornment used exclusively by respondent, medications, and other items as the court directs. The right to access shall be exercised on only one occasion as the court directs and in the presence of an agreed-upon adult third party or law enforcement officer.

(B) When the petitioner and the respondent attend the same public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school, the court when issuing a domestic violence order of protection and providing relief shall consider the severity of the act, any continuing physical danger or emotional distress to the petitioner, the educational rights guaranteed to the petitioner and respondent under federal and State law, the availability of a transfer of the respondent to another school, a change of placement or a change of program of the respondent, the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school, and any other relevant facts of the case. The court may order that the respondent not attend the public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school attended by the petitioner, order that the respondent accept a change of placement or change of program, as determined by the school district or private or non-public school, or place restrictions on the respondent’s movements within the school attended by the petitioner. The respondent bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer, change of placement, or change of program of the respondent is not available. The respondent also bears the burden of production with respect to the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school. A transfer, change of placement, or change of program is not unavailable to the respondent solely on the ground that the respondent does not agree with the school district’s or private or non-public school’s transfer, change of placement, or change of program or solely on the ground that the respondent fails or refuses to consent or otherwise does not take an action required to effectuate a transfer, change of placement, or change of program. When a court orders a respondent to stay away from the public, private, or non-public school attended by the petitioner and the respondent requests a transfer to another attendance center within the respondent’s school district or private or non-public school, the school district or private or non-public school shall have sole discretion to determine the attendance center to which the respondent is transferred. If the court order results in a transfer of the minor respondent to another attendance center, a change in the respondent’s placement, or a change of the respondent’s program, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the transfer or change.

(C) The court may order the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent to take certain actions or to refrain from taking certain actions to ensure that the respondent complies with the order. If the court orders a transfer of the respondent to another school, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the change of school by the respondent.

(4) Counseling. Require or recommend the respondent to undergo counseling for a specified duration with a social worker, psychologist, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, family service agency, alcohol or substance abuse program, mental health center guidance counselor, agency providing services to elders, program designed for domestic violence abusers, or any other guidance service the court deems appropriate. The court may order the respondent in any intimate partner relationship to report to an Illinois Department of Human Services protocol approved partner abuse intervention program for an assessment and to follow all recommended treatment.

(5) Physical care and possession of the minor child. In order to protect the minor child from abuse, neglect, or unwarranted separation from the person who has been the minor child’s primary caretaker, or to otherwise protect the well-being of the minor child, the court may do either or both of the following: (i) grant petitioner physical care or possession of the minor child, or both, or (ii) order respondent to return a minor child to, or not remove a minor child from, the physical care of a parent or person in loco parentis.

If the respondent is charged with abuse (as defined in Section 112A-3 of this Code) of a minor child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that awarding physical care to respondent would not be in the minor child’s best interest.

(6) Temporary allocation of parental responsibilities and significant decision-making responsibilities. Award temporary significant decision-making responsibility to petitioner in accordance with this Section, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015,2 and this State’s Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.3

If the respondent is charged with abuse (as defined in Section 112A-3 of this Code) of a minor child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that awarding temporary significant decision-making responsibility to respondent would not be in the child’s best interest.

(7) Parenting time. Determine the parenting time, if any, of respondent in any case in which the court awards physical care or temporary significant decision-making responsibility of a minor child to petitioner. The court shall restrict or deny respondent’s parenting time with a minor child if the court finds that respondent has done or is likely to do any of the following:

(i) abuse or endanger the minor child during parenting time;

(ii) use the parenting time as an opportunity to abuse or harass petitioner or petitioner’s family or household members;

(iii) improperly conceal or detain the minor child; or

(iv) otherwise act in a manner that is not in the best interests of the minor child.

The court shall not be limited by the standards set forth in Section 603.10 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. If the court grants parenting time, the order shall specify dates and times for the parenting time to take place or other specific parameters or conditions that are appropriate. No order for parenting time shall refer merely to the term “reasonable parenting time”. Petitioner may deny respondent access to the minor child if, when respondent arrives for parenting time, respondent is under the influence of drugs or alcohol and constitutes a threat to the safety and well-being of petitioner or petitioner’s minor children or is behaving in a violent or abusive manner. If necessary to protect any member of petitioner’s family or household from future abuse, respondent shall be prohibited from coming to petitioner’s residence to meet the minor child for parenting time, and the petitioner and respondent shall submit to the court their recommendations for reasonable alternative arrangements for parenting time. A person may be approved to supervise parenting time only after filing an affidavit accepting that responsibility and acknowledging accountability to the court.

(8) Removal or concealment of minor child. Prohibit respondent from removing a minor child from the State or concealing the child within the State.

(9) Order to appear. Order the respondent to appear in court, alone or with a minor child, to prevent abuse, neglect, removal or concealment of the child, to return the child to the custody or care of the petitioner, or to permit any court-ordered interview or examination of the child or the respondent.

(10) Possession of personal property. Grant petitioner exclusive possession of personal property and, if respondent has possession or control, direct respondent to promptly make it available to petitioner, if:

(i) petitioner, but not respondent, owns the property; or

(ii) the petitioner and respondent own the property jointly; sharing it would risk abuse of petitioner by respondent or is impracticable; and the balance of hardships favors temporary possession by petitioner.

If petitioner’s sole claim to ownership of the property is that it is marital property, the court may award petitioner temporary possession thereof under the standards of subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph only if a proper proceeding has been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended.

No order under this provision shall affect title to property.

(11) Protection of property. Forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, damaging, or otherwise disposing of any real or personal property, except as explicitly authorized by the court, if:

(i) petitioner, but not respondent, owns the property; or

(ii) the petitioner and respondent own the property jointly, and the balance of hardships favors granting this remedy.

If petitioner’s sole claim to ownership of the property is that it is marital property, the court may grant petitioner relief under subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph only if a proper proceeding has been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended.

The court may further prohibit respondent from improperly using the financial or other resources of an aged member of the family or household for the profit or advantage of respondent or of any other person.

(11.5) Protection of animals. Grant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.

(12) Order for payment of support. Order respondent to pay temporary support for the petitioner or any child in the petitioner’s care or over whom the petitioner has been allocated parental responsibility, when the respondent has a legal obligation to support that person, in accordance with the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which shall govern, among other matters, the amount of support, payment through the clerk and withholding of income to secure payment. An order for child support may be granted to a petitioner with lawful physical care of a child, or an order or agreement for physical care of a child, prior to entry of an order allocating significant decision-making responsibility. Such a support order shall expire upon entry of a valid order allocating parental responsibility differently and vacating petitioner’s significant decision-making responsibility unless otherwise provided in the order.

(13) Order for payment of losses. Order respondent to pay petitioner for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse. Such losses shall include, but not be limited to, medical expenses, lost earnings or other support, repair or replacement of property damaged or taken, reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and moving or other travel expenses, including additional reasonable expenses for temporary shelter and restaurant meals.

(i) Losses affecting family needs. If a party is entitled to seek maintenance, child support, or property distribution from the other party under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended, the court may order respondent to reimburse petitioner’s actual losses, to the extent that such reimbursement would be “appropriate temporary relief”, as authorized by subsection (a)(3) of Section 501 of that Act.

(ii) Recovery of expenses. In the case of an improper concealment or removal of a minor child, the court may order respondent to pay the reasonable expenses incurred or to be incurred in the search for and recovery of the minor child, including, but not limited to, legal fees, court costs, private investigator fees, and travel costs.

(14) Prohibition of entry. Prohibit the respondent from entering or remaining in the residence or household while the respondent is under the influence of alcohol or drugs and constitutes a threat to the safety and well-being of the petitioner or the petitioner’s children.

(14.5) Prohibition of firearm possession.

(A) A person who is subject to an existing domestic violence order of protection issued under this Code may not lawfully possess weapons under Section 8.2 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.4

(B) Any firearms in the possession of the respondent, except as provided in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph (14.5), shall be ordered by the court to be turned over to a person with a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card for safekeeping. The court shall issue an order that the respondent’s Firearm Owner’s Identification Card be turned over to the local law enforcement agency, which in turn shall immediately mail the card to the Department of State Police Firearm Owner’s Identification Card Office for safekeeping. The period of safekeeping shall be for the duration of the domestic violence order of protection. The firearm or firearms and Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, if unexpired, shall at the respondent’s request be returned to the respondent at expiration of the domestic violence order of protection.

(C) If the respondent is a peace officer as defined in Section 2-13 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the court shall order that any firearms used by the respondent in the performance of his or her duties as a peace officer be surrendered to the chief law enforcement executive of the agency in which the respondent is employed, who shall retain the firearms for safekeeping for the duration of the domestic violence order of protection.

(D) Upon expiration of the period of safekeeping, if the firearms or Firearm Owner’s Identification Card cannot be returned to respondent because respondent cannot be located, fails to respond to requests to retrieve the firearms, or is not lawfully eligible to possess a firearm, upon petition from the local law enforcement agency, the court may order the local law enforcement agency to destroy the firearms, use the firearms for training purposes, or for any other application as deemed appropriate by the local law enforcement agency; or that the firearms be turned over to a third party who is lawfully eligible to possess firearms, and who does not reside with respondent.

(15) Prohibition of access to records. If a domestic violence order of protection prohibits respondent from having contact with the minor child, or if petitioner’s address is omitted under subsection (b) of Section 112A-5 of this Code, or if necessary to prevent abuse or wrongful removal or concealment of a minor child, the order shall deny respondent access to, and prohibit respondent from inspecting, obtaining, or attempting to inspect or obtain, school or any other records of the minor child who is in the care of petitioner.

(16) Order for payment of shelter services. Order respondent to reimburse a shelter providing temporary housing and counseling services to the petitioner for the cost of the services, as certified by the shelter and deemed reasonable by the court.

(17) Order for injunctive relief. Enter injunctive relief necessary or appropriate to prevent further abuse of a family or household member or to effectuate one of the granted remedies, if supported by the balance of hardships. If the harm to be prevented by the injunction is abuse or any other harm that one of the remedies listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of this subsection is designed to prevent, no further evidence is necessary to establish that the harm is an irreparable injury.

(18) Telephone services.

(A) Unless a condition described in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph exists, the court may, upon request by the petitioner, order a wireless telephone service provider to transfer to the petitioner the right to continue to use a telephone number or numbers indicated by the petitioner and the financial responsibility associated with the number or numbers, as set forth in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph. In this paragraph (18), the term “wireless telephone service provider” means a provider of commercial mobile service as defined in 47 U.S.C. 332. The petitioner may request the transfer of each telephone number that the petitioner, or a minor child in his or her custody, uses. The clerk of the court shall serve the order on the wireless telephone service provider’s agent for service of process provided to the Illinois Commerce Commission. The order shall contain all of the following:

(i) The name and billing telephone number of the account holder including the name of the wireless telephone service provider that serves the account.

(ii) Each telephone number that will be transferred.

(iii) A statement that the provider transfers to the petitioner all financial responsibility for and right to the use of any telephone number transferred under this paragraph.

(B) A wireless telephone service provider shall terminate the respondent’s use of, and shall transfer to the petitioner use of, the telephone number or numbers indicated in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph unless it notifies the petitioner, within 72 hours after it receives the order, that one of the following applies:

(i) The account holder named in the order has terminated the account.

(ii) A difference in network technology would prevent or impair the functionality of a device on a network if the transfer occurs.

(iii) The transfer would cause a geographic or other limitation on network or service provision to the petitioner.

(iv) Another technological or operational issue would prevent or impair the use of the telephone number if the transfer occurs.

(C) The petitioner assumes all financial responsibility for and right to the use of any telephone number transferred under this paragraph. In this paragraph, “financial responsibility” includes monthly service costs and costs associated with any mobile device associated with the number.

(D) A wireless telephone service provider may apply to the petitioner its routine and customary requirements for establishing an account or transferring a number, including requiring the petitioner to provide proof of identification, financial information, and customer preferences.

(E) Except for willful or wanton misconduct, a wireless telephone service provider is immune from civil liability for its actions taken in compliance with a court order issued under this paragraph.

(F) All wireless service providers that provide services to residential customers shall provide to the Illinois Commerce Commission the name and address of an agent for service of orders entered under this paragraph (18). Any change in status of the registered agent must be reported to the Illinois Commerce Commission within 30 days of such change.

(G) The Illinois Commerce Commission shall maintain the list of registered agents for service for each wireless telephone service provider on the Commission’s website. The Commission may consult with wireless telephone service providers and the Circuit Court Clerks on the manner in which this information is provided and displayed.

(c) Relevant factors; findings.

(1) In determining whether to grant a specific remedy, other than payment of support, the court shall consider relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

(i) the nature, frequency, severity, pattern, and consequences of the respondent’s past abuse of the petitioner or any family or household member, including the concealment of his or her location in order to evade service of process or notice, and the likelihood of danger of future abuse to petitioner or any member of petitioner’s or respondent’s family or household; and

(ii) the danger that any minor child will be abused or neglected or improperly relocated from the jurisdiction, improperly concealed within the State, or improperly separated from the child’s primary caretaker.

(2) In comparing relative hardships resulting to the parties from loss of possession of the family home, the court shall consider relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

(i) availability, accessibility, cost, safety, adequacy, location, and other characteristics of alternate housing for each party and any minor child or dependent adult in the party’s care;

(ii) the effect on the party’s employment; and

(iii) the effect on the relationship of the party, and any minor child or dependent adult in the party’s care, to family, school, church, and community.

(3) Subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection (c), the court shall make its findings in an official record or in writing, and shall at a minimum set forth the following:

(i) That the court has considered the applicable relevant factors described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection (c).

(ii) Whether the conduct or actions of respondent, unless prohibited, will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse.

(iii) Whether it is necessary to grant the requested relief in order to protect petitioner or other alleged abused persons.

(4) (Blank).

(5) Never married parties. No rights or responsibilities for a minor child born outside of marriage attach to a putative father until a father and child relationship has been established under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984,5 the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, the Illinois Public Aid Code,6 Section 12 of the Vital Records Act,7 the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the Probate Act of 1975,8 the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,9 the Expedited Child Support Act of 1990,10 any judicial, administrative, or other act of another state or territory, any other statute of this State, or by any foreign nation establishing the father and child relationship, any other proceeding substantially in conformity with the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, or when both parties appeared in open court or at an administrative hearing acknowledging under oath or admitting by affirmation the existence of a father and child relationship. Absent such an adjudication, no putative father shall be granted temporary allocation of parental responsibilities, including parenting time with the minor child, or physical care and possession of the minor child, nor shall an order of payment for support of the minor child be entered.

(d) Balance of hardships; findings. If the court finds that the balance of hardships does not support the granting of a remedy governed by paragraph (2), (3), (10), (11), or (16) of subsection (b) of this Section, which may require such balancing, the court’s findings shall so indicate and shall include a finding as to whether granting the remedy will result in hardship to respondent that would substantially outweigh the hardship to petitioner from denial of the remedy. The findings shall be an official record or in writing.

(e) Denial of remedies. Denial of any remedy shall not be based, in whole or in part, on evidence that:

(1) respondent has cause for any use of force, unless that cause satisfies the standards for justifiable use of force provided by Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;

(2) respondent was voluntarily intoxicated;

(3) petitioner acted in self-defense or defense of another, provided that, if petitioner utilized force, such force was justifiable under Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;

(4) petitioner did not act in self-defense or defense of another;

(5) petitioner left the residence or household to avoid further abuse by respondent;

(6) petitioner did not leave the residence or household to avoid further abuse by respondent; or(7) conduct by any family or household member excused the abuse by respondent, unless that same conduct would have excused such abuse if the parties had not been family or household members.

5/112A-28. Data maintenance by law enforcement agencies

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) All sheriffs shall furnish to the Department of State Police, daily, in the form and detail the Department requires, copies of any recorded protective orders issued by the court, and any foreign protective orders filed by the clerk of the court, and transmitted to the sheriff by the clerk of the court. Each protective order shall be entered in the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System on the same day it is issued by the court.
(b) The Department of State Police shall maintain a complete and systematic record and index of all valid and recorded protective orders issued or filed under this Act. The data shall be used to inform all dispatchers and law enforcement officers at the scene of an alleged incident of abuse or violation of a protective order of any recorded prior incident of abuse involving the abused party and the effective dates and terms of any recorded protective order.
(c) The data, records and transmittals required under this Section shall pertain to:
(1) any valid emergency, interim or plenary domestic violence order of protection, civil no contact or stalking no contact order issued in a civil proceeding; and
(2) any valid ex parte or final protective order issued in a criminal proceeding or authorized under the laws of another state, tribe, or United States territory.

5/112A-30. Assistance by law enforcement officers

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Whenever a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a person has been abused by a family or household member, the officer shall immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, including:
(1) Arresting the abusing party, where appropriate;
(2) If there is probable cause to believe that particular weapons were used to commit the incident of abuse, subject to constitutional limitations, seizing and taking inventory of the weapons;
(3) Accompanying the victim of abuse to his or her place of residence for a reasonable period of time to remove necessary personal belongings and possessions;
(4) Offering the victim of abuse immediate and adequate information (written in a language appropriate for the victim or in Braille or communicated in appropriate sign language), which shall include a summary of the procedures and relief available to victims of abuse under this Article and the officer’s name and badge number;
(5) Providing the victim with one referral to an accessible service agency;
(6) Advising the victim of abuse about seeking medical attention and preserving evidence (specifically including photographs of injury or damage and damaged clothing or other property); and
(7) Providing or arranging accessible transportation for the victim of abuse (and, at the victim’s request, any minors or dependents in the victim’s care) to a medical facility for treatment of injuries or to a nearby place of shelter or safety; or, after the close of court business hours, providing or arranging for transportation for the victim (and, at the victim’s request, any minors or dependents in the victim’s care) to the nearest available circuit judge or associate judge so the victim may file a petition for an emergency order of protection under Section 217 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986. When a victim of abuse chooses to leave the scene of the offense, it shall be presumed that it is in the best interests of any minors or dependents in the victim’s care to remain with the victim or a person designated by the victim, rather than to remain with the abusing party.
(b) Whenever a law enforcement officer does not exercise arrest powers or otherwise initiate criminal proceedings, the officer shall:
(1) Make a police report of the investigation of any bona fide allegation of an incident of abuse and the disposition of the investigation, in accordance with subsection (a) of Section 112A-29;
(2) Inform the victim of abuse of the victim’s right to request that a criminal proceeding be initiated where appropriate, including specific times and places for meeting with the State’s Attorney’s office, a warrant officer, or other official in accordance with local procedure; and
(3) Advise the victim of the importance of seeking medical attention and preserving evidence (specifically including photographs of injury or damage and damaged clothing or other property).
(c) Except as provided by Section 24-6 of the Criminal Code of 20121 or under a court order, any weapon seized under subsection (a)(2) shall be returned forthwith to the person from whom it was seized when it is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes.
FN1] or under a court order, any weapon seized under subsection (a)(2) shall be returned forthwith to the person from whom it was seized when it is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes.

Chapter 730. Corrections

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 5. Unified Code of Corrections

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Chapter V. Sentencing

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article 4.5. General Sentencing Provision

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/5-4.5-45. CLASS 4 FELONIES; SENTENCE

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) TERM. The sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of not less than one year and not more than 3 years. The sentence of imprisonment for an extended term Class 4 felony, as provided in Section 5-8-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2), shall be a term not less than 3 years and not more than 6 years.
(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A sentence of periodic imprisonment shall be for a definite term of up to 18 months, except as otherwise provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-7-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-7-1).
(c) IMPACT INCARCERATION. See Sections 5-8-1.1 and 5-8-1.2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1 and 5/5-8-1.2) concerning eligibility for the impact incarceration program or the county impact incarceration program.
(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 30 months. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3).
(e) FINE. Fines may be imposed as provided in Section 5-4.5-50(b) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(b)).
(f) RESTITUTION. See Section 5-5-6 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6) concerning restitution.
(g) CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE. The sentence shall be concurrent or consecutive as provided in Section 5-8-4 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4) and Section 5-4.5-50 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50).
(h) DRUG COURT. See Section 20 of the Drug Court Treatment Act (730 ILCS 166/20) concerning eligibility for a drug court program.
(i) CREDIT FOR HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-4.5-100 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100) concerning credit for time spent in home detention prior to judgment.
(j) SENTENCE CREDIT. See Section 3-6-3 of this Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) or the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/) for rules and regulations for sentence credit.
(k) ELECTRONIC MONITORING AND HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-8A-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3) concerning eligibility for electronic monitoring and home detention.
(l) PAROLE; MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE. Except as provided in Section 3-3-8 or 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/3-3-8 or 5/5-8-1), the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be one year upon release from imprisonment.

5/5-4.5-55. CLASS A MISDEMEANORS; SENTENCE

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) TERM. The sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of less than one year.
(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A sentence of periodic imprisonment shall be for a definite term of less than one year, except as otherwise provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-7-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-7-1).
(c) IMPACT INCARCERATION. See Section 5-8-1.2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.2) concerning eligibility for the county impact incarceration program.
(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 2 years. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3).
(e) FINE. A fine not to exceed $2,500 for each offense or the amount specified in the offense, whichever is greater, may be imposed. A fine may be imposed in addition to a sentence of conditional discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment, or imprisonment. See Article 9 of Chapter V (730 ILCS 5/Ch. V, Art. 9) for imposition of additional amounts and determination of amounts and payment.
(f) RESTITUTION. See Section 5-5-6 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6) concerning restitution.
(g) CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE. The sentence shall be concurrent or consecutive as provided in Section 5-8-4 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4).
(h) DRUG COURT. See Section 20 of the Drug Court Treatment Act (730 ILCS 166/20) concerning eligibility for a drug court program.
(i) CREDIT FOR HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-4.5-100 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100) concerning credit for time spent in home detention prior to judgment.
(j) GOOD BEHAVIOR ALLOWANCE. See the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/) for rules and regulations for good behavior allowance.
(k) ELECTRONIC MONITORING AND HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-8A-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3) concerning eligibility for electronic monitoring and home detention.

Article 8. Imprisonment

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/5-8-1. Natural life imprisonment; enhancements for use of a firearm; mandatory supervised release

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense or in Article 4.5 of Chapter V, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, subject to Section 5-4.5-115 of this Code, according to the following limitations:

(1) for first degree murder,

(a) (blank),

(b) if a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed in subsection (b) or (b-5) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 are present, the court may sentence the defendant, subject to Section 5-4.5-105, to a term of natural life imprisonment, or

(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 18, and

(i) has previously been convicted of first degree murder under any state or federal law, or

(ii) is found guilty of murdering more than one victim, or

(iii) is found guilty of murdering a peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker when the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the peace officer or fireman from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker from performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker, or

(iv) is found guilty of murdering an employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, when the employee was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the employee from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the employee performing his official duties, or

(v) is found guilty of murdering an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver or other medical assistance or first aid person while employed by a municipality or other governmental unit when the person was killed in the course of performing official duties or to prevent the person from performing official duties or in retaliation for performing official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistant or first aid personnel, or

(vi) (blank), or

(vii) is found guilty of first degree murder and the murder was committed by reason of any person’s activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer. For the purpose of this Section, “community policing volunteer” has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

For purposes of clause (v), “emergency medical technician - ambulance”, “emergency medical technician - intermediate”, “emergency medical technician - paramedic”, have the meanings ascribed to them in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.

(d)(i) if the person committed the offense while armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(ii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(iii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.

(2) (blank);

(2.5) for a person who has attained the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense and who is convicted under the circumstances described in subdivision (b)(1)(B) of Section 11-1.20 or paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Section 12-13, subdivision (d)(2) of Section 11-1.30 or paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Section 12-14, subdivision (b)(1.2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (1.2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1, subdivision (b)(2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment.

(b) (Blank).

(c) (Blank).

(d) Subject to earlier termination under Section 3-3-8, the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be written as part of the sentencing order and shall be as follows:

(1) for first degree murder or a Class X felony except for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly and except for the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, 3 years;

(2) for a Class 1 felony or a Class 2 felony except for the offense of criminal sexual assault if committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly and except for the offenses of manufacture and dissemination of child pornography under clauses (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, 2 years;

(3) for a Class 3 felony or a Class 4 felony, 1 year;

(4) for defendants who commit the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault, on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, or who commit the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, manufacture of child pornography, or dissemination of child pornography after January 1, 2009, the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant;

(5) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse or felony criminal sexual abuse, 4 years, at least the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an electronic monitoring or home detention program under Article 8A of Chapter V of this Code;

(6) for a felony domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, and a felony violation of an order of protection, 4 years.

(e) (Blank).

(f) (Blank).

Article 9. Fines

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/5-9-1. Authorized fines

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) An offender may be sentenced to pay a fine as provided in Article 4.5 of Chapter V.

(b) (Blank.)

(c) There shall be added to every fine imposed in sentencing for a criminal or traffic offense, except an offense relating to parking or registration, or offense by a pedestrian, an additional penalty of $15 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed. The additional penalty of $15 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed, if not otherwise assessed, shall also be added to every fine imposed upon a plea of guilty, stipulation of facts or findings of guilty, resulting in a judgment of conviction, or order of supervision in criminal, traffic, local ordinance, county ordinance, and conservation cases (except parking, registration, or pedestrian violations), or upon a sentence of probation without entry of judgment under Section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act,1Section 410 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act,2 or Section 70 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act.

Such additional amounts shall be assessed by the court imposing the fine and shall be collected by the Circuit Clerk in addition to the fine and costs in the case. Each such additional penalty shall be remitted by the Circuit Clerk within one month after receipt to the State Treasurer. The State Treasurer shall deposit $1 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed into the LEADS Maintenance Fund. The State Treasurer shall deposit $3 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed into the Law Enforcement Camera Grant Fund. The remaining surcharge amount shall be deposited into the Traffic and Criminal Conviction Surcharge Fund, unless the fine, costs or additional amounts are subject to disbursement by the circuit clerk under Section 27.5 of the Clerks of Courts Act.3 Such additional penalty shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. Not later than March 1 of each year the Circuit Clerk shall submit a report of the amount of funds remitted to the State Treasurer under this subsection (c) during the preceding calendar year. Except as otherwise provided by Supreme Court Rules, if a court in imposing a fine against an offender levies a gross amount for fine, costs, fees and penalties, the amount of the additional penalty provided for herein shall be computed on the amount remaining after deducting from the gross amount levied all fees of the Circuit Clerk, the State’s Attorney and the Sheriff. After deducting from the gross amount levied the fees and additional penalty provided for herein, less any other additional penalties provided by law, the clerk shall remit the net balance remaining to the entity authorized by law to receive the fine imposed in the case. For purposes of this Section “fees of the Circuit Clerk” shall include, if applicable, the fee provided for under Section 27.3a of the Clerks of Courts Act4 and the fee, if applicable, payable to the county in which the violation occurred pursuant to Section 5-1101 of the Counties Code.5

(c-5) In addition to the fines imposed by subsection (c), any person convicted or receiving an order of supervision for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall pay an additional $100 fee to the clerk. This additional fee, less 2 1/2% that shall be used to defray administrative costs incurred by the clerk, shall be remitted by the clerk to the Treasurer within 60 days after receipt for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund. This additional fee of $100 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. Not later than March 1 of each year the Circuit Clerk shall submit a report of the amount of funds remitted to the State Treasurer under this subsection (c-5) during the preceding calendar year.

The Circuit Clerk may accept payment of fines and costs by credit card from an offender who has been convicted of a traffic offense, petty offense or misdemeanor and may charge the service fee permitted where fines and costs are paid by credit card provided for in Section 27.3b of the Clerks of Courts Act.6

(c-7) In addition to the fines imposed by subsection (c), any person convicted or receiving an order of supervision for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall pay an additional $5 fee to the clerk. This additional fee, less 2 1/2% that shall be used to defray administrative costs incurred by the clerk, shall be remitted by the clerk to the Treasurer within 60 days after receipt for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund. This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. Not later than March 1 of each year the Circuit Clerk shall submit a report of the amount of funds remitted to the State Treasurer under this subsection (c-7) during the preceding calendar year.

(c-9) (Blank).

(d) In determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, except for those fines established for violations of Chapter 15 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,7 the court shall consider:

(1) the financial resources and future ability of the offender to pay the fine; and

(2) whether the fine will prevent the offender from making court ordered restitution or reparation to the victim of the offense; and

(3) in a case where the accused is a dissolved corporation and the court has appointed counsel to represent the corporation, the costs incurred either by the county or the State for such representation.

(e) The court may order the fine to be paid forthwith or within a specified period of time or in installments.(f) All fines, costs and additional amounts imposed under this Section for any violation of Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,8 or a similar provision of a local ordinance, and any violation of the Child Passenger Protection Act,9 or a similar provision of a local ordinance, shall be collected and disbursed by the circuit clerk as provided under Section 27.5 of the Clerks of Courts Act.

Chapter 735. Civil Procedure

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 5. Code of Civil Procedure

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article XII. Judgments--Enforcement

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Part 6. Foreign Judgments and Foreign-Money Claims View the full text of all sections at this level Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/12-652. Filing and Status of Foreign Judgments

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the acts of Congress or the statutes of this State may be filed in the office of the circuit clerk for any county of this State. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the circuit court for any county of this State. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a circuit court for any county of this State and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner. A judgment filed or registered under this Act shall be construed to be an original Illinois judgment from the date it is filed with the clerk of the circuit court and for purposes of enforcement and revival, shall be treated in exactly the same manner as an Illinois judgment entered on that same date.

(b) A foreign judgment or lien arising by operation of law, and resulting from an order requiring child support payments shall be entitled to full faith and credit in this State, shall be enforceable in the same manner as any judgment or lien of this State resulting from an order requiring child support payments, and shall not be required to be filed with the office of the circuit clerk in any county of this State, except as provided for in Sections 10-25 and 10-25.5 of the Illinois Public Aid Code. [FN1]

(c) A foreign order of protection issued by the court of another state, tribe, or United States territory is entitled to full faith and credit in this State, is enforceable in the same manner as any order of protection issued by a circuit court for any county of this State, and may be filed with the circuit clerk in any county of this State as provided in Section 222.5 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 [FN2] or Section 22.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. [FN3] A foreign order of protection shall not be required to be filed with the circuit clerk to be entitled to full faith and credit in this State.

5/12-653. Notice of Filing

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) At the time of the filing of the foreign judgment, the judgment creditor or his lawyer shall make and file with the circuit clerk an affidavit setting forth the name and last known post office address of the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor.

(b) Promptly upon the filing of a foreign judgment (other than a foreign order of protection) and the affidavit, the clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice shall include the name and post office address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor’s lawyer, if any, in this State. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has been filed.

(c) The clerk shall not mail notice of the filing of a foreign order of protection to the respondent named in the order.

Chapter 740. Civil Liabilities

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 21. Stalking No Contact Order Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

21/10. Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 10. Definitions. For the purposes of this Act:

“Course of conduct” means 2 or more acts, including but not limited to acts in which a respondent directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, or threatens a person, workplace, school, or place of worship, engages in other contact, or interferes with or damages a person’s property or pet. A course of conduct may include contact via electronic communications. The incarceration of a person in a penal institution who commits the course of conduct is not a bar to prosecution under this Section.

“Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm.

“Contact” includes any contact with the victim, that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, or that is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued, including but not limited to being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; and appearing at the prohibited workplace, school, or place of worship.

“Petitioner” means any named petitioner for the stalking no contact order or any named victim of stalking on whose behalf the petition is brought. “Petitioner” includes an authorized agent of a place of employment, an authorized agent of a place of worship, or an authorized agent of a school.

“Reasonable person” means a person in the petitioner’s circumstances with the petitioner’s knowledge of the respondent and the respondent’s prior acts.

“Stalking” means engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety, the safety of a workplace, school, or place of worship, or the safety of a third person or suffer emotional distress. Stalking does not include an exercise of the right to free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful or picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute, including any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, and pension or retirement provisions, the making or maintaining of collective bargaining agreements, and the terms to be included in those agreements.“Stalking No Contact Order” means an emergency order or plenary order granted under this Act, which includes a remedy authorized by Section 80 of this Act.

21/15. Persons protected by this Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 15. Persons protected by this Act. A petition for a stalking no contact order may be filed when relief is not available to the petitioner under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986:

(1) by any person who is a victim of stalking;

(2) by a person on behalf of a minor child or an adult who is a victim of stalking but, because of age, disability, health, or inaccessibility, cannot file the petition;

(3) by an authorized agent of a workplace;

(4) by an authorized agent of a place of worship; or

(5) by an authorized agent of a school.

21/55. Venue

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 55. Venue. A petition for a stalking no contact order may be filed in any county where (1) the petitioner resides, (2) the respondent resides, or (3) one or more acts of the alleged stalking occurred.

21/80. Stalking no contact orders; remedies

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 80. Stalking no contact orders; remedies.

(a) If the court finds that the petitioner has been a victim of stalking, a stalking no contact order shall issue; provided that the petitioner must also satisfy the requirements of Section 95 on emergency orders or Section 100 on plenary orders. The petitioner shall not be denied a stalking no contact order because the petitioner or the respondent is a minor. The court, when determining whether or not to issue a stalking no contact order, may not require physical injury on the person of the petitioner. Modification and extension of prior stalking no contact orders shall be in accordance with this Act.

(b) A stalking no contact order shall order one or more of the following:

(1) prohibit the respondent from threatening to commit or committing stalking;

(2) order the respondent not to have any contact with the petitioner or a third person specifically named by the court;

(3) prohibit the respondent from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within a specified distance of the petitioner or the petitioner’s residence, school, daycare, or place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner; however, the court may order the respondent to stay away from the respondent’s own residence, school, or place of employment only if the respondent has been provided actual notice of the opportunity to appear and be heard on the petition;

(4) prohibit the respondent from possessing a Firearm Owners Identification Card, or possessing or buying firearms; and

(5) order other injunctive relief the court determines to be necessary to protect the petitioner or third party specifically named by the court.

(b-5) When the petitioner and the respondent attend the same public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school, the court when issuing a stalking no contact order and providing relief shall consider the severity of the act, any continuing physical danger or emotional distress to the petitioner, the educational rights guaranteed to the petitioner and respondent under federal and State law, the availability of a transfer of the respondent to another school, a change of placement or a change of program of the respondent, the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school, and any other relevant facts of the case. The court may order that the respondent not attend the public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school attended by the petitioner, order that the respondent accept a change of placement or program, as determined by the school district or private or non-public school, or place restrictions on the respondent’s movements within the school attended by the petitioner. The respondent bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer, change of placement, or change of program of the respondent is not available. The respondent also bears the burden of production with respect to the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school. A transfer, change of placement, or change of program is not unavailable to the respondent solely on the ground that the respondent does not agree with the school district’s or private or non-public school’s transfer, change of placement, or change of program or solely on the ground that the respondent fails or refuses to consent to or otherwise does not take an action required to effectuate a transfer, change of placement, or change of program. When a court orders a respondent to stay away from the public, private, or non-public school attended by the petitioner and the respondent requests a transfer to another attendance center within the respondent’s school district or private or non-public school, the school district or private or non-public school shall have sole discretion to determine the attendance center to which the respondent is transferred. In the event the court order results in a transfer of the minor respondent to another attendance center, a change in the respondent’s placement, or a change of the respondent’s program, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the transfer or change.

(b-6) The court may order the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent to take certain actions or to refrain from taking certain actions to ensure that the respondent complies with the order. In the event the court orders a transfer of the respondent to another school, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent are responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the change of school by the respondent.

(b-7) The court shall not hold a school district or private or non-public school or any of its employees in civil or criminal contempt unless the school district or private or non-public school has been allowed to intervene.

(b-8) The court may hold the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent in civil or criminal contempt for a violation of any provision of any order entered under this Act for conduct of the minor respondent in violation of this Act if the parents, guardian, or legal custodian directed, encouraged, or assisted the respondent minor in such conduct.

(c) The court may award the petitioner costs and attorneys fees if a stalking no contact order is granted.

(d) Monetary damages are not recoverable as a remedy.

(e) If the stalking no contact order prohibits the respondent from possessing a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, or possessing or buying firearms; the court shall confiscate the respondent’s Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and immediately return the card to the Department of State Police Firearm Owner’s Identification Card Office.

21/95. Emergency stalking no contact order

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 95. Emergency stalking no contact order.

(a) An emergency stalking no contact order shall issue if the petitioner satisfies the requirements of this subsection (a). The petitioner shall establish that:

(1) the court has jurisdiction under Section 50;

(2) the requirements of Section 80 are satisfied; and

(3) there is good cause to grant the remedy, regardless of prior service of process or of notice upon the respondent, because the harm which that remedy is intended to prevent would be likely to occur if the respondent were given any prior notice, or greater notice than was actually given, of the petitioner’s efforts to obtain judicial relief.

An emergency stalking no contact order shall be issued by the court if it appears from the contents of the petition and the examination of the petitioner that the averments are sufficient to indicate stalking by the respondent and to support the granting of relief under the issuance of the stalking no contact order.

An emergency stalking no contact order shall be issued if the court finds that items (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection (a) are met.

(a–5) When a petition for an emergency stalking no contact order is granted, the order shall not be publicly available until the order is served on the respondent.

(b) If the respondent appears in court for this hearing for an emergency order, he or she may elect to file a general appearance and testify. Any resulting order may be an emergency order, governed by this Section. Notwithstanding the requirements of this Section, if all requirements of Section 100 have been met, the court may issue a plenary order.

(c) Emergency orders; court holidays and evenings.

(1) When the court is unavailable at the close of business, the petitioner may file a petition for a 21-day emergency order before any available circuit judge or associate judge who may grant relief under this Act. If the judge finds that there is an immediate and present danger of abuse against the petitioner and that the petitioner has satisfied the prerequisites set forth in subsection (a), that judge may issue an emergency stalking no contact order.

(2) The chief judge of the circuit court may designate for each county in the circuit at least one judge to be reasonably available to issue orally, by telephone, by facsimile, or otherwise, an emergency stalking no contact order at all times, whether or not the court is in session.

(3) Any order issued under this Section and any documentation in support of the order shall be certified on the next court day to the appropriate court. The clerk of that court shall immediately assign a case number, file the petition, order, and other documents with the court, and enter the order of record and file it with the sheriff for service, in accordance with Section 60. Filing the petition shall commence proceedings for further relief under Section 20. Failure to comply with the requirements of this paragraph (3) does not affect the validity of the order.

21/100. Plenary stalking no contact order

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 100. Plenary stalking no contact order.

A plenary stalking no contact order shall issue if the petitioner has served notice of the hearing for that order on the respondent, in accordance with Section 65, and satisfies the requirements of this Section. The petitioner must establish that:

(1) the court has jurisdiction under Section 50;

(2) the requirements of Section 80 are satisfied;

(3) a general appearance was made or filed by or for the respondent or process was served on the respondent in the manner required by Section 60; and

(4) the respondent has answered or is in default.

21/105. Duration and extension of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Unless re-opened or extended or voided by entry of an order of greater duration, an emergency order shall be effective for not less than 14 nor more than 21 days.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, a plenary stalking no contact order shall be effective for a fixed period of time, not to exceed 2 years. A stalking no contact order entered in conjunction with a criminal prosecution or delinquency petition shall remain in effect as provided in Section 112A-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
(c) Any emergency or plenary order may be extended one or more times, as required, provided that the requirements of Section 95 or 100, as appropriate, are satisfied. If the motion for extension is uncontested and the petitioner seeks no modification of the order, the order may be extended on the basis of the petitioner’s motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension. Extensions may be granted only in open court and not under the provisions of subsection (c) of Section 95, which applies only when the court is unavailable at the close of business or on a court holiday.
(d) Any stalking no contact order which would expire on a court holiday shall instead expire at the close of the next court business day.
(e) The practice of dismissing or suspending a criminal prosecution in exchange for the issuance of a stalking no contact order undermines the purposes of this Act. This Section shall not be construed as encouraging that practice.

Act 22. Civil No Contact Order Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article I. General Provisions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

22/103. Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

“Civil no contact order” means an emergency order or plenary order granted under this Act, which includes a remedy authorized by Section 213 of this Act.
“Family or household members” include spouses, parents, children, stepchildren, and persons who share a common dwelling.
“Non-consensual” means a lack of freely given agreement.
“Petitioner” may mean not only any named petitioner for the civil no contact order and any named victim of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration on whose behalf the petition is brought, but also any other person sought to be protected by this Act.
“Respondent” in a petition for a civil no contact order may mean not only the person alleged to have committed an act of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration against the petitioner, but also any other named person alleged to have aided and abetted such an act of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration.
“Sexual conduct” means any intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the petitioner or the respondent, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus, or breast of the petitioner or the respondent, or any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age, or any transfer or transmission of semen by the respondent upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the petitioner, for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the petitioner or the respondent.
“Sexual penetration” means any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person or of any animal or object into the sex organ or anus of another person, including but not limited to cunnilingus, fellatio or anal penetration. Evidence of emission of semen is not required to prove sexual penetration.
“Stay away” means to refrain from both physical presence and nonphysical contact with the petitioner directly, indirectly, or through third parties who may or may not know of the order. “Nonphysical contact” includes, but is not limited to, telephone calls, mail, e-mail, fax, and written notes.

Article II. Civil No Contact Orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

22/201. Persons protected by this Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) The following persons are protected by this Act:
(1) any victim of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration on whose behalf the petition is brought;
(2) any family or household member of the named victim; and
(3) any employee of or volunteer at a rape crisis center that is providing services to the petitioner or the petitioner’s family or household member.
(b) A petition for a civil no contact order may be filed:
(1) by any person who is a victim of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration, including a single incident of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration; or
(2) by a person on behalf of a minor child or an adult who is a victim of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration but, because of age, disability, health, or inaccessibility, cannot file the petition.

22/202. Commencement of action; filing fees

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) An action for a civil no contact order is commenced:

(1) independently, by filing a petition for a civil no contact order in any civil court, unless specific courts are designated by local rule or order; or

(2) in conjunction with a delinquency petition or a criminal prosecution as provided in Article 112A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(a-5) When a petition for a civil no contact order is filed, the petition shall not be publicly available until the petition is served on the respondent.

(b) Withdrawal or dismissal of any petition for a civil no contact order prior to adjudication where the petitioner is represented by the State shall operate as a dismissal without prejudice. No action for a civil no contact order shall be dismissed because the respondent is being prosecuted for a crime against the petitioner. For any action commenced under item (2) of subsection (a) of this Section, dismissal of the conjoined case (or a finding of not guilty) shall not require dismissal of the action for a civil no contact order; instead, it may be treated as an independent action and, if necessary and appropriate, transferred to a different court or division.

(c) No fee shall be charged by the clerk of the court for filing petitions or modifying or certifying orders. No fee shall be charged by the sheriff for service by the sheriff of a petition, rule, motion, or order in an action commenced under this Section.(d) The court shall provide, through the office of the clerk of the court, simplified forms for filing of a petition under this Section by any person not represented by counsel.

22/203. Pleading; non-disclosure of address

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A petition for a civil no contact order shall be in writing and verified or accompanied by affidavit and shall allege that the petitioner has been the victim of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration by the respondent.
(b) If the petition states that disclosure of the petitioner’s address would risk abuse of the petitioner or any member of the petitioner’s family or household, that address may be omitted from all documents filed with the court. If the petitioner has not disclosed an address under this subsection, the petitioner shall designate an alternative address at which the respondent may serve notice of any motions.

22/204.3. Appointment of counsel

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

The court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if the respondent is represented by counsel.

22/207. Venue

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

A petition for a civil no contact order may be filed in any county where (1) the petitioner resides, (2) the respondent resides, or (3) the alleged non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration occurred.

22/213. Civil no contact order; remedies

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) If the court finds that the petitioner has been a victim of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration, a civil no contact order shall issue; provided that the petitioner must also satisfy the requirements of Section 214 on emergency orders or Section 215 on plenary orders. The petitioner shall not be denied a civil no contact order because the petitioner or the respondent is a minor. The court, when determining whether or not to issue a civil no contact order, may not require physical injury on the person of the victim. Modification and extension of prior civil no contact orders shall be in accordance with this Act.

(a-5) When a petition for a civil no contact order is granted, the order shall not be publicly available until the order is served on the respondent.

(b) (Blank).
(b-5) The court may provide relief as follows:
(1) prohibit the respondent from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance from the petitioner;
(2) restrain the respondent from having any contact, including nonphysical contact, with the petitioner directly, indirectly, or through third parties, regardless of whether those third parties know of the order;
(3) prohibit the respondent from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance from the petitioner’s residence, school, day care or other specified location;
(4) order the respondent to stay away from any property or animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by the petitioner and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the property or animal; and
(5) order any other injunctive relief as necessary or appropriate for the protection of the petitioner.
(b-6) When the petitioner and the respondent attend the same public or private elementary, middle, or high school, the court when issuing a civil no contact order and providing relief shall consider the severity of the act, any continuing physical danger or emotional distress to the petitioner, the educational rights guaranteed to the petitioner and respondent under federal and State law, the availability of a transfer of the respondent to another school, a change of placement or a change of program of the respondent, the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school, and any other relevant facts of the case. The court may order that the respondent not attend the public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school attended by the petitioner, order that the respondent accept a change of placement or program, as determined by the school district or private or non-public school, or place restrictions on the respondent’s movements within the school attended by the petitioner. The respondent bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer, change of placement, or change of program of the respondent is not available. The respondent also bears the burden of production with respect to the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school. A transfer, change of placement, or change of program is not unavailable to the respondent solely on the ground that the respondent does not agree with the school district’s or private or non-public school’s transfer, change of placement, or change of program or solely on the ground that the respondent fails or refuses to consent to or otherwise does not take an action required to effectuate a transfer, change of placement, or change of program. When a court orders a respondent to stay away from the public, private, or non-public school attended by the petitioner and the respondent requests a transfer to another attendance center within the respondent’s school district or private or non-public school, the school district or private or non-public school shall have sole discretion to determine the attendance center to which the respondent is transferred. In the event the court order results in a transfer of the minor respondent to another attendance center, a change in the respondent’s placement, or a change of the respondent’s program, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the transfer or change.
(b-7) The court may order the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent to take certain actions or to refrain from taking certain actions to ensure that the respondent complies with the order. In the event the court orders a transfer of the respondent to another school, the parents or legal guardians of the respondent are responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the change of school by the respondent.
(c) Denial of a remedy may not be based, in whole or in part, on evidence that:
(1) the respondent has cause for any use of force, unless that cause satisfies the standards for justifiable use of force provided by Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;1
(2) the respondent was voluntarily intoxicated;
(3) the petitioner acted in self-defense or defense of another, provided that, if the petitioner utilized force, such force was justifiable under Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;
(4) the petitioner did not act in self-defense or defense of another;
(5) the petitioner left the residence or household to avoid further non- consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration by the respondent; or
(6) the petitioner did not leave the residence or household to avoid further non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration by the respondent.
(d) Monetary damages are not recoverable as a remedy.

22/214. Emergency civil no contact order

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) An emergency civil no contact order shall issue if the petitioner satisfies the requirements of this subsection (a). The petitioner shall establish that:
(1) the court has jurisdiction under Section 206;
(2) the requirements of Section 213 are satisfied; and
(3) there is good cause to grant the remedy, regardless of prior service of process or of notice upon the respondent, because the harm which that remedy is intended to prevent would be likely to occur if the respondent were given any prior notice, or greater notice than was actually given, of the petitioner’s efforts to obtain judicial relief.

An emergency civil no contact order shall be issued by the court if it appears from the contents of the petition and the examination of the petitioner that the averments are sufficient to indicate nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration by the respondent and to support the granting of relief under the issuance of the civil no contact order.

An emergency civil no contact order shall be issued if the court finds that subsections (1), (2), and (3) above are met.
(b) If the respondent appears in court for this hearing for an emergency order, he or she may elect to file a general appearance and testify. Any resulting order may be an emergency order, governed by this Section. Notwithstanding the requirements of this Section, if all requirements of Section 215 have been met, the court may issue a plenary order.
(c) Emergency orders; court holidays and evenings.
(1) When the court is unavailable at the close of business, the petitioner may file a petition for a 21-day emergency order before any available circuit judge or associate judge who may grant relief under this Act. If the judge finds that there is an immediate and present danger of abuse against the petitioner and that the petitioner has satisfied the prerequisites set forth in subsection (a), that judge may issue an emergency civil no contact order.
(2) The chief judge of the circuit court may designate for each county in the circuit at least one judge to be reasonably available to issue orally, by telephone, by facsimile, or otherwise, an emergency civil no contact order at all times, whether or not the court is in session.
(3) Any order issued under this Section and any documentation in support of the order shall be certified on the next court day to the appropriate court. The clerk of that court shall immediately assign a case number, file the petition, order, and other documents with the court, and enter the order of record and file it with the sheriff for service, in accordance with Section 222. Filing the petition shall commence proceedings for further relief under Section 202. Failure to comply with the requirements of this paragraph (3) does not affect the validity of the order.

22/215. Plenary civil no contact order

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

A plenary civil no contact order shall issue if the petitioner has served notice of the hearing for that order on the respondent, in accordance with Section 209, and satisfies the requirements of this Section. The petitioner must establish that:
(1) the court has jurisdiction under Section 206;
(2) the requirements of Section 213 are satisfied;
(3) a general appearance was made or filed by or for the respondent or process was served on the respondent in the manner required by Section 208; and
(4) the respondent has answered or is in default.

22/215.5. Petitioner testimony at plenary civil no contact order hearing

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 215.5. Petitioner testimony at plenary civil no contact order hearing. In a plenary civil no contact order hearing, if a court finds that testimony by the petitioner in the courtroom may result in serious emotional distress to the petitioner, the court may order that the examination of the petitioner be conducted in chambers. Counsel shall be present at the examination unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties. The court shall cause a court reporter to be present who shall make a complete record of the examination instantaneously to be part of the record in the case.

22/216. Duration and extension of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Unless re-opened or extended or voided by entry of an order of greater duration, an emergency order shall be effective for not less than 14 nor more than 21 days.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, a plenary civil no contact order shall be effective for a fixed period of time, not to exceed 2 years. A civil no contact order entered in conjunction with a criminal prosecution or delinquency petition shall remain in effect as provided in Section 112A-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
(c) Any emergency or plenary order may be extended one or more times, as required, provided that the requirements of Section 214 or 215, as appropriate, are satisfied. If the motion for extension is uncontested and the petitioner seeks no modification of the order, the order may be extended on the basis of the petitioner’s motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension. Extensions may be granted only in open court and not under the provisions of subsection (c) of Section 214, which applies only when the court is unavailable at the close of business or on a court holiday.
(d) Any civil no contact order which would expire on a court holiday shall instead expire at the close of the next court business day.
(d-5) An extension of a plenary civil no contact order may be granted, upon good cause shown, to remain in effect until the civil no contact order is vacated or modified.
(e) The practice of dismissing or suspending a criminal prosecution in exchange for the issuance of a civil no contact order undermines the purposes of this Act. This Section shall not be construed as encouraging that practice.

22/218. Notice of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Upon issuance of any civil no contact order, the clerk shall immediately, or on the next court day if an emergency order is issued in accordance with subsection (c) of Section 214:
(1) enter the order on the record and file it in accordance with the circuit court procedures; and
(2) provide a file stamped copy of the order to the respondent, if present, and to the petitioner.
(b) The clerk of the issuing judge shall, or the petitioner may, on the same day that a civil no contact order is issued, file a certified copy of that order with the sheriff or other law enforcement officials charged with maintaining Department of State Police records or charged with serving the order upon the respondent. If the order was issued in accordance with subsection (c) of Section 214, the clerk shall, on the next court day, file a certified copy of the order with the Sheriff or other law enforcement officials charged with maintaining Department of State Police records. If the respondent, at the time of the issuance of the order, is committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections or Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, or is on parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release, the sheriff or other law enforcement officials charged with maintaining Department of State Police records shall notify the Department of Corrections or Department of Juvenile Justice within 48 hours of receipt of a copy of the civil no contact order from the clerk of the issuing judge or the petitioner. Such notice shall include the name of the respondent, the respondent’s IDOC inmate number or IDJJ youth identification number, the respondent’s date of birth, and the LEADS Record Index Number.
(c) Unless the respondent was present in court when the order was issued, the sheriff, other law enforcement official, or special process server shall promptly serve that order upon the respondent and file proof of such service in the manner provided for service of process in civil proceedings. Instead of serving the order upon the respondent, however, the sheriff, other law enforcement official, special process server, or other persons defined in Section 218.1 may serve the respondent with a short form notification as provided in Section 218.1. If process has not yet been served upon the respondent, it shall be served with the order or short form notification if such service is made by the sheriff, other law enforcement official, or special process server.
(d) If the person against whom the civil no contact order is issued is arrested and the written order is issued in accordance with subsection (c) of Section 214 and received by the custodial law enforcement agency before the respondent or arrestee is released from custody, the custodial law enforcement agent shall promptly serve the order upon the respondent or arrestee before the respondent or arrestee is released from custody. In no event shall detention of the respondent or arrestee be extended for hearing on the petition for civil no contact order or receipt of the order issued under Section 214 of this Act.
(e) Any order extending, modifying, or revoking any civil no contact order shall be promptly recorded, issued, and served as provided in this Section.
(f) Upon the request of the petitioner, within 24 hours of the issuance of a civil no contact order, the clerk of the issuing judge shall send written notice of the order along with a certified copy of the order to any school, college, or university at which the petitioner is enrolled.

22/218.5. Modification; reopening of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, upon motion by the petitioner, the court may modify an emergency or plenary civil no contact order by altering the remedy, subject to Section 213.

(b) After 30 days following entry of a plenary civil no contact order, a court may modify that order only when a change in the applicable law or facts since that plenary order was entered warrants a modification of its terms.

(c) Upon 2 days’ notice to the petitioner, or such shorter notice as the court may prescribe, a respondent subject to an emergency civil no contact order issued under this Act may appear and petition the court to rehear the original or amended petition. Any petition to rehear shall be verified and shall allege the following:

(1) that the respondent did not receive prior notice of the initial hearing in which the emergency order was entered under Sections 209 and 214; and

(2) that the respondent had a meritorious defense to the order or any of its remedies or that the order or any of its remedies was not authorized by this Act.

22/220. Enforcement of a civil no contact order

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Nothing in this Act shall preclude any Illinois court from enforcing a valid protective order issued in another state.

(b) Illinois courts may enforce civil no contact orders through both criminal proceedings and civil contempt proceedings, unless the action which is second in time is barred by collateral estoppel or the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

(b-1) The court shall not hold a school district or private or non-public school or any of its employees in civil or criminal contempt unless the school district or private or non-public school has been allowed to intervene.

(b-2) The court may hold the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent in civil or criminal contempt for a violation of any provision of any order entered under this Act for conduct of the minor respondent in violation of this Act if the parents, guardian, or legal custodian directed, encouraged, or assisted the respondent minor in such conduct.

(c) Criminal prosecution. A violation of any civil no contact order, whether issued in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be enforced by a criminal court when the respondent commits the crime of violation of a civil no contact order pursuant to Section 219 by having knowingly violated:

(1) remedies described in Section 213 and included in a civil no contact order; or

(2) a provision of an order, which is substantially similar to provisions of Section 213, in a valid civil no contact order which is authorized under the laws of another state, tribe, or United States territory.

Prosecution for a violation of a civil no contact order shall not bar a concurrent prosecution for any other crime, including any crime that may have been committed at the time of the violation of the civil no contact order.

(d) Contempt of court. A violation of any valid Illinois civil no contact order, whether issued in a civil or criminal proceeding, may be enforced through civil or criminal contempt procedures, as appropriate, by any court with jurisdiction, regardless of where the act or acts which violated the civil no contact order were committed, to the extent consistent with the venue provisions of this Act.

(1) In a contempt proceeding where the petition for a rule to show cause or petition for adjudication of criminal contempt sets forth facts evidencing an immediate danger that the respondent will flee the jurisdiction or inflict physical abuse on the petitioner or minor children or on dependent adults in the petitioner’s care, the court may order the attachment of the respondent without prior service of the petition for a rule to show cause, the rule to show cause, the petition for adjudication of criminal contempt or the adjudication of criminal contempt. Bond shall be set unless specifically denied in writing.

(2) A petition for a rule to show cause or a petition for adjudication of criminal contempt for violation of a civil no contact order shall be treated as an expedited proceeding.

(e) Actual knowledge. A civil no contact order may be enforced pursuant to this Section if the respondent violates the order after the respondent has actual knowledge of its contents as shown through one of the following means:

(1) by service, delivery, or notice under Section 208;

(2) by notice under Section 218;

(3) by service of a civil no contact order under Section 218; or

(4) by other means demonstrating actual knowledge of the contents of the order.

(f) The enforcement of a civil no contact order in civil or criminal court shall not be affected by either of the following:

(1) the existence of a separate, correlative order, entered under Section 202; or

(2) any finding or order entered in a conjoined criminal proceeding.

(g) Circumstances. The court, when determining whether or not a violation of a civil no contact order has occurred, shall not require physical manifestations of abuse on the person of the victim.

(h) Penalties.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, where the court finds the commission of a crime or contempt of court under subsection (a) or (b) of this Section, the penalty shall be the penalty that generally applies in such criminal or contempt proceedings, and may include one or more of the following: incarceration, payment of restitution, a fine, payment of attorneys’ fees and costs, or community service.

(2) The court shall hear and take into account evidence of any factors in aggravation or mitigation before deciding an appropriate penalty under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(3) To the extent permitted by law, the court is encouraged to:

(i) increase the penalty for the knowing violation of any civil no contact order over any penalty previously imposed by any court for respondent’s violation of any civil no contact order or penal statute involving petitioner as victim and respondent as defendant;

(ii) impose a minimum penalty of 24 hours imprisonment for respondent’s first violation of any civil no contact order; and

(iii) impose a minimum penalty of 48 hours imprisonment for respondent’s second or subsequent violation of a civil no contact order unless the court explicitly finds that an increased penalty or that period of imprisonment would be manifestly unjust.

(4) In addition to any other penalties imposed for a violation of a civil no contact order, a criminal court may consider evidence of any previous violations of a civil no contact order:

(i) to increase, revoke or modify the bail bond on an underlying criminal charge pursuant to Section 110-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963;

(ii) to revoke or modify an order of probation, conditional discharge or supervision, pursuant to Section 5-6-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections; or

(iii) to revoke or modify a sentence of periodic imprisonment, pursuant to Section 5-7-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections.

Chapter 750. Families

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 5. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Part IV. Dissolution and Legal Separation

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/401. Dissolution of Marriage

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 401. Dissolution of marriage.

(a) The court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage when at the time the action was commenced one of the spouses was a resident of this State or was stationed in this State while a member of the armed services, and the residence or military presence had been maintained for 90 days next preceding the commencement of the action or the making of the finding:

Irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and the court determines that efforts at reconciliation have failed or that future attempts at reconciliation would be impracticable and not in the best interests of the family.

(a-5) If the parties live separate and apart for a continuous period of not less than 6 months immediately preceding the entry of the judgment dissolving the marriage, there is an irrebuttable presumption that the requirement of irreconcilable differences has been met.

(b) Judgment shall not be entered unless, to the extent it has jurisdiction to do so, the court has considered, approved, reserved or made provision for the allocation of parental responsibilities, the support of any child of the marriage entitled to support, the maintenance of either spouse and the disposition of property. The court shall enter a judgment for dissolution that reserves any of these issues either upon (i) agreement of the parties, or (ii) motion of either party and a finding by the court that appropriate circumstances exist.

The death of a party subsequent to entry of a judgment for dissolution but before judgment on reserved issues shall not abate the proceedings.

If any provision of this Section or its application shall be adjudged unconstitutional or invalid for any reason by any court of competent jurisdiction, that judgment shall not impair, affect or invalidate any other provision or application of this Section, which shall remain in full force and effect.

Part V. Property, Support, and Attorney Fees

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/501. Temporary Relief

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 501. Temporary relief. In all proceedings under this Act, temporary relief shall be as follows:

(a) Either party may petition or move for:

(1) temporary maintenance or temporary support of a child of the marriage entitled to support, accompanied by an affidavit as to the factual basis for the relief requested. One form of financial affidavit, as determined by the Supreme Court, shall be used statewide. The financial affidavit shall be supported by documentary evidence including, but not limited to, income tax returns, pay stubs, and banking statements. Unless the court otherwise directs, any affidavit or supporting documentary evidence submitted pursuant to this paragraph shall not be made part of the public record of the proceedings but shall be available to the court or an appellate court in which the proceedings are subject to review, to the parties, their attorneys, and such other persons as the court may direct. Upon motion of a party, a court may hold a hearing to determine whether and why there is a disparity between a party’s sworn affidavit and the supporting documentation. If a party intentionally or recklessly files an inaccurate or misleading financial affidavit, the court shall impose significant penalties and sanctions including, but not limited to, costs and attorney’s fees;

(2) a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, accompanied by affidavit showing a factual basis for any of the following relief:

(i) restraining any person from transferring, encumbering, concealing or otherwise disposing of any property except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life, and, if so restrained, requiring him to notify the moving party and his attorney of any proposed extraordinary expenditures made after the order is issued; however, an order need not include an exception for transferring, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of property in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life if the court enters appropriate orders that enable the parties to pay their necessary personal and business expenses including, but not limited to, appropriate professionals to assist the court pursuant to subsection (l) of Section 503 to administer the payment and accounting of such living and business expenses;

(ii) enjoining a party from removing a child from the jurisdiction of the court for more than 14 days;

(iii) enjoining a party from striking or interfering with the personal liberty of the other party or of any child; or

(iv) providing other injunctive relief proper in the circumstances; or

(3) other appropriate temporary relief including, in the discretion of the court, ordering the purchase or sale of assets and requiring that a party or parties borrow funds in the appropriate circumstances.

Issues concerning temporary maintenance or temporary support of a child entitled to support shall be dealt with on a summary basis based on allocated parenting time, financial affidavits, tax returns, pay stubs, banking statements, and other relevant documentation, except an evidentiary hearing may be held upon a showing of good cause. If a party intentionally or recklessly files an inaccurate or misleading financial affidavit, the court shall impose significant penalties and sanctions including, but not limited to, costs and attorney’s fees resulting from the improper representation.

(b) The court may issue a temporary restraining order without requiring notice to the other party only if it finds, on the basis of the moving affidavit or other evidence, that irreparable injury will result to the moving party if no order is issued until the time for responding has elapsed.

(c) A response hereunder may be filed within 21 days after service of notice of motion or at the time specified in the temporary restraining order.

(c-1) As used in this subsection (c-1), “interim attorney’s fees and costs” means attorney’s fees and costs assessed from time to time while a case is pending, in favor of the petitioning party’s current counsel, for reasonable fees and costs either already incurred or to be incurred, and “interim award” means an award of interim attorney’s fees and costs. Interim awards shall be governed by the following:

(1) Except for good cause shown, a proceeding for (or relating to) interim attorney’s fees and costs in a pre-judgment dissolution proceeding shall be nonevidentiary and summary in nature. All hearings for or relating to interim attorney’s fees and costs under this subsection shall be scheduled expeditiously by the court. When a party files a petition for interim attorney’s fees and costs supported by one or more affidavits that delineate relevant factors, the court (or a hearing officer) shall assess an interim award after affording the opposing party a reasonable opportunity to file a responsive pleading. A responsive pleading shall set out the amount of each retainer or other payment or payments, or both, previously paid to the responding party’s counsel by or on behalf of the responding party. A responsive pleading shall include costs incurred, and shall indicate whether the costs are paid or unpaid. In assessing an interim award, the court shall consider all relevant factors, as presented, that appear reasonable and necessary, including to the extent applicable:

(A) the income and property of each party, including alleged marital property within the sole control of one party and alleged non-marital property within access to a party;

(B) the needs of each party;

(C) the realistic earning capacity of each party;

(D) any impairment to present earning capacity of either party, including age and physical and emotional health;

(E) the standard of living established during the marriage;

(F) the degree of complexity of the issues, including allocation of parental responsibility, valuation or division (or both) of closely held businesses, and tax planning, as well as reasonable needs for expert investigations or expert witnesses, or both;

(G) each party’s access to relevant information;

(H) the amount of the payment or payments made or reasonably expected to be made to the attorney for the other party; and

(I) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.

(2) Any assessment of an interim award (including one pursuant to an agreed order) shall be without prejudice to any final allocation and without prejudice as to any claim or right of either party or any counsel of record at the time of the award. Any such claim or right may be presented by the appropriate party or counsel at a hearing on contribution under subsection (j) of Section 503 or a hearing on counsel’s fees under subsection (c) of Section 508. Unless otherwise ordered by the court at the final hearing between the parties or in a hearing under subsection (j) of Section 503 or subsection (c) of Section 508, interim awards, as well as the aggregate of all other payments by each party to counsel and related payments to third parties, shall be deemed to have been advances from the parties’ marital estate. Any portion of any interim award constituting an overpayment shall be remitted back to the appropriate party or parties, or, alternatively, to successor counsel, as the court determines and directs, after notice in a form designated by the Supreme Court. An order for the award of interim attorney’s fees shall be a standardized form order and labeled “Interim Fee Award Order”.

(3) In any proceeding under this subsection (c-1), the court (or hearing officer) shall assess an interim award against an opposing party in an amount necessary to enable the petitioning party to participate adequately in the litigation, upon findings that the party from whom attorney’s fees and costs are sought has the financial ability to pay reasonable amounts and that the party seeking attorney’s fees and costs lacks sufficient access to assets or income to pay reasonable amounts. In determining an award, the court shall consider whether adequate participation in the litigation requires expenditure of more fees and costs for a party that is not in control of assets or relevant information. Except for good cause shown, an interim award shall not be less than payments made or reasonably expected to be made to the counsel for the other party. If the court finds that both parties lack financial ability or access to assets or income for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, the court (or hearing officer) shall enter an order that allocates available funds for each party’s counsel, including retainers or interim payments, or both, previously paid, in a manner that achieves substantial parity between the parties.

(4) The changes to this Section 501 made by this amendatory Act of 1996 apply to cases pending on or after June 1, 1997, except as otherwise provided in Section 508.

(c-2) Allocation of use of marital residence. Where there is on file a verified complaint or verified petition seeking temporary eviction from the marital residence, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding, only in cases where the physical or mental well-being of either spouse or his or her children is jeopardized by occupancy of the marital residence by both spouses, and only upon due notice and full hearing, unless waived by the court on good cause shown, enter orders granting the exclusive possession of the marital residence to either spouse, by eviction from, or restoration of, the marital residence, until the final determination of the cause pursuant to the factors listed in Section 602.7 of this Act. No such order shall in any manner affect any estate in homestead property of either party. In entering orders under this subsection (c-2), the court shall balance hardships to the parties.

(d) A temporary order entered under this Section:

(1) does not prejudice the rights of the parties or the child which are to be adjudicated at subsequent hearings in the proceeding;

(2) may be revoked or modified before final judgment, on a showing by affidavit and upon hearing; and

(3) terminates when the final judgment is entered or when the petition for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or declaration of invalidity of marriage is dismissed.

(e) The fees or costs of mediation shall be borne by the parties and may be assessed by the court as it deems equitable without prejudice and are subject to reallocation at the conclusion of the case.

(f) Companion animals. Either party may petition or move for the temporary allocation of sole or joint possession of and responsibility for a companion animal jointly owned by the parties. In issuing an order under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act.

5/504. Maintenance

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 504. Maintenance.

(a) Entitlement to maintenance. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity of marriage, or dissolution of a civil union, a proceeding for maintenance following a legal separation or dissolution of the marriage or civil union by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, a proceeding for modification of a previous order for maintenance under Section 510 of this Act, or any proceeding authorized under Section 501 of this Act, the court may grant a maintenance award for either spouse in amounts and for periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and the maintenance may be paid from the income or property of the other spouse. The court shall first make a finding as to whether a maintenance award is appropriate, after consideration of all relevant factors, including:

(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned and non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance as well as all financial obligations imposed on the parties as a result of the dissolution of marriage;

(2) the needs of each party;

(3) the realistic present and future earning capacity of each party;

(4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage;

(5) any impairment of the realistic present or future earning capacity of the party against whom maintenance is sought;

(6) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to support himself or herself through appropriate employment;

(6.1) the effect of any parental responsibility arrangements and its effect on a party’s ability to seek or maintain employment;

(7) the standard of living established during the marriage;

(8) the duration of the marriage;

(9) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and the needs of each of the parties;

(10) all sources of public and private income including, without limitation, disability and retirement income;

(11) the tax consequences to each party;

(12) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse;

(13) any valid agreement of the parties; and

(14) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.

(b) (Blank).

(b-1) Amount and duration of maintenance. Unless the court finds that a maintenance award is appropriate, it shall bar maintenance as to the party seeking maintenance regardless of the length of the marriage at the time the action was commenced. Only if the court finds that a maintenance award is appropriate, the court shall order guideline maintenance in accordance with paragraph (1) or non-guideline maintenance in accordance with paragraph (2) of this subsection (b-1). If the application of guideline maintenance results in a combined maintenance and child support obligation that exceeds 50% of the payor’s net income, the court may determine non-guideline maintenance in accordance with paragraph (2) of this subsection (b-1), non-guideline child support in accordance with paragraph (3.4) of subsection (a) of Section 505, or both.

(1) Maintenance award in accordance with guidelines. If the combined gross annual income of the parties is less than $500,000 and the payor has no obligation to pay child support or maintenance or both from a prior relationship, maintenance payable after the date the parties’ marriage is dissolved shall be in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph (1), unless the court makes a finding that the application of the guidelines would be inappropriate.

(A) The amount of maintenance under this paragraph (1) shall be calculated by taking 33 1/3% of the payor’s net annual income minus 25% of the payee’s net annual income. The amount calculated as maintenance, however, when added to the net income of the payee, shall not result in the payee receiving an amount that is in excess of 40% of the combined net income of the parties.

(A-1) Modification of maintenance orders entered before January 1, 2019 that are and continue to be eligible for inclusion in the gross income of the payee for federal income tax purposes and deductible by the payor shall be calculated by taking 30% of the payor’s gross annual income minus 20% of the payee’s gross annual income, unless both parties expressly provide otherwise in the modification order. The amount calculated as maintenance, however, when added to the gross income of the payee, may not result in the payee receiving an amount that is in excess of 40% of the combined gross income of the parties.

(B) The duration of an award under this paragraph (1) shall be calculated by multiplying the length of the marriage at the time the action was commenced by whichever of the following factors applies: less than 5 years (.20); 5 years or more but less than 6 years (.24); 6 years or more but less than 7 years (.28); 7 years or more but less than 8 years (.32); 8 years or more but less than 9 years (.36); 9 years or more but less than 10 years (.40); 10 years or more but less than 11 years (.44); 11 years or more but less than 12 years (.48); 12 years or more but less than 13 years (.52); 13 years or more but less than 14 years (.56); 14 years or more but less than 15 years (.60); 15 years or more but less than 16 years (.64); 16 years or more but less than 17 years (.68); 17 years or more but less than 18 years (.72); 18 years or more but less than 19 years (.76); 19 years or more but less than 20 years (.80). For a marriage of 20 or more years, the court, in its discretion, shall order maintenance for a period equal to the length of the marriage or for an indefinite term.

(1.5) In the discretion of the court, any term of temporary maintenance paid by court order under Section 501 may be a corresponding credit to the duration of maintenance set forth in subparagraph (b-1)(1)(B).

(2) Maintenance award not in accordance with guidelines. Any non-guidelines award of maintenance shall be made after the court’s consideration of all relevant factors set forth in subsection (a) of this Section.

(b-2) Findings. In each case involving the issue of maintenance, the court shall make specific findings of fact, as follows:

(1) the court shall state its reasoning for awarding or not awarding maintenance and shall include references to each relevant factor set forth in subsection (a) of this Section;

(2) if the court deviates from applicable guidelines under paragraph (1) of subsection (b-1), it shall state in its findings the amount of maintenance (if determinable) or duration that would have been required under the guidelines and the reasoning for any variance from the guidelines; and

(3) the court shall state whether the maintenance is fixed-term, indefinite, reviewable, or reserved by the court.

(b-3) Gross income. For purposes of this Section, the term “gross income” means all income from all sources, within the scope of that phrase in Section 505 of this Act, except maintenance payments in the pending proceedings shall not be included.

(b-3.5) Net income. As used in this Section, “net income” has the meaning provided in Section 505 of this Act, except maintenance payments in the pending proceedings shall not be included.

(b-4) Modification of maintenance orders entered before January 1, 2019. For any order for maintenance or unallocated maintenance and child support entered before January 1, 2019 that is modified after December 31, 2018, payments thereunder shall continue to retain the same tax treatment for federal income tax purposes unless both parties expressly agree otherwise and the agreement is included in the modification order.

(b-4.5) Maintenance designation.

(1) Fixed-term maintenance. If a court grants maintenance for a fixed term, the court shall designate the termination of the period during which this maintenance is to be paid. Maintenance is barred after the end of the period during which fixed-term maintenance is to be paid.

(2) Indefinite maintenance. If a court grants maintenance for an indefinite term, the court shall not designate a termination date. Indefinite maintenance shall continue until modification or termination under Section 510.

(3) Reviewable maintenance. If a court grants maintenance for a specific term with a review, the court shall designate the period of the specific term and state that the maintenance is reviewable. Upon review, the court shall make a finding in accordance with subdivision (b-8) of this Section, unless the maintenance is modified or terminated under Section 510.

(b-5) Interest on maintenance. Any maintenance obligation including any unallocated maintenance and child support obligation, or any portion of any support obligation, that becomes due and remains unpaid shall accrue simple interest as set forth in Section 505 of this Act.

(b-7) Maintenance judgments. Any new or existing maintenance order including any unallocated maintenance and child support order entered by the court under this Section shall be deemed to be a series of judgments against the person obligated to pay support thereunder. Each such judgment to be in the amount of each payment or installment of support and each such judgment to be deemed entered as of the date the corresponding payment or installment becomes due under the terms of the support order, except no judgment shall arise as to any installment coming due after the termination of maintenance as provided by Section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act or the provisions of any order for maintenance. Each such judgment shall have the full force, effect and attributes of any other judgment of this State, including the ability to be enforced. Notwithstanding any other State or local law to the contrary, a lien arises by operation of law against the real and personal property of the obligor for each installment of overdue support owed by the obligor.

(b-8) Review of maintenance. Upon review of any previously ordered maintenance award, the court may extend maintenance for further review, extend maintenance for a fixed non-modifiable term, extend maintenance for an indefinite term, or permanently terminate maintenance in accordance with subdivision (b-1)(1)(A) of this Section.

(c) Maintenance during an appeal. The court may grant and enforce the payment of maintenance during the pendency of an appeal as the court shall deem reasonable and proper.

(d) Maintenance during imprisonment. No maintenance shall accrue during the period in which a party is imprisoned for failure to comply with the court’s order for the payment of such maintenance.

(e) Fees when maintenance is paid through the clerk. When maintenance is to be paid through the clerk of the court in a county of 500,000 inhabitants or less, the order shall direct the obligor to pay to the clerk, in addition to the maintenance payments, all fees imposed by the county board under paragraph (4) of subsection (bb) of Section 27.1a of the Clerks of Courts Act. When maintenance is to be paid through the clerk of the court in a county of more than 500,000 but less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, the order shall direct the obligor to pay to the clerk, in addition to the maintenance payments, all fees imposed by the county board under paragraph (4) of subsection (bb) of Section 27.2 of the Clerks of Courts Act. Unless paid in cash or pursuant to an order for withholding, the payment of the fee shall be by a separate instrument from the support payment and shall be made to the order of the Clerk.

(f) Maintenance secured by life insurance. An award ordered by a court upon entry of a dissolution judgment or upon entry of an award of maintenance following a reservation of maintenance in a dissolution judgment may be reasonably secured, in whole or in part, by life insurance on the payor’s life on terms as to which the parties agree or, if the parties do not agree, on such terms determined by the court, subject to the following:

(1) With respect to existing life insurance, provided the court is apprised through evidence, stipulation, or otherwise as to level of death benefits, premium, and other relevant data and makes findings relative thereto, the court may allocate death benefits, the right to assign death benefits, or the obligation for future premium payments between the parties as it deems just.

(2) To the extent the court determines that its award should be secured, in whole or in part, by new life insurance on the payor’s life, the court may only order:

(i) that the payor cooperate on all appropriate steps for the payee to obtain such new life insurance; and

(ii) that the payee, at his or her sole option and expense, may obtain such new life insurance on the payor’s life up to a maximum level of death benefit coverage, or descending death benefit coverage, as is set by the court, such level not to exceed a reasonable amount in light of the court’s award, with the payee or the payee’s designee being the beneficiary of such life insurance.

In determining the maximum level of death benefit coverage, the court shall take into account all relevant facts and circumstances, including the impact on access to life insurance by the maintenance payor. If in resolving any issues under paragraph (2) of this subsection (f) a court reviews any submitted or proposed application for new insurance on the life of a maintenance payor, the review shall be in camera.

(3) (Blank).

Part VI. Allocation of Parental Responsibilities

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

5/600. Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) “Abuse” has the meaning ascribed to that term in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.1

(b) “Allocation judgment” means a judgment allocating parental responsibilities.

(c) “Caretaking functions” means tasks that involve interaction with a child or that direct, arrange, and supervise the interaction with and care of a child provided by others, or for obtaining the resources allowing for the provision of these functions. The term includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) satisfying a child’s nutritional needs; managing a child’s bedtime and wake-up routines; caring for a child when the child is sick or injured; being attentive to a child’s personal hygiene needs, including washing, grooming, and dressing; playing with a child and ensuring the child attends scheduled extracurricular activities; protecting a child’s physical safety; and providing transportation for a child;

(2) directing a child’s various developmental needs, including the acquisition of motor and language skills, toilet training, self-confidence, and maturation;

(3) providing discipline, giving instruction in manners, assigning and supervising chores, and performing other tasks that attend to a child’s needs for behavioral control and self-restraint;

(4) ensuring the child attends school, including remedial and special services appropriate to the child’s needs and interests, communicating with teachers and counselors, and supervising homework;

(5) helping a child develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal relationships with peers, siblings, and other family members;

(6) ensuring the child attends medical appointments and is available for medical follow-up and meeting the medical needs of the child in the home;

(7) providing moral and ethical guidance for a child; and

(8) arranging alternative care for a child by a family member, babysitter, or other child care provider or facility, including investigating such alternatives, communicating with providers, and supervising such care.

(d) “Parental responsibilities” means both parenting time and significant decision-making responsibilities with respect to a child.

(e) “Parenting time” means the time during which a parent is responsible for exercising caretaking functions and non-significant decision-making responsibilities with respect to the child.

(f) “Parenting plan” means a written agreement that allocates significant decision-making responsibilities, parenting time, or both.

(g) “Relocation” means:

(1) a change of residence from the child’s current primary residence located in the county of Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, or Will to a new residence within this State that is more than 25 miles from the child’s current residence, as measured by an Internet mapping service;

(2) a change of residence from the child’s current primary residence located in a county not listed in paragraph (1) to a new residence within this State that is more than 50 miles from the child’s current primary residence, as measured by an Internet mapping service; or

(3) a change of residence from the child’s current primary residence to a residence outside the borders of this State that is more than 25 miles from the current primary residence, as measured by an Internet mapping service.

(h) “Religious upbringing” means the choice of religion or denomination of a religion, religious schooling, religious training, or participation in religious customs or practices.

(i) “Restriction of parenting time” means any limitation or condition placed on parenting time, including supervision.

(j) “Right of first refusal” has the meaning provided in subsection (b) of Section 602.3 of this Act.

(k) “Significant decision-making” means deciding issues of long-term importance in the life of a child.

(l) “Step-parent” means a person married to a child’s parent, including a person married to the child’s parent immediately prior to the parent’s death.

(m) “Supervision” means the presence of a third party during a parent’s exercise of parenting time.

5/609.2. Parent's relocation

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A parent’s relocation constitutes a substantial change in circumstances for purposes of Section 610.5.

(b) A parent who has been allocated a majority of parenting time or either parent who has been allocated equal parenting time may seek to relocate with a child.

(c) A parent intending a relocation, as that term is defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (g) of Section 600 of this Act, must provide written notice of the relocation to the other parent under the parenting plan or allocation judgment. A copy of the notice required under this Section shall be filed with the clerk of the circuit court. The court may waive or seal some or all of the information required in the notice if there is a history of domestic violence.

(d) The notice must provide at least 60 days’ written notice before the relocation unless such notice is impracticable (in which case written notice shall be given at the earliest date practicable) or unless otherwise ordered by the court. At a minimum, the notice must set forth the following:

(1) the intended date of the parent’s relocation;

(2) the address of the parent’s intended new residence, if known; and

(3) the length of time the relocation will last, if the relocation is not for an indefinite or permanent period.

The court may consider a parent’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of this Section without good cause (i) as a factor in determining whether the parent’s relocation is in good faith; and (ii) as a basis for awarding reasonable attorney’s fees and costs resulting from the parent’s failure to comply with these provisions.

(e) If the non-relocating parent signs the notice that was provided pursuant to subsection (c) and the relocating parent files the notice with the court, relocation shall be allowed without any further court action. The court shall modify the parenting plan or allocation judgment to accommodate a parent’s relocation as agreed by the parents, as long as the agreed modification is in the child’s best interests.

(f) If the non-relocating parent objects to the relocation, fails to sign the notice provided under subsection (c), or the parents cannot agree on modification of the parenting plan or allocation judgment, the parent seeking relocation must file a petition seeking permission to relocate.

(g) The court shall modify the parenting plan or allocation judgment in accordance with the child’s best interests. The court shall consider the following factors:

(1) the circumstances and reasons for the intended relocation;

(2) the reasons, if any, why a parent is objecting to the intended relocation;

(3) the history and quality of each parent’s relationship with the child and specifically whether a parent has substantially failed or refused to exercise the parental responsibilities allocated to him or her under the parenting plan or allocation judgment;

(4) the educational opportunities for the child at the existing location and at the proposed new location;

(5) the presence or absence of extended family at the existing location and at the proposed new location;

(6) the anticipated impact of the relocation on the child;

(7) whether the court will be able to fashion a reasonable allocation of parental responsibilities between all parents if the relocation occurs;

(8) the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and ability to express reasoned and independent preferences as to relocation;

(9) possible arrangements for the exercise of parental responsibilities appropriate to the parents’ resources and circumstances and the developmental level of the child;

(10) minimization of the impairment to a parent-child relationship caused by a parent’s relocation; and

(11) any other relevant factors bearing on the child’s best interests.

(h) If a parent moves with the child 25 miles or less from the child’s current primary residence to a new primary residence outside Illinois, Illinois continues to be the home state of the child under subsection (c) of Section 202 of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.1 Any subsequent move from the new primary residence outside Illinois greater than 25 miles from the child’s original primary residence in Illinois must be in compliance with the provisions of this Section.

5/602.5. Allocation of parental responsibilities: decision-making

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Generally. The court shall allocate decision-making responsibilities according to the child’s best interests. Nothing in this Act requires that each parent be allocated decision-making responsibilities.

(b) Allocation of significant decision-making responsibilities. Unless the parents otherwise agree in writing on an allocation of significant decision-making responsibilities, or the issue of the allocation of parental responsibilities has been reserved under Section 401, the court shall make the determination. The court shall allocate to one or both of the parents the significant decision-making responsibility for each significant issue affecting the child. Those significant issues shall include, without limitation, the following:

(1) Education, including the choice of schools and tutors.

(2) Health, including all decisions relating to the medical, dental, and psychological needs of the child and to the treatments arising or resulting from those needs.

(3) Religion, subject to the following provisions:

(A) The court shall allocate decision-making responsibility for the child’s religious upbringing in accordance with any express or implied agreement between the parents.

(B) The court shall consider evidence of the parents’ past conduct as to the child’s religious upbringing in allocating decision-making responsibilities consistent with demonstrated past conduct in the absence of an express or implied agreement between the parents.

(C) The court shall not allocate any aspect of the child’s religious upbringing if it determines that the parents do not or did not have an express or implied agreement for such religious upbringing or that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate a course of conduct regarding the child’s religious upbringing that could serve as a basis for any such order.

(4) Extracurricular activities.

(c) Determination of child’s best interests. In determining the child’s best interests for purposes of allocating significant decision-making responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, without limitation, the following:

(1) the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and ability to express reasoned and independent preferences as to decision-making;

(2) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community;

(3) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;

(4) the ability of the parents to cooperate to make decisions, or the level of conflict between the parties that may affect their ability to share decision-making;

(5) the level of each parent’s participation in past significant decision-making with respect to the child;

(6) any prior agreement or course of conduct between the parents relating to decision-making with respect to the child;

(7) the wishes of the parents;

(8) the child’s needs;

(9) the distance between the parents’ residences, the cost and difficulty of transporting the child, each parent’s and the child’s daily schedules, and the ability of the parents to cooperate in the arrangement;

(10) whether a restriction on decision-making is appropriate under Section 603.10;

(11) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child;

(12) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s parent directed against the child;

(13) the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s household;

(14) whether one of the parents is a sex offender, and if so, the exact nature of the offense and what, if any, treatment in which the parent has successfully participated; and

(15) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant.

(d) A parent shall have sole responsibility for making routine decisions with respect to the child and for emergency decisions affecting the child’s health and safety during that parent’s parenting time.

(e) In allocating significant decision-making responsibilities, the court shall not consider conduct of a parent that does not affect that parent’s relationship to the child.

5/602.7. Allocation of parental responsibilities: parenting time

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Best interests. The court shall allocate parenting time according to the child’s best interests.

(b) Allocation of parenting time. Unless the parents present a mutually agreed written parenting plan and that plan is approved by the court, the court shall allocate parenting time. It is presumed both parents are fit and the court shall not place any restrictions on parenting time as defined in Section 600 and described in Section 603.10, unless it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent’s exercise of parenting time would seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.

In determining the child’s best interests for purposes of allocating parenting time, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, without limitation, the following:

(1) the wishes of each parent seeking parenting time;

(2) the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and ability to express reasoned and independent preferences as to parenting time;

(3) the amount of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions with respect to the child in the 24 months preceding the filing of any petition for allocation of parental responsibilities or, if the child is under 2 years of age, since the child’s birth;

(4) any prior agreement or course of conduct between the parents relating to caretaking functions with respect to the child;

(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents and siblings and with any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests;

(6) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community;

(7) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;

(8) the child’s needs;

(9) the distance between the parents’ residences, the cost and difficulty of transporting the child, each parent’s and the child’s daily schedules, and the ability of the parents to cooperate in the arrangement;

(10) whether a restriction on parenting time is appropriate;

(11) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s parent directed against the child or other member of the child’s household;

(12) the willingness and ability of each parent to place the needs of the child ahead of his or her own needs;

(13) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child;

(14) the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s household;

(15) whether one of the parents is a convicted sex offender or lives with a convicted sex offender and, if so, the exact nature of the offense and what if any treatment the offender has successfully participated in; the parties are entitled to a hearing on the issues raised in this paragraph (15);

(16) the terms of a parent’s military family-care plan that a parent must complete before deployment if a parent is a member of the United States Armed Forces who is being deployed; and

(17) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant.

(c) In allocating parenting time, the court shall not consider conduct of a parent that does not affect that parent’s relationship to the child.

(d) Upon motion, the court may allow a parent who is deployed or who has orders to be deployed as a member of the United States Armed Forces to designate a person known to the child to exercise reasonable substitute visitation on behalf of the deployed parent, if the court determines that substitute visitation is in the best interests of the child. In determining whether substitute visitation is in the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all of the relevant factors listed in subsection (b) of this Section and apply those factors to the person designated as a substitute for the deployed parent for visitation purposes. Visitation orders entered under this subsection are subject to subsections (e) and (f) of Section 602.9 and subsections (c) and (d) of Section 603.10.

(e) If the street address of a parent is not identified pursuant to Section 708 of this Act, the court shall require the parties to identify reasonable alternative arrangements for parenting time by the other parent including, but not limited to, parenting time of the minor child at the residence of another person or at a local public or private facility.

5/602.9. Visitation by certain non-parents

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) As used in this Section:

(1) “electronic communication” means time that a grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent spends with a child during which the child is not in the person’s actual physical custody, but which is facilitated by the use of communication tools such as the telephone, electronic mail, instant messaging, video conferencing or other wired or wireless technologies via the Internet, or another medium of communication;

(2) “sibling” means a brother or sister either of the whole blood or the half blood, stepbrother, or stepsister of the minor child;

(3) “step-parent” means a person married to a child’s parent, including a person married to the child’s parent immediately prior to the parent’s death; and

(4) “visitation” means in-person time spent between a child and the child’s grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, step-parent, or any person designated under subsection (d) of Section 602.7. In appropriate circumstances, visitation may include electronic communication under conditions and at times determined by the court.

(b) General provisions.

(1) An appropriate person, as identified in subsection (c) of this Section, may bring an action in circuit court by petition, or by filing a petition in a pending dissolution proceeding or any other proceeding that involves parental responsibilities or visitation issues regarding the child, requesting visitation with the child pursuant to this Section. If there is not a pending proceeding involving parental responsibilities or visitation with the child, the petition for visitation with the child must be filed in the county in which the child resides. Notice of the petition shall be given as provided in subsection (c) of Section 601.2 of this Act.

(2) This Section does not apply to a child:

(A) in whose interests a petition is pending under Section 2-13 of the Juvenile Court Act of 19871; or

(B) in whose interests a petition to adopt by an unrelated person is pending under the Adoption Act; or

(C) who has been voluntarily surrendered by the parent or parents, except for a surrender to the Department of Children and Family Services or a foster care facility; or

(D) who has been previously adopted by an individual or individuals who are not related to the biological parents of the child or who is the subject of a pending adoption petition by an individual or individuals who are not related to the biological parents of the child; or

(E) who has been relinquished pursuant to the Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection Act.

(3) A petition for visitation may be filed under this Section only if there has been an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent and the denial has caused the child undue mental, physical, or emotional harm.

(4) There is a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent’s actions and decisions regarding grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent visitation are not harmful to the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health. The burden is on the party filing a petition under this Section to prove that the parent’s actions and decisions regarding visitation will cause undue harm to the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health.

(5) In determining whether to grant visitation, the court shall consider the following:

(A) the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and ability to express reasoned and independent preferences as to visitation;

(B) the mental and physical health of the child;

(C) the mental and physical health of the grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent;

(D) the length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent;

(E) the good faith of the party in filing the petition;

(F) the good faith of the person denying visitation;

(G) the quantity of the visitation time requested and the potential adverse impact that visitation would have on the child’s customary activities;

(H) any other fact that establishes that the loss of the relationship between the petitioner and the child is likely to unduly harm the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health; and

(I) whether visitation can be structured in a way to minimize the child’s exposure to conflicts between the adults.

(6) Any visitation rights granted under this Section before the filing of a petition for adoption of the child shall automatically terminate by operation of law upon the entry of an order terminating parental rights or granting the adoption of the child, whichever is earlier. If the person or persons who adopted the child are related to the child, as defined by Section 1 of the Adoption Act, any person who was related to the child as grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling prior to the adoption shall have standing to bring an action under this Section requesting visitation with the child.

(7) The court may order visitation rights for the grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent that include reasonable access without requiring overnight or possessory visitation.

(c) Visitation by grandparents, great-grandparents, step-parents, and siblings.

(1) Grandparents, great-grandparents, step-parents, and siblings of a minor child who is one year old or older may bring a petition for visitation and electronic communication under this Section if there is an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent that causes undue mental, physical, or emotional harm to the child and if at least one of the following conditions exists:

(A) the child’s other parent is deceased or has been missing for at least 90 days. For the purposes of this subsection a parent is considered to be missing if the parent’s location has not been determined and the parent has been reported as missing to a law enforcement agency; or

(B) a parent of the child is incompetent as a matter of law; or

(C) a parent has been incarcerated in jail or prison for a period in excess of 90 days immediately prior to the filing of the petition; or

(D) the child’s parents have been granted a dissolution of marriage or have been legally separated from each other or there is pending a dissolution proceeding involving a parent of the child or another court proceeding involving parental responsibilities or visitation of the child (other than an adoption proceeding of an unrelated child, a proceeding under Article II of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, or an action for an order of protection under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or Article 112A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963) and at least one parent does not object to the grandparent, great-grandparent, step-parent, or sibling having visitation with the child. The visitation of the grandparent, great-grandparent, step-parent, or sibling must not diminish the parenting time of the parent who is not related to the grandparent, great-grandparent, step-parent, or sibling seeking visitation; or

(E)(i) the child is born to parents who are not married to each other; (ii) the parents are not living together; (iii) the petitioner is a grandparent, great-grandparent, step-parent, or sibling of the child; and (iv) the parent-child relationship has been legally established. For purposes of this subdivision (E), if the petitioner is a grandparent or great-grandparent, the parent-child relationship need be legally established only with respect to the parent who is related to the grandparent or great-grandparent. For purposes of this subdivision (E), if the petitioner is a step-parent, the parent-child relationship need be legally established only with respect to the parent who is married to the petitioner or was married to the petitioner immediately before the parent’s death.

(2) In addition to the factors set forth in subdivision (b)(5) of this Section, the court should consider:

(A) whether the child resided with the petitioner for at least 6 consecutive months with or without a parent present;

(B) whether the child had frequent and regular contact or visitation with the petitioner for at least 12 consecutive months; and

(C) whether the grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent was a primary caretaker of the child for a period of not less than 6 consecutive months within the 24-month period immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding.

(3) An order granting visitation privileges under this Section is subject to subsections (c) and (d) of Section 603.10.

(4) A petition for visitation privileges may not be filed pursuant to this subsection (c) by the parents or grandparents of a parent of the child if parentage between the child and the related parent has not been legally established.

(d) Modification of visitation orders.

(1) Unless by stipulation of the parties, no motion to modify a grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent visitation order may be made earlier than 2 years after the date the order was filed, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits that there is reason to believe the child’s present environment may endanger seriously the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health.

(2) The court shall not modify an order that grants visitation to a grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior visitation order or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior visitation order, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his or her parent, and that the modification is necessary to protect the mental, physical, or emotional health of the child. The court shall state in its decision specific findings of fact in support of its modification or termination of the grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent visitation. A child’s parent may always petition to modify visitation upon changed circumstances when necessary to promote the child’s best interests.

(3) Notice of a motion requesting modification of a visitation order shall be provided as set forth in subsection (c) of Section 601.2 of this Act.

(4) Attorney’s fees and costs shall be assessed against a party seeking modification of the visitation order if the court finds that the modification action is vexatious and constitutes harassment.

(e) No child’s grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent, or any person to whom the court is considering granting visitation privileges pursuant to subsection (d) of Section 602.7, who was convicted of any offense involving an illegal sex act perpetrated upon a victim less than 18 years of age including, but not limited to, offenses for violations of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-1.70, or Article 12 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012,2 is entitled to visitation while incarcerated or while on parole, probation, conditional discharge, periodic imprisonment, or mandatory supervised release for that offense, and upon discharge from incarceration for a misdemeanor offense or upon discharge from parole, probation, conditional discharge, periodic imprisonment, or mandatory supervised release for a felony offense. Visitation shall be denied until the person successfully completes a treatment program approved by the court. Upon completion of treatment, the court may deny visitation based on the factors listed in subdivision (b)(5) of this Section.(f) No child’s grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, or step-parent, or any person to whom the court is considering granting visitation privileges pursuant to subsection (d) of Section 602.7, may be granted visitation if he or she has been convicted of first degree murder of a parent, grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling of the child who is the subject of the visitation request. Pursuant to a motion to modify visitation, the court shall revoke visitation rights previously granted to any person who would otherwise be entitled to petition for visitation rights under this Section or granted visitation under subsection (d) of Section 602.7, if the person has been convicted of first degree murder of a parent, grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling of the child who is the subject of the visitation order. Until an order is entered pursuant to this subsection, no person may visit, with the child present, a person who has been convicted of first degree murder of the parent, grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling of the child without the consent of the child’s parent, other than a parent convicted of first degree murder as set forth herein, or legal guardian.

5/603.10. Restriction of parental responsibilities

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) After a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent engaged in any conduct that seriously endangered the child’s mental, moral, or physical health or that significantly impaired the child’s emotional development, the court shall enter orders as necessary to protect the child. Such orders may include, but are not limited to, orders for one or more of the following:

(1) a reduction, elimination, or other adjustment of the parent’s decision-making responsibilities or parenting time, or both decision-making responsibilities and parenting time;

(2) supervision, including ordering the Department of Children and Family Services to exercise continuing supervision under Section 5 of the Children and Family Services Act;

(3) requiring the exchange of the child between the parents through an intermediary or in a protected setting;

(4) restraining a parent’s communication with or proximity to the other parent or the child;

(5) requiring a parent to abstain from possessing or consuming alcohol or non-prescribed drugs while exercising parenting time with the child and within a specified period immediately preceding the exercise of parenting time;

(6) restricting the presence of specific persons while a parent is exercising parenting time with the child;

(7) requiring a parent to post a bond to secure the return of the child following the parent’s exercise of parenting time or to secure other performance required by the court;

(8) requiring a parent to complete a treatment program for perpetrators of abuse, for drug or alcohol abuse, or for other behavior that is the basis for restricting parental responsibilities under this Section; and

(9) any other constraints or conditions that the court deems necessary to provide for the child’s safety or welfare.

(b) The court may modify an order restricting parental responsibilities if, after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a modification is in the child’s best interests based on (i) a change of circumstances that occurred after the entry of an order restricting parental responsibilities; or (ii) conduct of which the court was previously unaware that seriously endangers the child. In determining whether to modify an order under this subsection, the court must consider factors that include, but need not be limited to, the following:

(1) abuse, neglect, or abandonment of the child;

(2) abusing or allowing abuse of another person that had an impact upon the child;

(3) use of drugs, alcohol, or any other substance in a way that interferes with the parent’s ability to perform caretaking functions with respect to the child; and

(4) persistent continuing interference with the other parent’s access to the child, except for actions taken with a reasonable, good-faith belief that they are necessary to protect the child’s safety pending adjudication of the facts underlying that belief, provided that the interfering parent initiates a proceeding to determine those facts as soon as practicable.

(c) An order granting parenting time to a parent or visitation to another person may be revoked by the court if that parent or other person is found to have knowingly used his or her parenting time or visitation to facilitate contact between the child and a parent who has been barred from contact with the child or to have knowingly used his or her parenting time or visitation to facilitate contact with the child that violates any restrictions imposed on a parent’s parenting time by a court of competent jurisdiction. Nothing in this subsection limits a court’s authority to enforce its orders in any other manner authorized by law.

(d) If parenting time of a parent is restricted, an order granting visitation to a non-parent with a child or an order granting parenting time to the other parent shall contain the following language:

“If a person granted parenting time or visitation under this order uses that time to facilitate contact between the child and a parent whose parenting time is restricted, or if such a person violates any restrictions placed on parenting time or visitation by the court, the parenting time or visitation granted under this order shall be revoked until further order of court.”

(e) A parent who, after a hearing, is determined by the court to have been convicted of any offense involving an illegal sex act perpetrated upon a victim less than 18 years of age, including but not limited to an offense under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012,1 is not entitled to parenting time while incarcerated or while on parole, probation, conditional discharge, periodic imprisonment, or mandatory supervised release for a felony offense, until the parent complies with such terms and conditions as the court determines are in the child’s best interests, taking into account the exact nature of the offense and what, if any, treatment in which the parent successfully participated.

(f) A parent may not, while the child is present, visit any person granted visitation or parenting time who has been convicted of first degree murder, unless the court finds, after considering all relevant factors, including those set forth in subsection (b) of Section 602.7, that it would be in the child’s best interests to allow the child to be present during such a visit.

Act 36. Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article 3. Enforcement

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

36/305. Registration Of Child-Custody Determination

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A child-custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this State, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the circuit court in this State:

(1) a letter or other document requesting registration;

(2) two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and

(3) except as otherwise provided in Section 209, the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child-custody determination sought to be registered.

(b) On receipt of the documents required by subsection (a), the registering court shall:

(1) cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and

(2) serve notice upon the persons named pursuant to subsection (a)(3) and provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with this Section.

(c) The notice required by subsection (b)(2) must state that:

(1) a registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this State;

(2) a hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be requested within 20 days after service of notice; and

(3) failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the child-custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted.

(d) A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request a hearing within 20 days after service of the notice. At that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting registration establishes that:

(1) the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under Article 2;

(2) the child-custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under Article 2; or

(3) the person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards of Section 108, in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought.

(e) If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the person requesting registration and all persons served must be notified of the confirmation.

(f) Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

36/306. Enforcement Of Registered Determination

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A court of this State may grant any relief normally available under the law of this State to enforce a registered child-custody determination made by a court of another state.

(b) A court of this State shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, except in accordance with Article 2, a registered child-custody determination of a court of another state.

Act 60. Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Article I. General Provisions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

60/101. Short Title

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

This Act shall be known and may be cited as the “Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986”.

60/102. Purposes; rules of construction

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes,
which are to:
(1) Recognize domestic violence as a serious crime against the individual and society which produces family disharmony in thousands of Illinois families, promotes a pattern of escalating violence which frequently culminates in intra-family homicide, and creates an emotional atmosphere that is not conducive to healthy childhood development;

(2) Recognize domestic violence against high risk adults with disabilities, who are particularly vulnerable due to impairments in ability to seek or obtain protection, as a serious problem which takes on many forms, including physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and facilitate accessibility of remedies under the Act in order to provide immediate and effective assistance and protection.

(3) Recognize that the legal system has ineffectively dealt with family violence in the past, allowing abusers to escape effective prosecution or financial liability, and has not adequately acknowledged the criminal nature of domestic violence; that, although many laws have changed, in practice there is still widespread failure to appropriately
protect and assist victims;

(4) Support the efforts of victims of domestic violence to avoid further abuse by promptly entering and diligently enforcing court orders which prohibit abuse and, when necessary, reduce the abuser’s access to the victim and address any related issues of child custody and economic support, so that victims are not trapped in abusive situations by fear of retaliation, loss of a child, financial dependence, or loss of
accessible housing or services;

(5) Clarify the responsibilities and support the efforts of law enforcement officers to provide immediate, effective assistance and protection for victims of domestic violence, recognizing that law enforcement officers often become the secondary victims of domestic violence, as evidenced by the high rates of police injuries and deaths
that occur in response to domestic violence calls; and

(6) Expand the civil and criminal remedies for victims of domestic violence; including, when necessary, the remedies which effect physical separation of the parties to prevent further abuse.

60/103. Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(1) “Abuse” means physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation but does not include reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis.
(2) “Adult with disabilities” means an elder adult with disabilities or a high-risk adult with disabilities. A person may be an adult with disabilities for purposes of this Act even though he or she has never been adjudicated an incompetent adult. However, no court proceeding may be initiated or continued on behalf of an adult with disabilities over that adult’s objection, unless such proceeding is approved by his or her legal guardian, if any.
(3) “Domestic violence” means abuse as defined in paragraph (1).
(4) “Elder adult with disabilities” means an adult prevented by advanced age from taking appropriate action to protect himself or herself from abuse by a family or household member.
(5) “Exploitation” means the illegal, including tortious, use of a high-risk adult with disabilities or of the assets or resources of a high-risk adult with disabilities. Exploitation includes, but is not limited to, the misappropriation of assets or resources of a high-risk adult with disabilities by undue influence, by breach of a fiduciary relationship, by fraud, deception, or extortion, or the use of such assets or resources in a manner contrary to law.
(6) “Family or household members” include spouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren and other persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal assistants, and caregivers as defined in Section 12-4.4a of the Criminal Code of 2012.1 For purposes of this paragraph, neither a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to constitute a dating relationship. In the case of a high-risk adult with disabilities, “family or household members” includes any person who has the responsibility for a high-risk adult as a result of a family relationship or who has assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the care of a high-risk adult with disabilities voluntarily, or by express or implied contract, or by court order.
(7) “Harassment” means knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress to the petitioner. Unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, the following types of conduct shall be presumed to cause emotional distress:
(i) creating a disturbance at petitioner’s place of employment or school;
(ii) repeatedly telephoning petitioner’s place of employment, home or residence;
(iii) repeatedly following petitioner about in a public place or places;
(iv) repeatedly keeping petitioner under surveillance by remaining present outside his or her home, school, place of employment, vehicle or other place occupied by petitioner or by peering in petitioner’s windows;
(v) improperly concealing a minor child from petitioner, repeatedly threatening to improperly remove a minor child of petitioner’s from the jurisdiction or from the physical care of petitioner, repeatedly threatening to conceal a minor child from petitioner, or making a single such threat following an actual or attempted improper removal or concealment, unless respondent was fleeing an incident or pattern of domestic violence; or
(vi) threatening physical force, confinement or restraint on one or more occasions.
(8) “High-risk adult with disabilities” means a person aged 18 or over whose physical or mental disability impairs his or her ability to seek or obtain protection from abuse, neglect, or exploitation.
(9) “Interference with personal liberty” means committing or threatening physical abuse, harassment, intimidation or willful deprivation so as to compel another to engage in conduct from which she or he has a right to abstain or to refrain from conduct in which she or he has a right to engage.
(10) “Intimidation of a dependent” means subjecting a person who is dependent because of age, health or disability to participation in or the witnessing of: physical force against another or physical confinement or restraint of another which constitutes physical abuse as defined in this Act, regardless of whether the abused person is a family or household member.
(11)(A) “Neglect” means the failure to exercise that degree of care toward a high-risk adult with disabilities which a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances and includes but is not limited to:
(i) the failure to take reasonable steps to protect a high-risk adult with disabilities from acts of abuse;
(ii) the repeated, careless imposition of unreasonable confinement;
(iii) the failure to provide food, shelter, clothing, and personal hygiene to a high-risk adult with disabilities who requires such assistance;
(iv) the failure to provide medical and rehabilitative care for the physical and mental health needs of a high-risk adult with disabilities; or
(v) the failure to protect a high-risk adult with disabilities from health and safety hazards.
(B) Nothing in this subsection (10) shall be construed to impose a requirement that assistance be provided to a high-risk adult with disabilities over his or her objection in the absence of a court order, nor to create any new affirmative duty to provide support to a high-risk adult with disabilities.
(12) “Order of protection” means an emergency order, interim order or plenary order, granted pursuant to this Act, which includes any or all of the remedies authorized by Section 214 of this Act.
(13) “Petitioner” may mean not only any named petitioner for the order of protection and any named victim of abuse on whose behalf the petition is brought, but also any other person protected by this Act.
(14) “Physical abuse” includes sexual abuse and means any of the following:
(i) knowing or reckless use of physical force, confinement or restraint;
(ii) knowing, repeated and unnecessary sleep deprivation; or
(iii) knowing or reckless conduct which creates an immediate risk of physical harm.
(14.5) “Stay away” means for the respondent to refrain from both physical presence and nonphysical contact with the petitioner whether direct, indirect (including, but not limited to, telephone calls, mail, email, faxes, and written notes), or through third parties who may or may not know about the order of protection.
(15) “Willful deprivation” means wilfully denying a person who because of age, health or disability requires medication, medical care, shelter, accessible shelter or services, food, therapeutic device, or other physical assistance, and thereby exposing that person to the risk of physical, mental or emotional harm, except with regard to medical care or treatment when the dependent person has expressed an intent to forgo such medical care or treatment. This paragraph does not create any new affirmative duty to provide support to dependent persons.

Article II. Orders of Protection

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

60/201. Persons protected by this Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) The following persons are protected by this Act:

(i) any person abused by a family or household member;

(ii) any high-risk adult with disabilities who is abused, neglected, or exploited by a family or household member;

(iii) any minor child or dependent adult in the care of such person;

(iv) any person residing or employed at a private home or public shelter which is housing an abused family or household member; and

(v) any of the following persons if the person is abused by a family or household member of a child:

(A) a foster parent of that child if the child has been placed in the foster parent’s home by the Department of Children and Family Services or by another state’s public child welfare agency;

(B) a legally appointed guardian or legally appointed custodian of that child;

(C) an adoptive parent of that child; or

(D) a prospective adoptive parent of that child if the child has been placed in the prospective adoptive parent’s home pursuant to the Adoption Act or pursuant to another state’s law.

For purposes of this paragraph (a)(v), individuals who would have been considered “family or household members” of the child under subsection (6) of Section 103 of this Act before a termination of the parental rights with respect to the child continue to meet the definition of “family or household members” of the child.

(b) A petition for an order of protection may be filed only:

(i) by a person who has been abused by a family or household member or by any person on behalf of a minor child or an adult who has been abused by a family or household member and who, because of age, health, disability, or inaccessibility, cannot file the petition;

(ii) by any person on behalf of a high-risk adult with disabilities who has been abused, neglected, or exploited by a family or household member; or

(iii) any of the following persons if the person is abused by a family or household member of a child:

(A) a foster parent of that child if the child has been placed in the foster parent’s home by the Department of Children and Family Services or by another state’s public child welfare agency;

(B) a legally appointed guardian or legally appointed custodian of that child;

(C) an adoptive parent of that child;

(D) a prospective adoptive parent of that child if the child has been placed in the prospective adoptive parent’s home pursuant to the Adoption Act or pursuant to another state’s law.

For purposes of this paragraph (b)(iii), individuals who would have been considered “family or household members” of the child under subsection (6) of Section 103 of this Act before a termination of the parental rights with respect to the child continue to meet the definition of “family or household members” of the child.(c) Any petition properly filed under this Act may seek protection for any additional persons protected by this Act.

60/201.1. Access of high-risk adults

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

No person shall obstruct or impede the access of a high-risk adult with disabilities to any agency or organization authorized to file a petition for an order of protection under Section 201 of this Act for the purpose of a private visit relating to legal rights, entitlements, claims and services under this Act and Section 1 of “An Act in relation to domestic relations and domestic violence shelters and service programs”, approved September 24, 1981, as now or hereafter amended. If a person does so obstruct or impede such access of a high-risk adult with disabilities, local law enforcement agencies shall take all appropriate action to assist the party seeking access in petitioning for a search warrant or an ex parte injunctive order. Such warrant or order may issue upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the high-risk adult with disabilities is the subject of abuse, neglect, or exploitation which constitutes a criminal offense or that any other criminal offense is occurring which affects the interests or welfare of the high-risk adult with disabilities. When, from the personal observations of a law enforcement officer, it appears probable that delay of entry in order to obtain a warrant or order would cause the high-risk adult with disabilities to be in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, entry may be made by the law enforcement officer after an announcement of the officer’s authority and purpose.

60/202. Commencement of action; filing fees; dismissal

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) How to commence action. Actions for orders of protection are commenced:
(1) Independently: By filing a petition for an order of protection in any civil court, unless specific courts are designated by local rule or order.
(2) In conjunction with another civil proceeding: By filing a petition for an order of protection under the same case number as another civil proceeding involving the parties, including but not limited to: (i) any proceeding under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act,1 Illinois Parentage Act of 2015,2 Nonsupport of Spouse and Children Act,3 Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act4 or an action for nonsupport brought under Article X of the Illinois Public Aid Code,5 provided that a petitioner and the respondent are a party to or the subject of that proceeding or (ii) a guardianship proceeding under the Probate Act of 1975,6 or a proceeding for involuntary commitment under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code,7 or any proceeding, other than a delinquency petition, under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987,8 provided that a petitioner or the respondent is a party to or the subject of such proceeding.
(3) In conjunction with a delinquency petition or a criminal prosecution as provided in Section 112A-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(a-5) When a petition for an emergency order of protection is filed, the petition shall not be publicly available until the petition is served on the respondent.

(b) Filing, certification, and service fees. No fee shall be charged by the clerk for filing, amending, vacating, certifying, or photocopying petitions or orders; or for issuing alias summons; or for any related filing service. No fee shall be charged by the sheriff for service by the sheriff of a petition, rule, motion, or order in an action commenced under this Section.
(c) Dismissal and consolidation. Withdrawal or dismissal of any petition for an order of protection prior to adjudication where the petitioner is represented by the State shall operate as a dismissal without prejudice. No action for an order of protection shall be dismissed because the respondent is being prosecuted for a crime against the petitioner. An independent action may be consolidated with another civil proceeding, as provided by paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this Section. For any action commenced under paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of this Section, dismissal of the conjoined case (or a finding of not guilty) shall not require dismissal of the action for the order of protection; instead, it may be treated as an independent action and, if necessary and appropriate, transferred to a different court or division. Dismissal of any conjoined case shall not affect the validity of any previously issued order of protection, and thereafter subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Section 220 shall be inapplicable to such order.
(d) Pro se petitions. The court shall provide, through the office of the clerk of the court, simplified forms and clerical assistance to help with the writing and filing of a petition under this Section by any person not represented by counsel. In addition, that assistance may be provided by the state’s attorney.
(e) As provided in this subsection, the administrative director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, with the approval of the administrative board of the courts, may adopt rules to establish and implement a pilot program to allow the electronic filing of petitions for temporary orders of protection and the issuance of such orders by audio-visual means to accommodate litigants for whom attendance in court to file for and obtain emergency relief would constitute an undue hardship or would constitute a risk of harm to the litigant.
(1) As used in this subsection:
(A) “Electronic means” means any method of transmission of information between computers or other machines designed for the purpose of sending or receiving electronic transmission and that allows for the recipient of information to reproduce the information received in a tangible medium of expression.
(B) “Independent audio-visual system” means an electronic system for the transmission and receiving of audio and visual signals, including those with the means to preclude the unauthorized reception and decoding of the signals by commercially available television receivers, channel converters, or other available receiving devices.
(C) “Electronic appearance” means an appearance in which one or more of the parties are not present in the court, but in which, by means of an independent audio-visual system, all of the participants are simultaneously able to see and hear reproductions of the voices and images of the judge, counsel, parties, witnesses, and any other participants.
(2) Any pilot program under this subsection (e) shall be developed by the administrative director or his or her delegate in consultation with at least one local organization providing assistance to domestic violence victims. The program plan shall include but not be limited to:
(A) identification of agencies equipped with or that have access to an independent audio-visual system and electronic means for filing documents; and
(B) identification of one or more organizations who are trained and available to assist petitioners in preparing and filing petitions for temporary orders of protection and in their electronic appearances before the court to obtain such orders; and
(C) identification of the existing resources available in local family courts for the implementation and oversight of the pilot program; and
(D) procedures for filing petitions and documents by electronic means, swearing in the petitioners and witnesses, preparation of a transcript of testimony and evidence presented, and a prompt transmission of any orders issued to the parties; and
(E) a timeline for implementation and a plan for informing the public about the availability of the program; and
(F) a description of the data to be collected in order to evaluate and make recommendations for improvements to the pilot program.
(3) In conjunction with an electronic appearance, any petitioner for an ex parte temporary order of protection may, using the assistance of a trained advocate if necessary, commence the proceedings by filing a petition by electronic means.
(A) A petitioner who is seeking an ex parte temporary order of protection using an electronic appearance must file a petition in advance of the appearance and may do so electronically.
(B) The petitioner must show that traveling to or appearing in court would constitute an undue hardship or create a risk of harm to the petitioner. In granting or denying any relief sought by the petitioner, the court shall state the names of all participants and whether it is granting or denying an appearance by electronic means and the basis for such a determination. A party is not required to file a petition or other document by electronic means or to testify by means of an electronic appearance.
(C) Nothing in this subsection (e) affects or changes any existing laws governing the service of process, including requirements for personal service or the sealing and confidentiality of court records in court proceedings or access to court records by the parties to the proceedings.
(4) Appearances.
(A) All electronic appearances by a petitioner seeking an ex parte temporary order of protection under this subsection (e) are strictly voluntary and the court shall obtain the consent of the petitioner on the record at the commencement of each appearance.
(B) Electronic appearances under this subsection (e) shall be recorded and preserved for transcription. Documentary evidence, if any, referred to by a party or witness or the court may be transmitted and submitted and introduced by electronic means.

60/203. Pleading; non-disclosure of address; non-disclosure of schools

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing and verified or accompanied by affidavit and shall allege that petitioner has been abused by respondent, who is a family or household member. The petition shall further set forth whether there is any other pending action between the parties. During the pendency of this proceeding, each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any subsequent proceeding for an order of protection in this or any other state.

(b) If the petition states that disclosure of petitioner’s address would risk abuse of petitioner or any member of petitioner’s family or household or reveal the confidential address of a shelter for domestic violence victims, that address may be omitted from all documents filed with the court. If disclosure is necessary to determine jurisdiction or consider any venue issue, it shall be made orally and in camera. If petitioner has not disclosed an address under this subsection, petitioner shall designate an alternative address at which respondent may serve notice of any motions.

(c) If the petitioner is seeking to have a child protected by the order of protection, and if that child is enrolled in any day-care facility, pre-school, pre-kindergarten, private school, public school district, college, or university, the petitioner may provide the name and address of the day-care facility, pre-school, pre-kindergarten, private school, public school district, college, or university to the court. However, if the petition states that disclosure of this information would risk abuse to petitioner or to the child protected under the order, this information may be omitted from all documents filed with the court.

60/205. Application of rules of civil procedure; Domestic abuse advocates

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Any proceeding to obtain, modify, reopen or appeal an order of protection, whether commenced alone or in conjunction with a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The standard of proof in such a proceeding is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the proceeding is heard in criminal or civil court. The Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to civil proceedings, as now or hereafter amended, shall apply, except as otherwise provided by this law.
(b) (1) In all circuit court proceedings under this Act, domestic abuse advocates shall be allowed to attend and sit at counsel table and confer with the victim, unless otherwise directed by the court.
(2) In criminal proceedings in circuit courts, domestic abuse advocates shall be allowed to accompany the victim and confer with the victim, unless otherwise directed by the court.
(3) Court administrators shall allow domestic abuse advocates to assist victims of domestic violence in the preparation of petitions for orders of protection.
(4) Domestic abuse advocates are not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when providing assistance of the types specified in this subsection (b).

60/206. Trial by jury

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

There shall be no right to trial by jury in any proceeding to obtain, modify, vacate or extend any order of protection under this Act. However, nothing in this Section shall deny any existing right to trial by jury in a criminal proceeding.

60/207. Subject matter jurisdiction

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Each of the circuit courts shall have the power to issue orders of protection.

60/208. Jurisdiction over persons

Updated: 
June 26, 2020
(As amended by P.A. 93-108, effective January 1, 2004) In child custody proceedings, the court’s personal jurisdiction is determined by this State’s Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act [750 ILCS 36/101]. Otherwise, the courts of this State have jurisdiction to bind (i) State residents and (ii) non-residents having minimum contacts with this State, to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute, Section 2-209 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as now or hereafter amended [735 ILCS 5/2-209].

60/209. Venue

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Filing. A petition for an order of protection may be filed in any county where (i) petitioner resides, (ii) respondent resides, (iii) the alleged abuse occurred or (iv) the petitioner is temporarily located if petitioner left petitioner’s residence to avoid further abuse and could not obtain safe, accessible, and adequate temporary housing in the county of that residence.
(b) Exclusive Possession. With respect to requests for exclusive possession of the residence under this Act, venue is proper only in the county where the residence is located, except in the following circumstances:
(1) If a request for exclusive possession of the residence is made under this Act in conjunction with a proceeding under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, venue is proper in the county or judicial circuit where the residence is located or in a contiguous county or judicial circuit.
(2) If a request for exclusive possession of the residence is made under this Act in any other proceeding, provided the petitioner meets the requirements of item (iv) of subsection (a), venue is proper in the county or judicial circuit where the residence is located or in a contiguous county or judicial circuit. In such case, however, if the court is not located in the county where the residence is located, it may grant exclusive possession of the residence under subdivision (b)(2) of Section 214 only in an emergency order under Section 217, and such grant may be extended thereafter beyond the maximum initial period only by a court located in the county where the residence is located.
(c) Inconvenient forum. If an order of protection is issued by a court in a county in which neither of the parties resides, the court may balance hardships to the parties and accordingly transfer any proceeding to extend, modify, re-open, vacate or enforce any such order to a county wherein a party resides.
(d) Objection. Objection to venue is waived if not made within such time as respondent’s response is due, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b). In no event shall venue be deemed jurisdictional.

60/210. Process

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Summons. Any action for an order of protection, whether commenced alone or in conjunction with another proceeding, is a distinct cause of action and requires that a separate summons be issued and served, except that in pending cases the following methods may be used:

(1) By delivery of the summons to respondent personally in open court in pending civil or criminal cases.

(2) By notice in accordance with Section 210.1 in civil cases in which the defendant has filed a general appearance.

The summons shall be in the form prescribed by Supreme Court Rule 101(d), except that it shall require respondent to answer or appear within 7 days. Attachments to the summons or notice shall include the petition for order of protection and supporting affidavits, if any, and any emergency order of protection that has been issued. The enforcement of an order of protection under Section 223 shall not be affected by the lack of service, delivery, or notice, provided the requirements of subsection (d) of that Section are otherwise met.

(b) Blank.

(c) Expedited service. The summons shall be served by the sheriff or other law enforcement officer at the earliest time and shall take precedence over other summonses except those of a similar emergency nature. Special process servers may be appointed at any time, and their designation shall not affect the responsibilities and authority of the sheriff or other official process servers. In counties with a population over 3,000,000, a special process server may not be appointed if the order of protection grants the surrender of a child, the surrender of a firearm or firearm owners identification card, or the exclusive possession of a shared residence.

(d) Remedies requiring actual notice. The counseling, payment of support, payment of shelter services, and payment of losses remedies provided by paragraphs 4, 12, 13, and 16 of subsection (b) of Section 214 may be granted only if respondent has been personally served with process, has answered or has made a general appearance.

(e) Remedies upon constructive notice. Service of process on a member of respondent’s household or by publication shall be adequate for the remedies provided by paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, and 17 of subsection (b) of Section 214, but only if: (i) petitioner has made all reasonable efforts to accomplish actual service of process personally upon respondent, but respondent cannot be found to effect such service and (ii) petitioner files an affidavit or presents sworn testimony as to those efforts.

(f) Default. A plenary order of protection may be entered by default as follows:

(1) For any of the remedies sought in the petition, if respondent has been served or given notice in accordance with subsection (a) and if respondent then fails to appear as directed or fails to appear on any subsequent appearance or hearing date agreed to by the parties or set by the court; or

(2) For any of the remedies provided in accordance with subsection (e), if respondent fails to answer or appear in accordance with the date set in the publication notice or the return date indicated on the service of a household member.

(e) If an order is granted under subsection (c) of Section 95, the court shall immediately file a certified copy of the order with the sheriff or other law enforcement official charged with maintaining Department of State Police records.

60/210.1. Service of notice in conjunction with a pending civil case

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Notice. When an action for an order of protection is sought in conjunction with a pending civil case in which the court has obtained jurisdiction over respondent, and respondent has filed a general appearance, then a separate summons need not issue. Original notice of a hearing on a petition for an order of protection may be given, and the documents served, in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rules 11 and 12. When, however, an emergency order of protection is sought in such a case on an ex parte application, then the procedure set forth in subsection (a) of Section 210 (other than in subsection (a)(2)) shall be followed. If an order of protection is issued using the notice provisions of this Section, then the order of protection or extensions of that order may survive the disposition of the main civil case. The enforcement of any order of protection under Section 223 shall not be affected by the lack of notice under this Section, provided the requirements of subsection (d) of that Section are otherwise met.
(b) Default. The form of notice described in subsection (a) shall include the following language directed to the respondent: A 2-year plenary order of protection may be entered by default for any of the remedies sought in the petition if you fail to appear on the specified hearing date or on any subsequent hearing date agreed to by the parties or set by the court.
(c) Party to give notice. Notice in the pending civil case shall be given (i) by either party under this Section, with respect to extensions, modifications, hearings, or other relief pertinent to an order of protection, in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rules 11 and 12 or (ii) by the respondent as provided in subsection (c) of Section 224.

60/211. Service of notice of hearings

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Except as provided in Sections 210 and 210.1, notice of hearings on petitions or motions shall be served in accordance with Supreme Court Rules 11 and 12, unless notice is excused by Section 217 of this Act, or by the Code of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court Rules, or local rules, as now or hereafter amended.

60/212. Hearings

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A petition for an order of protection shall be treated as an expedited proceeding, and no court shall transfer or otherwise decline to decide all or part of such petition except as otherwise provided herein. Nothing in this Section shall prevent the court from reserving issues when jurisdiction or notice requirements are not met.

(b) Any court or a division thereof which ordinarily does not decide matters of child custody and family support may decline to decide contested issues of physical care, custody, visitation, or family support unless a decision on one or more of those contested issues is necessary to avoid the risk of abuse, neglect, removal from the state or concealment within the state of the child or of separation of the child from the primary caretaker. If the court or division thereof has declined to decide any or all of these issues, then it shall transfer all undecided issues to the appropriate court or division. In the event of such a transfer, a government attorney involved in the criminal prosecution may, but need not, continue to offer counsel to petitioner on transferred matters.

(c) If the court transfers or otherwise declines to decide any issue, judgment on that issue shall be expressly reserved and ruling on other issues shall not be delayed or declined.

60/213. Continuances

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Petitions for emergency orders. Petitions for emergency remedies shall be granted or denied in accordance with the standards of Section 217, regardless of respondent’s appearance or presence in court.
(b) Petitions for interim and plenary orders. Any action for an order of protection is an expedited proceeding. Continuances should be granted only for good cause shown and kept to the minimum reasonable duration, taking into account the reasons for the continuance. If the continuance is necessary for some, but not all, of the remedies requested, hearing on those other remedies shall not be delayed.

60/213.1. Hearsay exception

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

In an action for an order of protection on behalf of a high-risk adult with disabilities, a finding of lack of capacity to testify shall not render inadmissible any statement as long as the reliability of the statement is ensured by circumstances bringing it within the scope of a hearsay exception. The following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule whether or not the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) A statement relating to a startling event or condition made spontaneously while the declarant was under the contemporaneous or continuing stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
(2) A statement made for the purpose of obtaining, receiving, or promoting medical diagnosis or treatment, including psychotherapy, and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. For purposes of obtaining a protective order, the identity of any person inflicting abuse or neglect as defined in this Act shall be deemed reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(3) A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, and (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts. Circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness include:
(1) the credibility of the witness who testifies the statement was made;
(2) assurance of the declarant’s personal knowledge of the event;
(3) the declarant’s interest or bias and the presence or absence of capacity or motive to fabricate;
(4) the presence or absence of suggestiveness or prompting at the time the statement was made;
(5) whether the declarant has ever reaffirmed or recanted the statement; and
(6) corroboration by physical evidence or behavioral changes in the declarant. The record shall reflect the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the trustworthiness requirement. A statement shall not be admitted under the exception set forth in this Section unless its proponent gives written notice stating his or her intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of offering the statement to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.

60/213.2. Waiver of privilege

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

When the subject of any proceeding under this Act is a high-risk adult with disabilities for whom no guardian has been appointed, no party other than the high-risk adult or the attorney for the high-risk adult shall be entitled to invoke or waive a common law or statutory privilege on behalf of the high-risk adult which results in the exclusion of evidence.


60/213.3. Independent counsel; temporary substitute guardian

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

If the petitioner is a high-risk adult with disabilities for whom a guardian has been appointed, the court shall appoint independent counsel other than a guardian ad litem and, may appoint a temporary substitute guardian under the provisions of Article XIa of the Probate Act of 1975. The court shall appoint a temporary substitute guardian if the guardian is named as a respondent in a petition under this Act.

60/214. Order of protection; remedies

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Issuance of order. If the court finds that petitioner has been abused by a family or household member or that petitioner is a high-risk adult who has been abused, neglected, or exploited, as defined in this Act, an order of protection prohibiting the abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall issue; provided that petitioner must also satisfy the requirements of one of the following Sections, as appropriate: Section 217 on emergency orders, Section 218 on interim orders, or Section 219 on plenary orders. Petitioner shall not be denied an order of protection because petitioner or respondent is a minor. The court, when determining whether or not to issue an order of protection, shall not require physical manifestations of abuse on the person of the victim. Modification and extension of prior orders of protection shall be in accordance with this Act.

(b) Remedies and standards. The remedies to be included in an order of protection shall be determined in accordance with this Section and one of the following Sections, as appropriate: Section 217 on emergency orders, Section 218 on interim orders, and Section 219 on plenary orders. The remedies listed in this subsection shall be in addition to other civil or criminal remedies available to petitioner.

(1) Prohibition of abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Prohibit respondent’s harassment, interference with personal liberty, intimidation of a dependent, physical abuse, or willful deprivation, neglect or exploitation, as defined in this Act, or stalking of the petitioner, as defined in Section 12-7.3 of the Criminal Code of 2012,1 if such abuse, neglect, exploitation, or stalking has occurred or otherwise appears likely to occur if not prohibited.

(2) Grant of exclusive possession of residence. Prohibit respondent from entering or remaining in any residence, household, or premises of the petitioner, including one owned or leased by respondent, if petitioner has a right to occupancy thereof. The grant of exclusive possession of the residence, household, or premises shall not affect title to real property, nor shall the court be limited by the standard set forth in subsection (c-2) of Section 501 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.2

(A) Right to occupancy. A party has a right to occupancy of a residence or household if it is solely or jointly owned or leased by that party, that party’s spouse, a person with a legal duty to support that party or a minor child in that party’s care, or by any person or entity other than the opposing party that authorizes that party’s occupancy (e.g., a domestic violence shelter). Standards set forth in subparagraph (B) shall not preclude equitable relief.

(B) Presumption of hardships. If petitioner and respondent each has the right to occupancy of a residence or household, the court shall balance (i) the hardships to respondent and any minor child or dependent adult in respondent’s care resulting from entry of this remedy with (ii) the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner’s care resulting from continued exposure to the risk of abuse (should petitioner remain at the residence or household) or from loss of possession of the residence or household (should petitioner leave to avoid the risk of abuse). When determining the balance of hardships, the court shall also take into account the accessibility of the residence or household. Hardships need not be balanced if respondent does not have a right to occupancy.

The balance of hardships is presumed to favor possession by petitioner unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, showing that the hardships to respondent substantially outweigh the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner’s care. The court, on the request of petitioner or on its own motion, may order respondent to provide suitable, accessible, alternate housing for petitioner instead of excluding respondent from a mutual residence or household.

(3) Stay away order and additional prohibitions. Order respondent to stay away from petitioner or any other person protected by the order of protection, or prohibit respondent from entering or remaining present at petitioner’s school, place of employment, or other specified places at times when petitioner is present, or both, if reasonable, given the balance of hardships. Hardships need not be balanced for the court to enter a stay away order or prohibit entry if respondent has no right to enter the premises.

(A) If an order of protection grants petitioner exclusive possession of the residence, or prohibits respondent from entering the residence, or orders respondent to stay away from petitioner or other protected persons, then the court may allow respondent access to the residence to remove items of clothing and personal adornment used exclusively by respondent, medications, and other items as the court directs. The right to access shall be exercised on only one occasion as the court directs and in the presence of an agreed-upon adult third party or law enforcement officer.

(B) When the petitioner and the respondent attend the same public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school, the court when issuing an order of protection and providing relief shall consider the severity of the act, any continuing physical danger or emotional distress to the petitioner, the educational rights guaranteed to the petitioner and respondent under federal and State law, the availability of a transfer of the respondent to another school, a change of placement or a change of program of the respondent, the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school, and any other relevant facts of the case. The court may order that the respondent not attend the public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school attended by the petitioner, order that the respondent accept a change of placement or change of program, as determined by the school district or private or non-public school, or place restrictions on the respondent’s movements within the school attended by the petitioner. The respondent bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer, change of placement, or change of program of the respondent is not available. The respondent also bears the burden of production with respect to the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school. A transfer, change of placement, or change of program is not unavailable to the respondent solely on the ground that the respondent does not agree with the school district’s or private or non-public school’s transfer, change of placement, or change of program or solely on the ground that the respondent fails or refuses to consent or otherwise does not take an action required to effectuate a transfer, change of placement, or change of program. When a court orders a respondent to stay away from the public, private, or non-public school attended by the petitioner and the respondent requests a transfer to another attendance center within the respondent’s school district or private or non-public school, the school district or private or non-public school shall have sole discretion to determine the attendance center to which the respondent is transferred. In the event the court order results in a transfer of the minor respondent to another attendance center, a change in the respondent’s placement, or a change of the respondent’s program, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the transfer or change.

(C) The court may order the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent to take certain actions or to refrain from taking certain actions to ensure that the respondent complies with the order. In the event the court orders a transfer of the respondent to another school, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the change of school by the respondent.

(4) Counseling. Require or recommend the respondent to undergo counseling for a specified duration with a social worker, psychologist, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, family service agency, alcohol or substance abuse program, mental health center guidance counselor, agency providing services to elders, program designed for domestic violence abusers or any other guidance service the court deems appropriate. The Court may order the respondent in any intimate partner relationship to report to an Illinois Department of Human Services protocol approved partner abuse intervention program for an assessment and to follow all recommended treatment.

(5) Physical care and possession of the minor child. In order to protect the minor child from abuse, neglect, or unwarranted separation from the person who has been the minor child’s primary caretaker, or to otherwise protect the well-being of the minor child, the court may do either or both of the following: (i) grant petitioner physical care or possession of the minor child, or both, or (ii) order respondent to return a minor child to, or not remove a minor child from, the physical care of a parent or person in loco parentis.

If a court finds, after a hearing, that respondent has committed abuse (as defined in Section 103) of a minor child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that awarding physical care to respondent would not be in the minor child’s best interest.

(6) Temporary allocation of parental responsibilities: significant decision-making. Award temporary decision-making responsibility to petitioner in accordance with this Section, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act,3 the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015,4 and this State’s Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.5

If a court finds, after a hearing, that respondent has committed abuse (as defined in Section 103) of a minor child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that awarding temporary significant decision-making responsibility to respondent would not be in the child’s best interest.

(7) Parenting time. Determine the parenting time, if any, of respondent in any case in which the court awards physical care or allocates temporary significant decision-making responsibility of a minor child to petitioner. The court shall restrict or deny respondent’s parenting time with a minor child if the court finds that respondent has done or is likely to do any of the following: (i) abuse or endanger the minor child during parenting time; (ii) use the parenting time as an opportunity to abuse or harass petitioner or petitioner’s family or household members; (iii) improperly conceal or detain the minor child; or (iv) otherwise act in a manner that is not in the best interests of the minor child. The court shall not be limited by the standards set forth in Section 603.10 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.6 If the court grants parenting time, the order shall specify dates and times for the parenting time to take place or other specific parameters or conditions that are appropriate. No order for parenting time shall refer merely to the term “reasonable parenting time”.

Petitioner may deny respondent access to the minor child if, when respondent arrives for parenting time, respondent is under the influence of drugs or alcohol and constitutes a threat to the safety and well-being of petitioner or petitioner’s minor children or is behaving in a violent or abusive manner.

If necessary to protect any member of petitioner’s family or household from future abuse, respondent shall be prohibited from coming to petitioner’s residence to meet the minor child for parenting time, and the parties shall submit to the court their recommendations for reasonable alternative arrangements for parenting time. A person may be approved to supervise parenting time only after filing an affidavit accepting that responsibility and acknowledging accountability to the court.

(8) Removal or concealment of minor child. Prohibit respondent from removing a minor child from the State or concealing the child within the State.

(9) Order to appear. Order the respondent to appear in court, alone or with a minor child, to prevent abuse, neglect, removal or concealment of the child, to return the child to the custody or care of the petitioner or to permit any court-ordered interview or examination of the child or the respondent.

(10) Possession of personal property. Grant petitioner exclusive possession of personal property and, if respondent has possession or control, direct respondent to promptly make it available to petitioner, if:

(i) petitioner, but not respondent, owns the property; or

(ii) the parties own the property jointly; sharing it would risk abuse of petitioner by respondent or is impracticable; and the balance of hardships favors temporary possession by petitioner.

If petitioner’s sole claim to ownership of the property is that it is marital property, the court may award petitioner temporary possession thereof under the standards of subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph only if a proper proceeding has been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended.

No order under this provision shall affect title to property.

(11) Protection of property. Forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, damaging or otherwise disposing of any real or personal property, except as explicitly authorized by the court, if:

(i) petitioner, but not respondent, owns the property; or

(ii) the parties own the property jointly, and the balance of hardships favors granting this remedy.

If petitioner’s sole claim to ownership of the property is that it is marital property, the court may grant petitioner relief under subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph only if a proper proceeding has been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended.

The court may further prohibit respondent from improperly using the financial or other resources of an aged member of the family or household for the profit or advantage of respondent or of any other person.

(11.5) Protection of animals. Grant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.

(12) Order for payment of support. Order respondent to pay temporary support for the petitioner or any child in the petitioner’s care or over whom the petitioner has been allocated parental responsibility, when the respondent has a legal obligation to support that person, in accordance with the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which shall govern, among other matters, the amount of support, payment through the clerk and withholding of income to secure payment. An order for child support may be granted to a petitioner with lawful physical care of a child, or an order or agreement for physical care of a child, prior to entry of an order allocating significant decision-making responsibility. Such a support order shall expire upon entry of a valid order allocating parental responsibility differently and vacating the petitioner’s significant decision-making authority, unless otherwise provided in the order.

(13) Order for payment of losses. Order respondent to pay petitioner for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Such losses shall include, but not be limited to, medical expenses, lost earnings or other support, repair or replacement of property damaged or taken, reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs and moving or other travel expenses, including additional reasonable expenses for temporary shelter and restaurant meals.

(i) Losses affecting family needs. If a party is entitled to seek maintenance, child support or property distribution from the other party under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended, the court may order respondent to reimburse petitioner’s actual losses, to the extent that such reimbursement would be “appropriate temporary relief”, as authorized by subsection (a)(3) of Section 501 of that Act.

(ii) Recovery of expenses. In the case of an improper concealment or removal of a minor child, the court may order respondent to pay the reasonable expenses incurred or to be incurred in the search for and recovery of the minor child, including but not limited to legal fees, court costs, private investigator fees, and travel costs.

(14) Prohibition of entry. Prohibit the respondent from entering or remaining in the residence or household while the respondent is under the influence of alcohol or drugs and constitutes a threat to the safety and well-being of the petitioner or the petitioner’s children.

(14.5) Prohibition of firearm possession.

(a) Prohibit a respondent against whom an order of protection was issued from possessing any firearms during the duration of the order if the order:

(1) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;

(2) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and

(3)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.

Any Firearm Owner’s Identification Card in the possession of the respondent, except as provided in subsection (b), shall be ordered by the court to be turned over to the local law enforcement agency. The local law enforcement agency shall immediately mail the card to the Department of State Police Firearm Owner’s Identification Card Office for safekeeping. The court shall issue a warrant for seizure of any firearm in the possession of the respondent, to be kept by the local law enforcement agency for safekeeping, except as provided in subsection (b). The period of safekeeping shall be for the duration of the order of protection. The firearm or firearms and Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, if unexpired, shall at the respondent’s request, be returned to the respondent at the end of the order of protection. It is the respondent’s responsibility to notify the Department of State Police Firearm Owner’s Identification Card Office.

(b) If the respondent is a peace officer as defined in Section 2-13 of the Criminal Code of 2012,7 the court shall order that any firearms used by the respondent in the performance of his or her duties as a peace officer be surrendered to the chief law enforcement executive of the agency in which the respondent is employed, who shall retain the firearms for safekeeping for the duration of the order of protection.

(c) Upon expiration of the period of safekeeping, if the firearms or Firearm Owner’s Identification Card cannot be returned to respondent because respondent cannot be located, fails to respond to requests to retrieve the firearms, or is not lawfully eligible to possess a firearm, upon petition from the local law enforcement agency, the court may order the local law enforcement agency to destroy the firearms, use the firearms for training purposes, or for any other application as deemed appropriate by the local law enforcement agency; or that the firearms be turned over to a third party who is lawfully eligible to possess firearms, and who does not reside with respondent.

(15) Prohibition of access to records. If an order of protection prohibits respondent from having contact with the minor child, or if petitioner’s address is omitted under subsection (b) of Section 203, or if necessary to prevent abuse or wrongful removal or concealment of a minor child, the order shall deny respondent access to, and prohibit respondent from inspecting, obtaining, or attempting to inspect or obtain, school or any other records of the minor child who is in the care of petitioner.

(16) Order for payment of shelter services. Order respondent to reimburse a shelter providing temporary housing and counseling services to the petitioner for the cost of the services, as certified by the shelter and deemed reasonable by the court.

(17) Order for injunctive relief. Enter injunctive relief necessary or appropriate to prevent further abuse of a family or household member or further abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a high-risk adult with disabilities or to effectuate one of the granted remedies, if supported by the balance of hardships. If the harm to be prevented by the injunction is abuse or any other harm that one of the remedies listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of this subsection is designed to prevent, no further evidence is necessary that the harm is an irreparable injury.

(18) Telephone services.

(A) Unless a condition described in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph exists, the court may, upon request by the petitioner, order a wireless telephone service provider to transfer to the petitioner the right to continue to use a telephone number or numbers indicated by the petitioner and the financial responsibility associated with the number or numbers, as set forth in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph. For purposes of this paragraph (18), the term “wireless telephone service provider” means a provider of commercial mobile service as defined in 47 U.S.C. 332. The petitioner may request the transfer of each telephone number that the petitioner, or a minor child in his or her custody, uses. The clerk of the court shall serve the order on the wireless telephone service provider’s agent for service of process provided to the Illinois Commerce Commission. The order shall contain all of the following:

(i) The name and billing telephone number of the account holder including the name of the wireless telephone service provider that serves the account.

(ii) Each telephone number that will be transferred.

(iii) A statement that the provider transfers to the petitioner all financial responsibility for and right to the use of any telephone number transferred under this paragraph.

(B) A wireless telephone service provider shall terminate the respondent’s use of, and shall transfer to the petitioner use of, the telephone number or numbers indicated in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph unless it notifies the petitioner, within 72 hours after it receives the order, that one of the following applies:

(i) The account holder named in the order has terminated the account.

(ii) A difference in network technology would prevent or impair the functionality of a device on a network if the transfer occurs.

(iii) The transfer would cause a geographic or other limitation on network or service provision to the petitioner.

(iv) Another technological or operational issue would prevent or impair the use of the telephone number if the transfer occurs.

(C) The petitioner assumes all financial responsibility for and right to the use of any telephone number transferred under this paragraph. In this paragraph, “financial responsibility” includes monthly service costs and costs associated with any mobile device associated with the number.

(D) A wireless telephone service provider may apply to the petitioner its routine and customary requirements for establishing an account or transferring a number, including requiring the petitioner to provide proof of identification, financial information, and customer preferences.

(E) Except for willful or wanton misconduct, a wireless telephone service provider is immune from civil liability for its actions taken in compliance with a court order issued under this paragraph.

(F) All wireless service providers that provide services to residential customers shall provide to the Illinois Commerce Commission the name and address of an agent for service of orders entered under this paragraph (18). Any change in status of the registered agent must be reported to the Illinois Commerce Commission within 30 days of such change.

(G) The Illinois Commerce Commission shall maintain the list of registered agents for service for each wireless telephone service provider on the Commission’s website. The Commission may consult with wireless telephone service providers and the Circuit Court Clerks on the manner in which this information is provided and displayed.

(c) Relevant factors; findings.

(1) In determining whether to grant a specific remedy, other than payment of support, the court shall consider relevant factors, including but not limited to the following:

(i) the nature, frequency, severity, pattern and consequences of the respondent’s past abuse, neglect or exploitation of the petitioner or any family or household member, including the concealment of his or her location in order to evade service of process or notice, and the likelihood of danger of future abuse, neglect, or exploitation to petitioner or any member of petitioner’s or respondent’s family or household; and

(ii) the danger that any minor child will be abused or neglected or improperly relocated from the jurisdiction, improperly concealed within the State or improperly separated from the child’s primary caretaker.

(2) In comparing relative hardships resulting to the parties from loss of possession of the family home, the court shall consider relevant factors, including but not limited to the following:

(i) availability, accessibility, cost, safety, adequacy, location and other characteristics of alternate housing for each party and any minor child or dependent adult in the party’s care;

(ii) the effect on the party’s employment; and

(iii) the effect on the relationship of the party, and any minor child or dependent adult in the party’s care, to family, school, church and community.

(3) Subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection, the court shall make its findings in an official record or in writing, and shall at a minimum set forth the following:

(i) That the court has considered the applicable relevant factors described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.

(ii) Whether the conduct or actions of respondent, unless prohibited, will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse.

(iii) Whether it is necessary to grant the requested relief in order to protect petitioner or other alleged abused persons.

(4) For purposes of issuing an ex parte emergency order of protection, the court, as an alternative to or as a supplement to making the findings described in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) through (c)(3)(iii) of this subsection, may use the following procedure:

When a verified petition for an emergency order of protection in accordance with the requirements of Sections 203 and 217 is presented to the court, the court shall examine petitioner on oath or affirmation. An emergency order of protection shall be issued by the court if it appears from the contents of the petition and the examination of petitioner that the averments are sufficient to indicate abuse by respondent and to support the granting of relief under the issuance of the emergency order of protection.

(5) Never married parties. No rights or responsibilities for a minor child born outside of marriage attach to a putative father until a father and child relationship has been established under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, the Illinois Public Aid Code,8 Section 12 of the Vital Records Act,9 the Juvenile Court Act of 1987,10 the Probate Act of 1975, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,11 the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,12 the Expedited Child Support Act of 1990,13 any judicial, administrative, or other act of another state or territory, any other Illinois statute, or by any foreign nation establishing the father and child relationship, any other proceeding substantially in conformity with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-193), or where both parties appeared in open court or at an administrative hearing acknowledging under oath or admitting by affirmation the existence of a father and child relationship. Absent such an adjudication, finding, or acknowledgment, no putative father shall be granted temporary allocation of parental responsibilities, including parenting time with the minor child, or physical care and possession of the minor child, nor shall an order of payment for support of the minor child be entered.

(d) Balance of hardships; findings. If the court finds that the balance of hardships does not support the granting of a remedy governed by paragraph (2), (3), (10), (11), or (16) of subsection (b) of this Section, which may require such balancing, the court’s findings shall so indicate and shall include a finding as to whether granting the remedy will result in hardship to respondent that would substantially outweigh the hardship to petitioner from denial of the remedy. The findings shall be an official record or in writing.

(e) Denial of remedies. Denial of any remedy shall not be based, in whole or in part, on evidence that:

(1) Respondent has cause for any use of force, unless that cause satisfies the standards for justifiable use of force provided by Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;14

(2) Respondent was voluntarily intoxicated;

(3) Petitioner acted in self-defense or defense of another, provided that, if petitioner utilized force, such force was justifiable under Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;

(4) Petitioner did not act in self-defense or defense of another;

(5) Petitioner left the residence or household to avoid further abuse, neglect, or exploitation by respondent;

(6) Petitioner did not leave the residence or household to avoid further abuse, neglect, or exploitation by respondent;(7) Conduct by any family or household member excused the abuse, neglect, or exploitation by respondent, unless that same conduct would have excused such abuse, neglect, or exploitation if the parties had not been family or household members.

60/215. Mutual orders of protection; correlative separate orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Mutual orders of protection are prohibited. Correlative separate orders of protection undermine the purposes of this Act and are prohibited unless both parties have properly filed written pleadings, proved past abuse by the other party, given prior written notice to the other party unless excused under Section 217, satisfied all prerequisites for the type of order and each remedy granted, and otherwise complied with this Act. In these cases, the court shall hear relevant evidence, make findings, and issue separate orders in accordance with Sections 214 and 221. The fact that correlative separate orders are issued shall not be a sufficient basis to deny any remedy to petitioner or to prove that the parties are equally at fault or equally endangered.

60/216. Accountability for Actions of Others

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

For the purposes of issuing an order of protection, deciding what remedies should be included and enforcing the order, Article 5 of the Criminal Code of 20121 shall govern whether respondent is legally accountable for the conduct of another person.

60/217. Emergency order of protection

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Prerequisites. An emergency order of protection shall issue if petitioner satisfies the requirements of this subsection for one or more of the requested remedies. For each remedy requested, petitioner shall establish that:

(1) The court has jurisdiction under Section 208;

(2) The requirements of Section 214 are satisfied; and

(3) There is good cause to grant the remedy, regardless of prior service of process or of notice upon the respondent, because:

(i) For the remedies of “prohibition of abuse” described in Section 214(b)(1), “stay away order and additional prohibitions” described in Section 214(b)(3), “removal or concealment of minor child” described in Section 214(b)(8), “order to appear” described in Section 214(b)(9), “physical care and possession of the minor child” described in Section 214(b)(5), “protection of property” described in Section 214(b)(11), “prohibition of entry” described in Section 214(b)(14), “prohibition of firearm possession” described in Section 214(b)(14.5), “prohibition of access to records” described in Section 214(b)(15), and “injunctive relief” described in Section 214(b)(16), the harm which that remedy is intended to prevent would be likely to occur if the respondent were given any prior notice, or greater notice than was actually given, of the petitioner’s efforts to obtain judicial relief;

(ii) For the remedy of “grant of exclusive possession of residence” described in Section 214(b)(2), the immediate danger of further abuse of petitioner by respondent, if petitioner chooses or had chosen to remain in the residence or household while respondent was given any prior notice or greater notice than was actually given of petitioner’s efforts to obtain judicial relief, outweighs the hardships to respondent of an emergency order granting petitioner exclusive possession of the residence or household. This remedy shall not be denied because petitioner has or could obtain temporary shelter elsewhere while prior notice is given to respondent, unless the hardships to respondent from exclusion from the home substantially outweigh those to petitioner;

(iii) For the remedy of “possession of personal property” described in Section 214(b)(10), improper disposition of the personal property would be likely to occur if respondent were given any prior notice, or greater notice than was actually given, of petitioner’s efforts to obtain judicial relief, or petitioner has an immediate and pressing need for possession of that property.

An emergency order may not include the counseling, legal custody, payment of support or monetary compensation remedies.

(a-5) When a petition for an emergency order of protection is granted, the order shall not be publicly available until the order is served on the respondent.

(b) Appearance by respondent. If respondent appears in court for this hearing for an emergency order, he or she may elect to file a general appearance and testify. Any resulting order may be an emergency order, governed by this Section. Notwithstanding the requirements of this Section, if all requirements of Section 218 have been met, the court may issue a 30-day interim order.

(c) Emergency orders: court holidays and evenings.

(1) Prerequisites. When the court is unavailable at the close of business, the petitioner may file a petition for a 21-day emergency order before any available circuit judge or associate judge who may grant relief under this Act. If the judge finds that there is an immediate and present danger of abuse to petitioner and that petitioner has satisfied the prerequisites set forth in subsection (a) of Section 217, that judge may issue an emergency order of protection.

(1.5) Issuance of order. The chief judge of the circuit court may designate for each county in the circuit at least one judge to be reasonably available to issue orally, by telephone, by facsimile, or otherwise, an emergency order of protection at all times, whether or not the court is in session.

(2) Certification and transfer. The judge who issued the order under this Section shall promptly communicate or convey the order to the sheriff to facilitate the entry of the order into the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System by the Department of State Police pursuant to Section 302. Any order issued under this Section and any documentation in support thereof shall be certified on the next court day to the appropriate court. The clerk of that court shall immediately assign a case number, file the petition, order and other documents with the court, and enter the order of record and file it with the sheriff for service, in accordance with Section 222. Filing the petition shall commence proceedings for further relief under Section 202. Failure to comply with the requirements of this subsection shall not affect the validity of the order.

60/218. 30-Day interim order of protection

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Prerequisites. An interim order of protection shall issue if petitioner has served notice of the hearing for that order on respondent, in accordance with Section 211, and satisfies the requirements of this subsection for one or more of the requested remedies. For each remedy requested, petitioner shall establish that:
(1) The court has jurisdiction under Section 208;
(2) The requirements of Section 214 are satisfied; and
(3) A general appearance was made or filed by or for respondent; or process was served on respondent in the manner required by Section 210; or the petitioner is diligently attempting to complete the required service of process. An interim order may not include the counseling, payment of support or monetary compensation remedies, unless the respondent has filed a general appearance or has been personally served.
(b) Appearance by respondent. If respondent appears in court for this hearing for an interim order, he or she may elect to file a general appearance and testify. Any resulting order may be an interim order, governed by this Section. Notwithstanding the requirements of this Section, if all requirements of Section 219 have been met, the Court may issue a plenary order of protection.

60/219. Plenary Order of Protection

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Plenary order of protection. A plenary order of protection shall issue if petitioner has served notice of the hearing for that order on respondent, in accordance with Section 211, and satisfies the requirements of this Section for one or more of the requested remedies. For each remedy requested, petitioner must establish that:

(1) the court has jurisdiction under Section 208;

(2) the requirements of Section 214 are satisfied;

(3) a general appearance was made or filed by or for respondent or process was served on respondent in the manner required by Section 210; and

(4) respondent has answered or is in default.

60/220. Duration and extension of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Duration of emergency and interim orders. Unless re-opened or extended or voided by entry of an order of greater duration:
(1) Emergency orders issued under Section 217 shall be effective for not less than 14 nor more than 21 days;
(2) Interim orders shall be effective for up to 30 days.
(b) Duration of plenary orders.
(0.05) A plenary order of protection entered under this Act shall be valid for a fixed period of time, not to exceed two years.
(1) A plenary order of protection entered in conjunction with another civil proceeding shall remain in effect as follows:
(i) if entered as preliminary relief in that other proceeding, until entry of final judgment in that other proceeding;
(ii) if incorporated into the final judgment in that other proceeding, until the order of protection is vacated or modified; or
(iii) if incorporated in an order for involuntary commitment, until termination of both the involuntary commitment and any voluntary commitment, or for a fixed period of time not exceeding 2 years.
(2) Duration of an order of protection entered in conjunction with a criminal prosecution or delinquency petition shall remain in effect as provided in Section 112A-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
(c) Computation of time. The duration of an order of protection shall not be reduced by the duration of any prior order of protection.
(d) Law enforcement records. When a plenary order of protection expires upon the occurrence of a specified event, rather than upon a specified date as provided in subsection (b), no expiration date shall be entered in Department of State Police records. To remove the plenary order from those records, either party shall request the clerk of the court to file a certified copy of an order stating that the specified event has occurred or that the plenary order has been vacated or modified with the Sheriff, and the Sheriff shall direct that law enforcement records shall be promptly corrected in accordance with the filed order.
(e) Extension of orders. Any emergency, interim or plenary order may be extended one or more times, as required, provided that the requirements of Section 217, 218 or 219, as appropriate, are satisfied. If the motion for extension is uncontested and petitioner seeks no modification of the order, the order may be extended on the basis of petitioner’s motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension. An extension of a plenary order of protection may be granted, upon good cause shown, to remain in effect until the order of protection is vacated or modified. Extensions may be granted only in open court and not under the provisions of subsection (c) of Section 217, which applies only when the court is unavailable at the close of business or on a court holiday.
(f) Termination date. Any order of protection which would expire on a court holiday shall instead expire at the close of the next court business day.
(g) Statement of purpose. The practice of dismissing or suspending a criminal prosecution in exchange for the issuance of an order of protection undermines the purposes of this Act. This Section shall not be construed as encouraging that practice.

60/221. Contents of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Any order of protection shall describe the following:
(1) Each remedy granted by the court, in reasonable detail and not by reference to any other document, so that respondent may clearly understand what he or she must do or refrain from doing. Pre-printed form orders of protection shall include the definitions of the types of abuse, neglect, and exploitation, as provided in Section 103. Remedies set forth in pre-printed form orders shall be numbered consistently with and corresponding to the numerical sequence of remedies listed in Section 214 (at least as of the date the form orders are printed).
(2) The reason for denial of petitioner’s request for any remedy listed in Section 214.
(b) An order of protection shall further state the following:
(1) The name of each petitioner that the court finds was abused, neglected, or exploited by respondent, and that respondent is a member of the family or household of each such petitioner, and the name of each other person protected by the order and that such person is protected by this Act.
(2) For any remedy requested by petitioner on which the court has declined to rule, that that remedy is reserved.
(3) The date and time the order of protection was issued, whether it is an emergency, interim or plenary order and the duration of the order.
(4) The date, time and place for any scheduled hearing for extension of that order of protection or for another order of greater duration or scope.
(5) For each remedy in an emergency order of protection, the reason for entering that remedy without prior notice to respondent or greater notice than was actually given.
(6) For emergency and interim orders of protection, that respondent may petition the court, in accordance with Section 224, to re-open that order if he or she did not receive actual prior notice of the hearing, in accordance with Section 211, and alleges that he or she had a meritorious defense to the order or that the order or any of its remedies was not authorized by this Act.
(c) Any order of protection shall include the following notice, printed in conspicuous type: “Any knowing violation of an order of protection forbidding physical abuse, neglect, exploitation, harassment, intimidation, interference with personal liberty, willful deprivation, or entering or remaining present at specified places when the protected person is present, or granting exclusive possession of the residence or household, or granting a stay away order is a Class A misdemeanor. Grant of exclusive possession of the residence or household shall constitute notice forbidding trespass to land. Any knowing violation of an order awarding legal custody or physical care of a child or prohibiting removal or concealment of a child may be a Class 4 felony. Any willful violation of any order is contempt of court. Any violation may result in fine or imprisonment.”

(d) An emergency order of protection shall state, “This Order of Protection is enforceable, even without registration, in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and the U.S. territories pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act (18 U.S.C. 2265). Violating this Order of Protection may subject the respondent to federal charges and punishment (18 U.S.C. 2261-2262).”

(e) An interim or plenary order of protection shall state, “This Order of Protection is enforceable, even without registration, in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and the U.S. territories pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act (18 U.S.C. 2265). Violating this Order of Protection may subject the respondent to federal charges and punishment (18 U.S.C. 2261-2262). The respondent may be subject to federal criminal penalties for possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving any firearm or ammunition under the Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) and (9)).”

60/222. Notice of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Entry and issuance. Upon issuance of any order of protection, the clerk shall immediately (i) enter the order on the record and file it in accordance with the circuit court procedures and (ii) provide a file stamped copy of the order to respondent, if present, and to petitioner.

(b) Filing with sheriff. The clerk of the issuing judge shall, or the petitioner may, on the same day that an order of protection is issued, file a certified copy of that order with the sheriff or other law enforcement officials charged with maintaining Department of State Police records or charged with serving the order upon respondent. If the respondent, at the time of the issuance of the order, is committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections or Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice or is on parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release, the sheriff or other law enforcement officials charged with maintaining Department of State Police records shall notify the Department of Corrections or Department of Juvenile Justice within 48 hours of receipt of a copy of the order of protection from the clerk of the issuing judge or the petitioner. Such notice shall include the name of the respondent, the respondent’s IDOC inmate number or IDJJ youth identification number, the respondent’s date of birth, and the LEADS Record Index Number.

(c) Service by sheriff. Unless respondent was present in court when the order was issued, the sheriff, other law enforcement official or special process server shall promptly serve that order upon respondent and file proof of such service, in the manner provided for service of process in civil proceedings. Instead of serving the order upon the respondent, however, the sheriff, other law enforcement official, special process server, or other persons defined in Section 222.10 may serve the respondent with a short form notification as provided in Section 222.10. If process has not yet been served upon the respondent, it shall be served with the order or short form notification if such service is made by the sheriff, other law enforcement official, or special process server. A single fee may be charged for service of an order obtained in civil court, or for service of such an order together with process, unless waived or deferred under Section 210.

(c-5) If the person against whom the order of protection is issued is arrested and the written order is issued in accordance with subsection (c) of Section 217 and received by the custodial law enforcement agency before the respondent or arrestee is released from custody, the custodial law enforcement agent shall promptly serve the order upon the respondent or arrestee before the respondent or arrestee is released from custody. In no event shall detention of the respondent or arrestee be extended for hearing on the petition for order of protection or receipt of the order issued under Section 217 of this Act.

(d) Extensions, modifications and revocations. Any order extending, modifying or revoking any order of protection shall be promptly recorded, issued and served as provided in this Section.

(e) Notice to schools. Upon the request of the petitioner, within 24 hours of the issuance of an order of protection, the clerk of the issuing judge shall send a certified copy of the order of protection to the day-care facility, pre-school or pre-kindergarten, or private school or the principal office of the public school district or any college or university in which any child who is a protected person under the order of protection or any child of the petitioner is enrolled as requested by the petitioner at the mailing address provided by the petitioner. If the child transfers enrollment to another day-care facility, pre-school, pre-kindergarten, private school, public school, college, or university, the petitioner may, within 24 hours of the transfer, send to the clerk written notice of the transfer, including the name and address of the institution to which the child is transferring. Within 24 hours of receipt of notice from the petitioner that a child is transferring to another day-care facility, pre-school, pre-kindergarten, private school, public school, college, or university, the clerk shall send a certified copy of the order to the institution to which the child is transferring.

(f) Disclosure by schools. After receiving a certified copy of an order of protection that prohibits a respondent’s access to records, neither a day-care facility, pre-school, pre-kindergarten, public or private school, college, or university nor its employees shall allow a respondent access to a protected child’s records or release information in those records to the respondent. The school shall file the copy of the order of protection in the records of a child who is a protected person under the order of protection. When a child who is a protected person under the order of protection transfers to another day-care facility, pre-school, pre-kindergarten, public or private school, college, or university, the institution from which the child is transferring may, at the request of the petitioner, provide, within 24 hours of the transfer, written notice of the order of protection, along with a certified copy of the order, to the institution to which the child is transferring.

(g) Notice to health care facilities and health care practitioners. Upon the request of the petitioner, the clerk of the circuit court shall send a certified copy of the order of protection to any specified health care facility or health care practitioner requested by the petitioner at the mailing address provided by the petitioner.(h) Disclosure by health care facilities and health care practitioners. After receiving a certified copy of an order of protection that prohibits a respondent’s access to records, no health care facility or health care practitioner shall allow a respondent access to the records of any child who is a protected person under the order of protection, or release information in those records to the respondent, unless the order has expired or the respondent shows a certified copy of the court order vacating the corresponding order of protection that was sent to the health care facility or practitioner. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require health care facilities or health care practitioners to alter procedures related to billing and payment. The health care facility or health care practitioner may file the copy of the order of protection in the records of a child who is a protected person under the order of protection, or may employ any other method to identify the records to which a respondent is prohibited access. No health care facility or health care practitioner shall be civilly or professionally liable for reliance on a copy of an order of protection, except for willful and wanton misconduct.

60/222.5. Filing of an order of protection issued in another state

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A person entitled to protection under an order of protection issued by the court of another state, tribe, or United States territory may file a certified copy of the order of protection with the clerk of the court in a judicial circuit in which the person believes that enforcement may be necessary.
(b) The clerk shall:
(1) treat the foreign order of protection in the same manner as a judgment of the circuit court for any county of this State in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, except that the clerk shall not mail notice of the filing of the foreign order to the respondent named in the order; and
(2) on the same day that a foreign order of protection is filed, file a certified copy of that order with the sheriff or other law enforcement officials charged with maintaining Department of State Police records as set forth in Section 222 of this Act.
(c) Neither residence in this State nor filing of a foreign order of protection shall be required for enforcement of the order by this State. Failure to file the foreign order shall not be an impediment to its treatment in all respects as an Illinois order of protection.
(d) The clerk shall not charge a fee to file a foreign order of protection under this Section.
(e) The sheriff shall inform the Department of State Police as set forth in Section 302 of this Act.

60/222.10. Short form notification

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Instead of personal service of an order of protection under Section 222, a sheriff, other law enforcement official, special process server, or personnel assigned by the Department of Corrections or Department of Juvenile Justice to investigate the alleged misconduct of committed persons or alleged violations of a parolee’s or releasee’s conditions of parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release may serve a respondent with a short form notification. The short form notification must include the following items:

(1) The respondent’s name.

(2) The respondent’s date of birth, if known.

(3) The petitioner’s name.

(4) The names of other protected parties.

(5) The date and county in which the order of protection was filed.

(6) The court file number.

(7) The hearing date and time, if known.

(8) The conditions that apply to the respondent, either in checklist form or handwritten.

(b) The short form notification must contain the following notice in bold print:

“The order is now enforceable. You must report to the office of the sheriff or the office of the circuit court in (name of county) County to obtain a copy of the order. You are subject to arrest and may be charged with a misdemeanor or felony if you violate any of the terms of the order.”

(c) Upon verification of the identity of the respondent and the existence of an unserved order against the respondent, a sheriff or other law enforcement official may detain the respondent for a reasonable time necessary to complete and serve the short form notification.

(d) When service is made by short form notification under this Section, it may be proved by the affidavit of the person making the service.

(e) The Attorney General shall make the short form notification form available to law enforcement agencies in this State.

(f) A single short form notification form may be used for orders of protection under this Act, stalking no contact orders under the Stalking No Contact Order Act, and civil no contact orders under the Civil No Contact Order Act.

60/223. Enforcement of orders of protection

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 223. Enforcement of orders of protection.

(a) When violation is crime. A violation of any order of protection, whether issued in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be enforced by a criminal court when:

(1) The respondent commits the crime of violation of an order of protection pursuant to Section 12-3.4 or 12-30 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012,1 by having knowingly violated:

(i) remedies described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (14), or (14.5) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of this Act; or

(ii) a remedy, which is substantially similar to the remedies authorized under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (14), and (14.5) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of this Act, in a valid order of protection which is authorized under the laws of another state, tribe, or United States territory; or

(iii) any other remedy when the act constitutes a crime against the protected parties as defined by the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.2

Prosecution for a violation of an order of protection shall not bar concurrent prosecution for any other crime, including any crime that may have been committed at the time of the violation of the order of protection; or

(2) The respondent commits the crime of child abduction pursuant to Section 10-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012,3 by having knowingly violated:

(i) remedies described in paragraphs (5), (6) or (8) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of this Act; or

(ii) a remedy, which is substantially similar to the remedies authorized under paragraphs (5), (6), or (8) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of this Act, in a valid order of protection which is authorized under the laws of another state, tribe, or United States territory.

(b) When violation is contempt of court. A violation of any valid Illinois order of protection, whether issued in a civil or criminal proceeding, may be enforced through civil or criminal contempt procedures, as appropriate, by any court with jurisdiction, regardless where the act or acts which violated the order of protection were committed, to the extent consistent with the venue provisions of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall preclude any Illinois court from enforcing any valid order of protection issued in another state. Illinois courts may enforce orders of protection through both criminal prosecution and contempt proceedings, unless the action which is second in time is barred by collateral estoppel or the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

(1) In a contempt proceeding where the petition for a rule to show cause sets forth facts evidencing an immediate danger that the respondent will flee the jurisdiction, conceal a child, or inflict physical abuse on the petitioner or minor children or on dependent adults in petitioner’s care, the court may order the attachment of the respondent without prior service of the rule to show cause or the petition for a rule to show cause. Bond shall be set unless specifically denied in writing.

(2) A petition for a rule to show cause for violation of an order of protection shall be treated as an expedited proceeding.

(b-1) The court shall not hold a school district or private or non-public school or any of its employees in civil or criminal contempt unless the school district or private or non-public school has been allowed to intervene.

(b-2) The court may hold the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent in civil or criminal contempt for a violation of any provision of any order entered under this Act for conduct of the minor respondent in violation of this Act if the parents, guardian, or legal custodian directed, encouraged, or assisted the respondent minor in such conduct.

(c) Violation of custody or support orders or temporary or final judgments allocating parental responsibilities. A violation of remedies described in paragraphs (5), (6), (8), or (9) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of this Act may be enforced by any remedy provided by Section 607.5 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.4 The court may enforce any order for support issued under paragraph (12) of subsection (b) of Section 214 in the manner provided for under Parts V and VII of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.5

(d) Actual knowledge. An order of protection may be enforced pursuant to this Section if the respondent violates the order after the respondent has actual knowledge of its contents as shown through one of the following means:

(1) By service, delivery, or notice under Section 210.

(2) By notice under Section 210.1 or 211.

(3) By service of an order of protection under Section 222.

(4) By other means demonstrating actual knowledge of the contents of the order.

(e) The enforcement of an order of protection in civil or criminal court shall not be affected by either of the following:

(1) The existence of a separate, correlative order, entered under Section 215.

(2) Any finding or order entered in a conjoined criminal proceeding.

(f) Circumstances. The court, when determining whether or not a violation of an order of protection has occurred, shall not require physical manifestations of abuse on the person of the victim.

(g) Penalties.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, where the court finds the commission of a crime or contempt of court under subsections (a) or (b) of this Section, the penalty shall be the penalty that generally applies in such criminal or contempt proceedings, and may include one or more of the following: incarceration, payment of restitution, a fine, payment of attorneys’ fees and costs, or community service.

(2) The court shall hear and take into account evidence of any factors in aggravation or mitigation before deciding an appropriate penalty under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(3) To the extent permitted by law, the court is encouraged to:

(i) increase the penalty for the knowing violation of any order of protection over any penalty previously imposed by any court for respondent’s violation of any order of protection or penal statute involving petitioner as victim and respondent as defendant;

(ii) impose a minimum penalty of 24 hours imprisonment for respondent’s first violation of any order of protection; and

(iii) impose a minimum penalty of 48 hours imprisonment for respondent’s second or subsequent violation of an order of protection

unless the court explicitly finds that an increased penalty or that period of imprisonment would be manifestly unjust.

(4) In addition to any other penalties imposed for a violation of an order of protection, a criminal court may consider evidence of any violations of an order of protection:

(i) to increase, revoke or modify the bail bond on an underlying criminal charge pursuant to Section 110-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963;6

(ii) to revoke or modify an order of probation, conditional discharge or supervision, pursuant to Section 5-6-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections;7

(iii) to revoke or modify a sentence of periodic imprisonment, pursuant to Section 5-7-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections.8(5) In addition to any other penalties, the court shall impose an additional fine of $20 as authorized by Section 5-9-1.11 of the Unified Code of Corrections9 upon any person convicted of or placed on supervision for a violation of an order of protection. The additional fine shall be imposed for each violation of this Section.

60/223.1. Order of protection; status

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Whenever relief is sought under this Act, the court, before granting relief, shall determine whether any order of protection has previously been entered in the instant proceeding or any other proceeding in which any party, or a child of any party, or both, if relevant, has been designated as either a respondent or a protected person.

60/224. Modification and re-opening of orders

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, upon motion by petitioner, the court may modify an emergency, interim, or plenary order of protection:

(1) If respondent has abused petitioner since the hearing for that order, by adding or altering one or more remedies, as authorized by Section 214; and

(2) Otherwise, by adding any remedy authorized by Section 214 which was:

(i) reserved in that order of protection;

(ii) not requested for inclusion in that order of protection; or

(iii) denied on procedural grounds, but not on the merits.

(b) Upon motion by petitioner or respondent, the court may modify any prior order of protection’s remedy for custody, visitation or payment of support in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. [FN1] Each order of protection shall be entered in the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System on the same day it is issued by the court.

(c) After 30 days following entry of a plenary order of protection, a court may modify that order only when changes in the applicable law or facts since that plenary order was entered warrant a modification of its terms.

(d) Upon 2 days’ notice to petitioner, in accordance with Section 211 of this Act, or such shorter notice as the court may prescribe, a respondent subject to an emergency or interim order of protection issued under this Act may appear and petition the court to re-hear the original or amended petition. Any petition to re-hear shall be verified and shall allege the following:

(1) that respondent did not receive prior notice of the initial hearing in which the emergency, interim, or plenary order was entered under Sections 211 and 217; and

(2) that respondent had a meritorious defense to the order or any of its remedies or that the order or any of its remedies was not authorized by this Act.

(e) In the event that the emergency or interim order granted petitioner exclusive possession and the petition of respondent seeks to re-open or vacate that grant, the court shall set a date for hearing within 14 days on all issues relating to exclusive possession. Under no circumstances shall a court continue a hearing concerning exclusive possession beyond the 14th day, except by agreement of the parties. Other issues raised by the pleadings may be consolidated for the hearing if neither party nor the court objects.

(f) This Section does not limit the means, otherwise available by law, for vacating or modifying orders of protection.

60/225. Immunity from prosecution

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Any individual or organization acting in good faith to report the abuse of any person 60 years of age or older or to do any of the following in complying with the provisions of this Act shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability as a result of such action: providing any information to the appropriate law enforcement agency, providing that the giving of any information does not violate any privilege of confidentiality under law; assisting in any investigation; assisting in the preparation of any materials for distribution under this Act; or by providing services ordered under an order of protection. Any individual, agency, or organization acting in good faith to report or investigate alleged abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a high-risk adult with disabilities, to testify in any proceeding on behalf of a high-risk adult with disabilities, to take photographs or perform an examination, or to perform any other act in compliance with the provisions of this Act shall not be the subject of criminal prosecution, civil liability, or other penalty, sanction, restriction, or retaliation as a result of such action.

60/226. . Untrue statements

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the payment of reasonable expenses actually incurred by the other party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be summarily taxed by the court upon motion made within 30 days of the judgment or dismissal, as provided in Supreme Court Rule 137. The court may direct that a copy of an order entered under this Section be provided to the State’s Attorney so that he or she may determine whether to prosecute for perjury. This Section shall not apply to proceedings heard in Criminal Court or to criminal contempt of court proceedings, whether heard in Civil or Criminal Court.

60/227. Privileged communications between domestic violence counselors and victims

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) As used in this Section:

(1) “Domestic violence program” means any unit of local government, organization, or association whose major purpose is to provide one or more of the following: information, crisis intervention, emergency shelter, referral, counseling, advocacy, or emotional support to victims of domestic violence.
(2) “Domestic violence advocate or counselor” means any person
(A) who has undergone a minimum of forty hours of training in domestic violence advocacy, crisis intervention, and related areas, and (B) who provides services to victims through a domestic violence program either on an employed or volunteer basis.
(3) “Confidential communication” means any communication between an alleged victim of domestic violence and a domestic violence advocate or counselor in the course of providing information, counseling, or advocacy. The term includes all records kept by the advocate or counselor or by the domestic violence program in the course of providing services to an alleged victim concerning the alleged victim and the services provided. The confidential nature of the communication is not waived by the presence at the time of the communication of any additional persons, including but not limited to an interpreter, to further express the interests of the domestic violence victim or by the advocate’s or counselor’s disclosure to such an additional person with the consent of the victim when reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the advocate or counselor is consulted.
(4) “Domestic violence victim” means any person who consults a domestic violence counselor for the purpose of securing advice, counseling or assistance related to one or more alleged incidents of domestic violence.
(5) “Domestic violence” means abuse as defined in this Act.
(b) No domestic violence advocate or counselor shall disclose any confidential communication or be examined as a witness in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding without the written consent of the domestic violence victim except (1) in accordance with the provisions of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act or (2) in cases where failure to disclose is likely to result in an imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death of the victim or another person.
(c) A domestic violence advocate or counselor who knowingly discloses any confidential communication in violation of this Act commits a Class A misdemeanor.
(d) When a domestic violence victim is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the guardian of the domestic violence victim or the executor or administrator of the estate of the domestic violence victim may waive the privilege established by this Section, except where the guardian, executor or administrator of the estate has been charged with a violent crime against the domestic violence victim or has had an Order of Protection entered against him or her at the request of or on behalf of the domestic violence victim or otherwise has an interest adverse to that of the domestic violence victim with respect to the waiver of the privilege. In that case, the court shall appoint an attorney for the estate of the domestic violence victim.
(e) A minor may knowingly waive the privilege established by this Section. Where a minor is, in the opinion of the court, incapable of knowingly waiving the privilege, the parent or guardian of the minor may waive the privilege on behalf of the minor, except where such parent or guardian has been charged with a violent crime against the minor or has had an Order of Protection entered against him or her on request of or on behalf of the minor or otherwise has any interest adverse to that of the minor with respect to the waiver of the privilege. In that case, the court shall appoint an attorney for the minor child who shall be compensated in accordance with Section 506 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.
(f) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit in any way any privilege that might otherwise exist under statute or common law.
(g) The assertion of any privilege under this Section shall not result in an inference unfavorable to the State’s cause or to the cause of the domestic violence victim.

60/227.1. Other privileged information

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Except as otherwise provided in this Section, no court or administrative or legislative body shall compel any person or domestic violence program to disclose the location of any domestic violence program or the identity of any domestic violence advocate or counselor in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any administrative or legislative proceeding. A court may compel disclosure of the location of a domestic violence program or the identity of a domestic violence advocate or counselor if the court finds, following a hearing, that there is clear and convincing evidence that failure to disclose would be likely to result in an imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death to a domestic violence victim or another person. If the court makes such a finding, then disclosure shall take place in camera, under a restrictive protective order that does not frustrate the purposes of compelling the disclosure, and the information disclosed shall not be made a part of the written record of the case.

Article III. Law Enforcement Responsibilities

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

60/301. Arrest without warrant

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Any law enforcement officer may make an arrest without warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed or is committing any crime, including but not limited to violation of an order of protection, under Section 12-3.4 or 12-30 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012,1 even if the crime was not committed in the presence of the officer.
(b) The law enforcement officer may verify the existence of an order of protection by telephone or radio communication with his or her law enforcement agency or by referring to the copy of the order provided by the petitioner or respondent.
(c) Any law enforcement officer may make an arrest without warrant if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe a defendant at liberty under the provisions of subdivision (d)(1) or (d)(2) of Section 110-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 19632 has violated a condition of his or her bail bond or recognizance.

60/301.1. Law enforcement policies

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Every law enforcement agency shall develop, adopt, and implement written policies regarding arrest procedures for domestic violence incidents consistent with the provisions of this Act. In developing these policies, each law enforcement agency shall consult with community organizations and other law enforcement agencies with expertise in recognizing and handling domestic violence incidents.

(b) In the initial training of new recruits and every 5 years in the continuing education of law enforcement officers, every law enforcement agency shall provide training to aid in understanding the actions of domestic violence victims and abusers and to prevent further victimization of those who have been abused, focusing specifically on looking beyond the physical evidence to the psychology of domestic violence situations, such as the dynamics of the aggressor-victim relationship, separately evaluating claims where both parties claim to be the victim, and long-term effects.

The Law Enforcement Training Standards Board shall formulate and administer the training under this subsection (b) as part of the current programs for both new recruits and active law enforcement officers. The Board shall formulate the training by July 1, 2017, and implement the training statewide by July 1, 2018. In formulating the training, the Board shall work with community organizations with expertise in domestic violence to determine which topics to include. The Law Enforcement Training Standards Board shall oversee the implementation and continual administration of the training.

60/302. Data maintenance by law enforcement agencies

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) All sheriffs shall furnish to the Department of State Police, on the same day as received, in the form and detail the Department requires, copies of any recorded emergency, interim, or plenary orders of protection issued by the court, and any foreign orders of protection filed by the clerk of the court, and transmitted to the sheriff by the clerk of the court pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 222 of this Act. Each order of protection shall be entered in the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System on the same day it is issued by the court. If an emergency order of protection was issued in accordance with subsection (c) of Section 217, the order shall be entered in the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System as soon as possible after receipt from the clerk.

(b) The Department of State Police shall maintain a complete and systematic record and index of all valid and recorded orders of protection issued pursuant to this Act. The data shall be used to inform all dispatchers and law enforcement officers at the scene of an alleged incident of abuse, neglect, or exploitation or violation of an order of protection of any recorded prior incident of abuse, neglect, or exploitation involving the abused, neglected, or exploited party and the effective dates and terms of any recorded order of protection.

(c) The data, records and transmittals required under this Section shall pertain to any valid emergency, interim or plenary order of protection, whether issued in a civil or criminal proceeding or authorized under the laws of another state, tribe, or United States territory.

60/303. Reports by law enforcement officers

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Every law enforcement officer investigating an alleged incident of abuse, neglect, or exploitation between family or household members shall make a written police report of any bona fide allegation and the disposition of such investigation. The police report shall include the victim’s statements as to the frequency and severity of prior incidents of abuse, neglect, or exploitation by the same family or household member and the number of prior calls for police assistance to prevent such further abuse, neglect, or exploitation.
(b) Every police report completed pursuant to this Section shall be recorded and compiled as a domestic crime within the meaning of Section
5.1 of the Criminal Identification Act.

60/304. Assistance by law enforcement officers

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Whenever a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a person has been abused, neglected, or exploited by a family or household member, the officer shall immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, neglect, or exploitation, including:
(1) Arresting the abusing, neglecting and exploiting party, where appropriate;
(2) If there is probable cause to believe that particular weapons were used to commit the incident of abuse, subject to constitutional limitations, seizing and taking inventory of the weapons;
(3) Accompanying the victim of abuse, neglect, or exploitation to his or her place of residence for a reasonable period of time to remove necessary personal belongings and possessions;
(4) Offering the victim of abuse, neglect, or exploitation immediate and adequate information (written in a language appropriate for the victim or in Braille or communicated in appropriate sign language), which shall include a summary of the procedures and relief available to victims of abuse under subsection (c) of Section 217 and the officer’s name and badge number;
(5) Providing the victim with one referral to an accessible service agency;
(6) Advising the victim of abuse about seeking medical attention and preserving evidence (specifically including photographs of injury or damage and damaged clothing or other property); and
(7) Providing or arranging accessible transportation for the victim of abuse (and, at the victim’s request, any minors or dependents in the victim’s care) to a medical facility for treatment of injuries or to a nearby place of shelter or safety; or, after the close of court business hours, providing or arranging for transportation for the victim (and, at the victim’s request, any minors or dependents in the victim’s care) to the nearest available circuit judge or associate judge so the victim may file a petition for an emergency order of protection under subsection (c) of Section 217. When a victim of abuse chooses to leave the scene of the offense, it shall be presumed that it is in the best interests of any minors or dependents in the victim’s care to remain with the victim or a person designated by the victim, rather than to remain with the abusing party.
(b) Whenever a law enforcement officer does not exercise arrest powers or otherwise initiate criminal proceedings, the officer shall:
(1) Make a police report of the investigation of any bona fide allegation of an incident of abuse, neglect, or exploitation and the disposition of the investigation, in accordance with subsection (a) of Section 303;
(2) Inform the victim of abuse neglect, or exploitation of the victim’s right to request that a criminal proceeding be initiated where appropriate, including specific times and places for meeting with the State’s Attorney’s office, a warrant officer, or other official in accordance with local procedure; and
(3) Advise the victim of the importance of seeking medical attention and preserving evidence (specifically including photographs of injury or damage and damaged clothing or other property).
(c) Except as provided by Section 24-6 of the Criminal Code of 20121 or under a court order, any weapon seized under subsection (a)(2) shall be returned forthwith to the person from whom it was seized when it is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes.

60/305. Limited law enforcement liability

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Any act of omission or commission by any law enforcement officer acting in good faith in rendering emergency assistance or otherwise enforcing this Act shall not impose civil liability upon the law enforcement officer or his or her supervisor or employer, unless the act is a result of willful or wanton misconduct.

Article IV. Health Care Providers

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

60/401. Providing information on services; liability

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Any person who is licensed, certified or otherwise authorized by the law of this State to administer health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a profession shall offer to a person suspected to be a victim of abuse immediate and adequate information regarding services available to victims of abuse.

Any person who is licensed, certified or otherwise authorized by the law of this State to administer health care in the ordinary course of business, or practice of a profession and who in good faith offers to a person suspected to be a victim of abuse information regarding services available to victims of abuse shall not be civilly liable for any act or omission of the agency providing those services to the victims of abuse or for the inadequacy of those services provided by the agency.

Act 61. Address Confidentiality for Victims of Domestic Violence Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

1Note: We understand that as of October 1, 2002, this act was NOT being implemented. Check with the IL Attorney General’s Office to find out if it is being implemented at this time.

61/1. Short title.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

This Act may be cited as the Address Confidentiality for Victims of Domestic Violence Act.

61/5. Legislative findings.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

The General Assembly finds that persons attempting to escape from actual or threatened domestic violence frequently establish new addresses in order to prevent their assailants or probable assailants from finding them. The purpose of this Act is to enable State and local agencies to respond to requests for public records without disclosing the location of a victim of domestic violence, to enable interagency cooperation with the Attorney General in providing address confidentiality for victims of domestic violence, and to enable State and local agencies to accept a program participant’s use of an address designated by the Attorney General as a substitute mailing address.

61/10. Definitions.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
“Address” means a residential street address, school address, or work address of an individual, as specified on the individual’s application to be a program participant under this Act.
“Program participant” means a person certified as a program participant under this Act.
“Domestic violence” has the same meaning as in the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 and includes a threat of domestic violence against an individual in a domestic situation, regardless of whether the domestic violence or threat has been reported to law enforcement officers.

61/11. Address confidentiality program; administration.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Subject to appropriations for the purposes of this Act, the Attorney General shall administer an address confidentiality program for victims of domestic violence.

61/15. Address confidentiality program; application; certification.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) An adult person, a parent or guardian acting on behalf of a minor, or a guardian acting on behalf of a person with a disability, as defined in Article 11a of the Probate Act of 1975,1 may apply to the Attorney General to have an address designated by the Attorney General serve as the person’s address or the address of the minor or person with a disability. The Attorney General shall approve an application if it is filed in the manner and on the form prescribed by him or her and if it contains:
(1) a sworn statement by the applicant that the applicant has good reason to believe (i) that the applicant, or the minor or person with a disability on whose behalf the application is made, is a victim of domestic violence; and (ii) that the applicant fears for his or her safety or his or her children’s safety, or the safety of the minor or person with a disability on whose behalf the application is made;
(2) a designation of the Attorney General as agent for purposes of service of process and receipt of mail;
(3) the mailing address where the applicant can be contacted by the Attorney General, and the phone number or numbers where the applicant can be called by the Attorney General;
(4) the new address or addresses that the applicant requests not be disclosed for the reason that disclosure will increase the risk of domestic violence; and
(5) the signature of the applicant and of any individual or representative of any office designated in writing under Section 40 of this Act who assisted in the preparation of the application, and the date on which the applicant signed the application.
(b) Applications shall be filed with the office of the Attorney General.
(c) Upon filing a properly completed application, the Attorney General shall certify the applicant as a program participant. Applicants shall be certified for 4 years following the date of filing unless the certification is withdrawn or invalidated before that date. The Attorney General shall by rule establish a renewal procedure.
(d) A person who falsely attests in an application that disclosure of the applicant’s address would endanger the applicant’s safety or the safety of the applicant’s children or the minor or incapacitated person on whose behalf the application is made, or who knowingly provides false or incorrect information upon making an application, is guilty of a Class 3 felony.

61/20. Certification cancellation.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) If the program participant obtains a name change, he or she loses certification as a program participant.
(b) The Attorney General may cancel a program participant’s certification if there is a change in the residential address from the one listed on the application, unless the program participant provides the Attorney General within 7 days notice before the change of address.
(c) The Attorney General may cancel certification of a program participant if mail forwarded by the Attorney General to the program participant’s address is returned as nondeliverable.
(d) The Attorney General shall cancel certification of a program participant who applies using false information.

61/25. Agency use of designated address.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A program participant may request that State and local agencies use the address designated by the Attorney General as his or her address. When creating a new public record, State and local agencies shall accept the address designated by the Attorney General as a program participant’s substitute address, unless the Attorney General has determined that:
(1) the agency has a bona fide statutory or administrative requirement for the use of the address that would otherwise be confidential under this Act; and
(2) this address will be used only for those statutory and administrative purposes.
(b) A program participant may use the address designated by the Attorney General as his or her work address.
(c) The office of the Attorney General shall forward all first class mail to the appropriate program participants.

61/30. Voting by program participant; use of designated address by election authority.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A program participant who is otherwise qualified to vote may apply to vote under Article 20 of the Election Code. The program participant shall automatically receive absentee ballots for all elections in the jurisdictions for which that individual resides in the same manner as absentee voters who qualify under Article 20 of the Election Code. The Attorney General shall adopt rules to ensure the integrity of the voting process and the confidentiality of the program participant. The election authority shall transmit the absentee ballot to the program participant at the address designated by the participant in his or her application. Neither the name nor the address of a program participant shall be included in any list of registered voters available to the public.
(b) The election authority may not make the participant’s address contained in voter registration records available for public inspection or copying except under the following circumstances:
(1) if requested by a law enforcement agency, to the law enforcement agency; and
(2) if directed by a court order, to a person identified in the order.

61/35. Disclosure of address prohibited; exceptions.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

The Attorney General may not make a program participant’s address, other than the address designated by the Attorney General, available for inspection or copying, except under the following circumstances:
(a) if requested by a law enforcement agency, to the law enforcement agency;
(b) if directed by a court order, to a person identified in the order; and
(c) if certification has been canceled.

61/40. Assistance for program applicants.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

The Attorney General shall designate State and local agencies and nonprofit agencies that provide counseling and shelter services to victims of domestic violence to assist persons applying to be program participants. Any assistance and counseling rendered by the office of the Attorney General or its designees to applicants shall in no way be construed as legal advice.

61/45. Rules.

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

The Attorney General may adopt rules to facilitate the administration of this Act by State and local agencies.

Chapter 765. Property

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 750. Safe Homes Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

750/10. Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Sec. 10. Definitions. For purposes of this Act:
“Domestic violence” means “abuse” as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 by a “family or household member” as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
“Landlord” means the owner of a building or the owner’s agent with regard to matters concerning landlord’s leasing of a dwelling.
“Sexual violence” means any act of sexual assault, sexual abuse, or stalking of an adult or minor child, including but not limited to non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration as defined in the Civil No Contact Order Act and the offenses of stalking, aggravated stalking, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse as those offenses are described in the Criminal Code of 2012.
“Tenant” means a person who has entered into an oral or written lease with a landlord whereby the person is the lessee under the lease.

750/15. Affirmative defense

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) In any action brought by a landlord against a tenant to recover rent for breach of lease, a tenant shall have an affirmative defense and not be liable for rent for the period after which a tenant vacates the premises owned by the landlord, if by preponderance of the evidence, the court finds that:

(1) at the time that the tenant vacated the premises, the tenant or a member of tenant’s household was under a credible imminent threat of domestic or sexual violence at the premises; and

(2) the tenant gave written notice to the landlord prior to or within 3 days of vacating the premises that the reason for vacating the premises was because of a credible imminent threat of domestic or sexual violence against the tenant or a member of the tenant’s household.

(b) In any action brought by a landlord against a tenant to recover rent for breach of lease, a tenant shall have an affirmative defense and not be liable for rent for the period after which the tenant vacates the premises owned by the landlord, if by preponderance of the evidence, the court finds that:

(1) a tenant or a member of tenant’s household was a victim of sexual violence on the premises that is owned or controlled by a landlord and the tenant has vacated the premises as a result of the sexual violence; and

(2) the tenant gave written notice to the landlord prior to or within 3 days of vacating the premises that the reason for vacating the premises was because of the sexual violence against the tenant or member of the tenant’s household, the date of the sexual violence, and that the tenant provided at least one form of the following types of evidence to the landlord supporting the claim of the sexual violence: medical, court or police evidence of sexual violence; or statement from an employee of a victim services or rape crisis organization from which the tenant or a member of the tenant’s household sought services; and

(3) the sexual violence occurred not more than 60 days prior to the date of giving the written notice to the landlord, or if the circumstances are such that the tenant cannot reasonably give notice because of reasons related to the sexual violence, such as hospitalization or seeking assistance for shelter or counseling, then as soon thereafter as practicable. Nothing in this subsection (b) shall be construed to be a defense against an eviction action for failure to pay rent before the tenant provided notice and vacated the premises.(c) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to be a defense against an action for rent for a period of time before the tenant vacated the landlord’s premises and gave notice to the landlord as required in subsection (b).

750/20. Change of locks

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a)(1) Written leases. Upon written notice from all tenants who have signed as lessees under a written lease, the tenants may request that a landlord change the locks of the dwelling unit in which they live if one or more of the tenants reasonably believes that one of the tenants or a member of tenant’s household is under a credible imminent threat of domestic or sexual violence at the premises. If the threat of violence is from a person who is not a lessee under the written lease, notice to the landlord requesting a change of locks shall be accompanied by at least one form of the following types of evidence to support a claim of domestic or sexual violence: medical, court or police evidence of domestic or sexual violence; or a statement from an employee of a victim services, domestic violence, or rape crisis organization from which the tenant or a member of the tenant’s household sought services. If the threat of violence is from a person who is a lessee under a written lease, notice to the landlord requesting a change of locks shall be accompanied by a plenary order of protection pursuant to Section 219 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or Section 112A-19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or a plenary civil no contact order pursuant to Section 215 of the Civil No Contact Order Act, granting the tenant exclusive possession of the premises. The tenant requesting a change of locks shall not be required to obtain written notice from the person posing a threat who is a lessee under the written lease, provided that the notice is accompanied by a plenary order of protection or a plenary civil no contact order granting the tenant exclusive possession of the premises.

(2) Oral leases. Upon written notice from all tenants who are lessees under an oral lease, the tenants may request that a landlord change the locks of the dwelling unit in which they live if one or more of the tenants reasonably believes that one of the tenants or a member of tenant’s household is under a credible imminent threat of domestic or sexual violence at the premises. Notice to the landlord requesting a change of locks shall be accompanied by a plenary order of protection pursuant to Section 219 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or Section 112A-19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or a plenary civil no contact order pursuant to Section 215 of the Civil No Contact Order Act, granting the tenant exclusive possession of the premises. The tenant requesting a change of locks shall not be required to obtain written notice from the person posing a threat who is a lessee under the oral lease, provided that the notice is accompanied by a plenary order of protection or a plenary civil no contact order granting the tenant exclusive possession of the premises.

(b) Once a landlord has received notice of a request for change of locks and has received one form of evidence referred to in Section (a) above, the landlord shall, within 48 hours, change the locks or give the tenant the permission to change the locks. If the landlord changes the locks, the landlord shall make a good faith effort to give a key to the new locks to the tenant as soon as possible or not more than 48 hours of the locks being changed.

(1) The landlord may charge a fee for the expense of changing the locks. That fee must not exceed the reasonable price customarily charged for changing a lock.

(2) If a landlord fails to change the locks within 48 hours after being provided with the notice and evidence referred to in (a) above, the tenant may change the locks without the landlord’s permission. If the tenant changes the locks, the tenant shall make a good faith effort to give a key to the new locks to the landlord within 48 hours of the locks being changed. In the case where a tenant changes the locks without the landlord’s permission, the tenant shall do so in a workmanlike manner with locks of similar or better quality than the original lock.

(c) The landlord who changes locks or allows the change of locks under this Act shall not be liable to any third party for damages resulting from a person being unable to access the dwelling.

750/25. Penalty for violation of lock-change provisions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) If a landlord takes action to prevent the tenant who has complied with Section 20 of this Act from changing his or her locks, the tenant may seek a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction ordering the landlord to refrain from preventing the tenant from changing the locks. A tenant who successfully brings an action pursuant to this Section may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

(b) A tenant who changes locks and does not make a good faith effort to provide a copy of a key to the landlord within 48 hours of the tenant changing the locks, shall be liable for any damages to the dwelling or the building in which the dwelling is located that could have been prevented had landlord been able to access the dwelling unit in the event of an emergency.

(b-1) A landlord who changes the locks and does not make a good faith effort to provide a copy of a key to the tenant within 48 hours of the landlord changing the locks shall be liable for any damages to the tenant incurred as a result of not having access to his or her unit.

(c) The remedies provided to landlord and tenant under this Section 25 shall be sole and exclusive for violations of the lock-change provisions of this Act.

750/27. Nondisclosure, confidentiality, and privilege

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) A landlord may not disclose to a prospective landlord (1) that a tenant or a member of tenant’s household exercised his or her rights under the Act, or (2) any information provided by the tenant or a member of tenant’s household in exercising those rights.

(b) The prohibition on disclosure under subsection (a) shall not apply in civil proceedings brought under this Act, or if such disclosure is required by law.

(c) A tenant or a member of tenant’s household, who is the victim of domestic or sexual violence or is the parent or legal guardian of the victim of domestic or sexual violence, may waive the prohibition on disclosure under subsection (a) by consenting to the disclosure in writing.

(d) Furnishing evidence to support a claim of domestic or sexual violence against a tenant or a member of tenant’s household pursuant to Section 15 or 20 shall not waive any confidentiality or privilege that may exist between the victim of domestic or sexual violence and a third party.

750/29. Nondisclosure violation penalty

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

A landlord who, in violation of Section 27, discloses that a tenant has exercised his or her rights under the Act, or discloses any information provided by the tenant in exercising those rights, shall be liable for actual damages up to $2,000 resulting from the disclosure. A tenant who successfully brings an action pursuant to this Section may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

750/30. Prohibition of waiver or modification

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

The provisions of this Act may not be waived or modified in any lease or separate agreement.

750/35. Public housing excluded

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

This Act does not apply to public housing, assisted under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq., and its implementing regulations, with the exception of the tenant-based Housing Choice Voucher program. Public housing includes dwelling units in mixed-finance projects that are assisted through a public housing authority’s capital, operating, or other funds.

Chapter 820. Employment

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Wages and Hours

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

Act 180. Victims' Economic Security and Safety Act

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

180/10. Definitions

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(1) “Commerce” includes trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication; and “industry or activity affecting commerce” means any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce, and includes “commerce” and any “industry affecting commerce”.

(2) “Course of conduct” means a course of repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person or conveying oral or written threats, including threats conveyed through electronic communications, or threats implied by conduct.

(3) “Department” means the Department of Labor.

(4) “Director” means the Director of Labor.

(5) “Domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence ” means domestic violence, sexual assault, gender violence, or stalking.

(6) “Domestic violence” means abuse, as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, by a family or household member, as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.

(7) “Electronic communications” includes communications via telephone, mobile phone, computer, e-mail, video recorder, fax machine, telex, pager, online platform (including, but not limited to, any public-facing website, web application, digital application, or social network), or any other electronic communication, as defined in Section 12-7.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(8) “Employ” includes to suffer or permit to work.

(9) Employee.

(A) In general. “Employee” means any person employed by an employer.

(B) Basis. “Employee” includes a person employed as described in subparagraph (A) on a full or part-time basis, or as a participant in a work assignment as a condition of receipt of federal or State income-based public assistance.

(10) “Employer” means any of the following: (A) the State or any agency of the State; (B) any unit of local government or school district; or (C) any person that employs at least one employee.

(11) “Employment benefits” means all benefits provided or made available to employees by an employer, including group life insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, sick leave, annual leave, educational benefits, pensions, and profit-sharing, regardless of whether such benefits are provided by a practice or written policy of an employer or through an “employee benefit plan”. “Employee benefit plan” or “plan” means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.

(12) “Family or household member”, for employees with a family or household member who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence, means a spouse, parent, son, daughter, other person related by blood or by present or prior marriage, other person who shares a relationship through a son or daughter, and persons jointly residing in the same household.

(12.5) “Gender violence” means:

(A) one or more acts of violence or aggression satisfying the elements of any criminal offense under the laws of this State that are committed, at least in part, on the basis of a person’s actual or perceived sex or gender, regardless of whether the acts resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction;

(B) a physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions satisfying the elements of any criminal offense under the laws of this State, regardless of whether the intrusion or invasion resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction; or

(C) a threat of an act described in item (A) or (B) causing a realistic apprehension that the originator of the threat will commit the act.

(13) “Parent” means the biological parent of an employee or an individual who stood in loco parentis to an employee when the employee was a son or daughter. “Son or daughter” means a biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is under 18 years of age, or is 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.

(14) “Perpetrator” means an individual who commits or is alleged to have committed any act or threat of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence.

(15) “Person” means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons.

(16) “Public agency” means the Government of the State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the State, or of a political subdivision of the State; or any governmental agency.

(17) “Public assistance” includes cash, food stamps, medical assistance, housing assistance, and other benefits provided on the basis of income by a public agency or public employer.

(18) “Reduced work schedule” means a work schedule that reduces the usual number of hours per workweek, or hours per workday, of an employee.

(19) “Repeatedly” means on 2 or more occasions.

(20) “Sexual assault” means any conduct proscribed by: (i) Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 20121 except Sections 11-35 and 11-45; (ii) Sections 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, and 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or (iii) a similar provision of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(21) “Stalking” means any conduct proscribed by the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 in Sections 12-7.3, 12-7.4, and 12-7.5.

(22) “Victim” or “survivor” means an individual who has been subjected to domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence.

(23) “Victim services organization” means a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that provides assistance to victims of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence or to advocates for such victims, including a rape crisis center, an organization carrying out a domestic violence program, an organization operating a shelter or providing counseling services, or a legal services organization or other organization providing assistance through the legal process.

180/15. Purposes

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

The purposes of this Act are:

(1) to promote the State’s interest in reducing domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, gender violence, and stalking by enabling victims of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence to maintain the financial independence necessary to leave abusive situations, achieve safety, and minimize the physical and emotional injuries from domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence, and to reduce the devastating economic consequences of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence to employers and employees;

(2) to address the failure of existing laws to protect the employment rights of employees who are victims of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence and employees with a family or household member who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence, by protecting the civil and economic rights of those employees, and by furthering the equal opportunity of women for economic self-sufficiency and employment free from discrimination;

(3) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1) and (2) by (A) entitling employed victims of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence and employees with a family or household member who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence to take unpaid leave to seek medical help, legal assistance, counseling, safety planning, and other assistance without penalty from their employers for the employee or the family or household member who is a victim; and (B) prohibiting employers from discriminating against any employee who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence or any employee who has a family or household member who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence, in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers and protects the safety of all persons in the workplace.

180/20. Entitlement to leave due to domestic or sexual violence

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

(a) Leave requirement.

(1) Basis. An employee who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence or an employee who has a family or household member who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence whose interests are not adverse to the employee as it relates to the domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence may take unpaid leave from work if the employee or employee’s family or household member is experiencing an incident of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence or to address domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence by:

(A) seeking medical attention for, or recovering from, physical or psychological injuries caused by domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence to the employee or the employee’s family or household member;

(B) obtaining services from a victim services organization for the employee or the employee’s family or household member;

(C) obtaining psychological or other counseling for the employee or the employee’s family or household member;

(D) participating in safety planning, temporarily or permanently relocating, or taking other actions to increase the safety of the employee or the employee’s family or household member from future domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence or ensure economic security; or

(E) seeking legal assistance or remedies to ensure the health and safety of the employee or the employee’s family or household member, including preparing for or participating in any civil or criminal legal proceeding related to or derived from domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence.

(2) Period. Subject to subsection (c), an employee working for an employer that employs at least 50 employees shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period. Subject to subsection (c), an employee working for an employer that employs at least 15 but not more than 49 employees shall be entitled to a total of 8 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period. Subject to subsection (c), an employee working for an employer that employs at least one but not more than 14 employees shall be entitled to a total of 4 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period. The total number of workweeks to which an employee is entitled shall not decrease during the relevant 12-month period. This Act does not create a right for an employee to take unpaid leave that exceeds the unpaid leave time allowed under, or is in addition to the unpaid leave time permitted by, the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.).

(3) Schedule. Leave described in paragraph (1) may be taken intermittently or on a reduced work schedule.

(b) Notice. The employee shall provide the employer with at least 48 hours’ advance notice of the employee’s intention to take the leave, unless providing such notice is not practicable. When an unscheduled absence occurs, the employer may not take any action against the employee if the employee, upon request of the employer and within a reasonable period after the absence, provides certification under subsection (c).

(c) Certification.

(1) In general. The employer may require the employee to provide certification to the employer that:

(A) the employee or the employee’s family or household member is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence; and

(B) the leave is for one of the purposes enumerated in paragraph (a)(1).

The employee shall provide such certification to the employer within a reasonable period after the employer requests certification.

(2) Contents. An employee may satisfy the certification requirement of paragraph (1) by providing to the employer a sworn statement of the employee, and upon obtaining such documents the employee shall provide:

(A) documentation from an employee, agent, or volunteer of a victim services organization, an attorney, a member of the clergy, or a medical or other professional from whom the employee or the employee’s family or household member has sought assistance in addressing domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence and the effects of the violence;

(B) a police or court record; or

(C) other corroborating evidence.

(d) Confidentiality. All information provided to the employer pursuant to subsection (b) or (c), including a statement of the employee or any other documentation, record, or corroborating evidence, and the fact that the employee has requested or obtained leave pursuant to this Section, shall be retained in the strictest confidence by the employer, except to the extent that disclosure is:

(1) requested or consented to in writing by the employee; or

(2) otherwise required by applicable federal or State law.

(e) Employment and benefits.

(1) Restoration to position.

(A) In general. Any employee who takes leave under this Section for the intended purpose of the leave shall be entitled, on return from such leave:

(i) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or

(ii) to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.

(B) Loss of benefits. The taking of leave under this Section shall not result in the loss of any employment benefit accrued prior to the date on which the leave commenced.

(C) Limitations. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to entitle any restored employee to:

(i) the accrual of any seniority or employment benefits during any period of leave; or

(ii) any right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.

(D) Construction. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit an employer from requiring an employee on leave under this Section to report periodically to the employer on the status and intention of the employee to return to work.

(2) Maintenance of health benefits.

(A) Coverage. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), during any period that an employee takes leave under this Section, the employer shall maintain coverage for the employee and any family or household member under any group health plan for the duration of such leave at the level and under the conditions coverage would have been provided if the employee had continued in employment continuously for the duration of such leave.

(B) Failure to return from leave. The employer may recover the premium that the employer paid for maintaining coverage for the employee and the employee’s family or household member under such group health plan during any period of leave under this Section if:

(i) the employee fails to return from leave under this Section after the period of leave to which the employee is entitled has expired; and

(ii) the employee fails to return to work for a reason other than:

(I) the continuation, recurrence, or onset of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence that entitles the employee to leave pursuant to this Section; or

(II) other circumstances beyond the control of the employee.

(C) Certification.

(i) Issuance. An employer may require an employee who claims that the employee is unable to return to work because of a reason described in subclause (I) or (II) of subparagraph (B)(ii) to provide, within a reasonable period after making the claim, certification to the employer that the employee is unable to return to work because of that reason.

(ii) Contents. An employee may satisfy the certification requirement of clause (i) by providing to the employer:

(I) a sworn statement of the employee;

(II) documentation from an employee, agent, or volunteer of a victim services organization, an attorney, a member of the clergy, or a medical or other professional from whom the employee has sought assistance in addressing domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence and the effects of that violence;

(III) a police or court record; or

(IV) other corroborating evidence.

(D) Confidentiality. All information provided to the employer pursuant to subparagraph (C), including a statement of the employee or any other documentation, record, or corroborating evidence, and the fact that the employee is not returning to work because of a reason described in subclause (I) or (II) of subparagraph (B)(ii) shall be retained in the strictest confidence by the employer, except to the extent that disclosure is:

(i) requested or consented to in writing by the employee; or

(ii) otherwise required by applicable federal or State law.

(f) Prohibited acts.

(1) Interference with rights.

(A) Exercise of rights. It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right provided under this Section.

(B) Employer discrimination. It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or harass any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual (including retaliation in any form or manner) because the individual:

(i) exercised any right provided under this Section; or

(ii) opposed any practice made unlawful by this Section.

(C) Public agency sanctions. It shall be unlawful for any public agency to deny, reduce, or terminate the benefits of, otherwise sanction, or harass any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the amount, terms, or conditions of public assistance of the individual (including retaliation in any form or manner) because the individual:

(i) exercised any right provided under this Section; or

(ii) opposed any practice made unlawful by this Section.

(2) Interference with proceedings or inquiries. It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner discriminate (as described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of paragraph (1)) against any individual because such individual:

(A) has filed any charge, or has instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding, under or related to this Section;

(B) has given, or is about to give, any information in connection with any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under this Section; or

(C) has testified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under this Section.

180/25. Existing leave usable for addressing domestic or sexual violence

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 25. Existing leave usable for addressing domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence. An employee who is entitled to take paid or unpaid leave (including family, medical, sick, annual, personal, or similar leave) from employment, pursuant to federal, State, or local law, a collective bargaining agreement, or an employment benefits program or plan, may elect to substitute any period of such leave for an equivalent period of leave provided under Section 20. The employer may not require the employee to substitute available paid or unpaid leave for leave provided under Section 20.

180/30. Victims' employment sustainability; prohibited discriminatory acts

Updated: 
June 26, 2020

§ 30. Victims’ employment sustainability; prohibited discriminatory acts.

(a) An employer shall not fail to hire, refuse to hire, discharge, constructively discharge, or harass any individual, otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, or retaliate against an individual in any form or manner, and a public agency shall not deny, reduce, or terminate the benefits of, otherwise sanction, or harass any individual, otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the amount, terms, or conditions of public assistance of the individual, or retaliate against an individual in any form or manner, because:

(1) the individual involved:

(A) is or is perceived to be a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence;

(B) attended, participated in, prepared for, or requested leave to attend, participate in, or prepare for a criminal or civil court proceeding relating to an incident of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence of which the individual or a family or household member of the individual was a victim, or requested or took leave for any other reason provided under Section 20;

(C) requested an adjustment to a job structure, workplace facility, or work requirement, including a transfer, reassignment, or modified schedule, leave, a changed telephone number or seating assignment, installation of a lock, or implementation of a safety procedure in response to actual or threatened domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence, regardless of whether the request was granted; or

(D) is an employee whose employer is subject to Section 21 of the Workplace Violence Prevention Act;1 or

(2) the workplace is disrupted or threatened by the action of a person whom the individual states has committed or threatened to commit domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence against the individual or the individual’s family or household member.

(b) In this Section:

(1) “Discriminate”, used with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or with respect to the terms or conditions of public assistance, includes not making a reasonable accommodation to the known limitations resulting from circumstances relating to being a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence or a family or household member being a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence of an otherwise qualified individual:

(A) who is:

(i) an applicant or employee of the employer (including a public agency); or

(ii) an applicant for or recipient of public assistance from a public agency; and

(B) who is:

(i) a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence; or

(ii) with a family or household member who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence whose interests are not adverse to the individual in subparagraph (A) as it relates to the domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence;

unless the employer or public agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer or public agency.

A reasonable accommodation must be made in a timely fashion. Any exigent circumstances or danger facing the employee or his or her family or household member shall be considered in determining whether the accommodation is reasonable.

(2) “Qualified individual” means:

(A) in the case of an applicant or employee described in paragraph (1)(A)(i), an individual who, but for being a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence or with a family or household member who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires; or

(B) in the case of an applicant or recipient described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii), an individual who, but for being a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence or with a family or household member who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence, can satisfy the essential requirements of the program providing the public assistance that the individual receives or desires.

(3) “Reasonable accommodation” may include an adjustment to a job structure, workplace facility, or work requirement, including a transfer, reassignment, or modified schedule, leave, a changed telephone number or seating assignment, installation of a lock, or implementation of a safety procedure, or assistance in documenting domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence that occurs at the workplace or in work-related settings, in response to actual or threatened domestic violence, sexual violence, or gender violence.

(4) Undue hardship.

(A) In general. “Undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).

(B) Factors to be considered. In determining whether a reasonable accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of an employer or public agency, factors to be considered include:

(i) the nature and cost of the reasonable accommodation needed under this Section;

(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation, the number of persons employed at such facility, the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation on the operation of the facility;

(iii) the overall financial resources of the employer or public agency, the overall size of the business of an employer or public agency with respect to the number of employees of the employer or public agency, and the number, type, and location of the facilities of an employer or public agency; and

(iv) the type of operation of the employer or public agency, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the employer or public agency, the geographic separateness of the facility from the employer or public agency, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility to the employer or public agency.

(c) An employer subject to Section 21 of the Workplace Violence Prevention Act shall not violate any provisions of the Workplace Violence Prevention Act.